Book of Quotations on Rhetoric

Nearly 2,000 years ago, in the *Institutio oratoria*, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian undertook to catalogue what he believed were the more significant definitions of rhetoric. Some 3,000 words later, he concluded, "there has grown up a perverse desire in writers of textbooks [on rhetoric] never to formulate anything in words which some predecessor has used. I shall have no such pretensions." Indeed, Quintilian borrowed his definition—the science of speaking well—from Marcus Cato.

Although Quintilian opted out of this "perverse desire," it has continued unabatedly. If anything, the practice of defining and redefining the term rhetoric has intensified in recent years. In 1828, when Richard Whately sought to repeat Quintilian's undertaking, he explained, in words that could be echoed today, "To enter into an examination of all the definitions [of rhetoric] that have been given, would lead to much uninteresting and uninstructive verbal controversy."

Undoubtedly, this obsession with definitions, taxonomies, and just words in general—copiousness, Erasmus calls it—has made rhetoric an art that is hard to master. Yet, as Kenneth Burke reminds us, "a definition the critic's equivalent of a lyric, or of an aria in opera." Hence, copiousness is the hallmark of rhetoric. And while it may be one of rhetoric's greatest weaknesses, it is also one of its greatest strengths. For better or worse, rhetoric is an example of what philosopher W. B. Gallie calls an "essentially contested concept."

Sappho (ca. 6th Century BCE)

"Whom has
Persuasion to bring round now

"to your love? Who, Sappho, is
unfair to you? For, let her
run, she will soon run after;

"if she won't accept gifts, she
will one day give them; and if
she won't love you—she soon will

"love, although unwillingly..."

Source: Sappho, "Prayer to My Lady of Paphos," *Sappho: A New Translation*. Trans. Mary Barnard. Berkeley: U of California P, 1958. 38.

Sappho (ca. 6th Century BCE)

Aphrodite's
daughter, you
cheat mortals.

Source: Sappho, "Persuasion," *Sappho: A New Translation*. Trans. Mary Barnard. Berkeley: U of California P, 1958. 65.

Corax (ca. 476 BCE)

[Rhetoric is] the *demiourgos*, or artificer, of persuasion.

Source: Quoted in George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963. 61.

Gorgias (ca. 414 BCE)

Speech is a powerful lord that with the smallest and most invisible body accomplished most godlike works. It can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity. [. . .]

Divine sweetness transmitted through words is inductive of pleasure, reductive of pain. Thus, by entering into the opinion of the soul the force of incantation is wont to beguile and persuade and alter it by witchcraft, and the two arts of witchcraft and magic are errors of the soul and deceivers of opinion.
Source: Gorgias, "Encomium of Helen." *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York. Oxford UP, 1991. 286.

Gorgias (ca. 414 BCE)
The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.
Source: Gorgias, "Encomium of Helen." *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York. Oxford UP, 1991. 287.

***Dissoi logoi* (ca. 403-395 BCE)**
I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same art to be able to converse in brief questions and answers to know the truth of things, to plead one's cause correctly, to be able to speak in public, to have an understanding of argument-skills, and to teach people about nature of everything—both how everything is and how it came into being. First of all, will not the man who knows about the nature of everything also be able to *act* rightly in regard to everything? Furthermore the man acquainted with the skills involved in argument will also know how to speak correctly on every topic. For the man who intends to speak correctly must speak on the topics of which he has knowledge; and he will, one must at any rate suppose, have knowledge of *everything*. For he has knowledge of all argument-skills and all arguments are about everything that is. And the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he speaks about must know < > and <how to> give sound advice to the city on the performance of good actions and prevent them from performing evil ones. In knowing these things he will also know the things that differ from them—since he will know everything. For these <objects of knowledge> are part of *all* <objects of knowledge>, and the exigency of the situation will, if need be, provide him with those <other Objects>, so as to achieve the same end. Even if he does not know how to play the flute, he will always prove able to play the flute should the situation ever call for his doing this. And the man who knows how to plead his cause must have a correct understanding of what is just; for that is what legal cases have to do with. And in knowing this he will know both that which is the contrary of it, and the <other things?> different in kind <from it?>. He must also know all the laws. If, however, he is going to have no knowledge of the facts, he will have no knowledge of the laws either. For who is it knows the rules (laws) of music? The man acquainted with music. Whereas the man unacquainted with music is also unacquainted with the rules that govern it. At any rate, if a man knows the truth of things, the argument follows without difficulty that he knows everything. As for the man who is able to converse in brief questions and answers, he must under questioning give answers on every subject. So he must have knowledge of every subject.
Source: *Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the "Dissoi Logoi."* Ed. and trans. T. M. Robinson. New York: Arno, 1979. 137, 139, 141.

Isocrates (353 BCE)
But since we have the ability to persuade one another and to make dear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts. Speech is responsible for nearly all our inventions. It legislated in matters of justice and injustice and beauty and baseness, and without these laws, we could not live with one another. By it we refute the bad and praise the good; through it, we educate the ignorant and recognize the intelligent. We regard speaking well to be the clearest sign of a good

mind, which it requires, and truthful, lawful, and just speech we consider the image of a good and faithful soul. With speech we fight over contentious matters, and we investigate the unknown. We use the same arguments by which we persuade others in our own deliberations; we call those able to speak in a crowd "rhetorical"; we regard as sound advisers those who debate with themselves most skillfully about public affairs. If one must summarize the power of discourse, we will discover that nothing done prudently occurs without speech, that speech is the leader of all thoughts and actions, and that the most intelligent people use it most of all.
Source: Isocrates, *Antidosis*. *Isocrates I*. Trans. David C. Mirhady and Yun Lee Too. Austin. U of Texas P, 2000. 251-52.

Plato (ca. 4th Century BCE)
SOCRATES: O Menexenus! Death in battle is certainly in many respects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago prepared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what he has done and for what he has not done—that is the beauty of them—and they steal away our souls with their embellished words. In every conceivable form they praise the city, and they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who went before us, and they praise ourselves also who are still alive, until I feel quite elevated by their laudations, and I stand listening to their words, Menexenus, and become enchanted with them, and all in a moment I imagine myself to have become a greater and nobler and finer man than I was before. And if, as often happens, there are any foreigners who accompany me to the speech, I become suddenly conscious of having a sort of triumph over them, and they seem to experience a corresponding feeling of admiration at me, and at the greatness of the city, which appears to them, when they are under the influence of the speaker, more wonderful than ever. This consciousness of dignity lasts me more than three days, and not until the fourth or fifth day do I come to my senses and know where I am—in the meantime I have been living in the Islands of the Blessed. Such is the art of our rhetoricians, and in such manner does the sound of their words keep ringing in my ears.
MENEXENUS: You are always making fun of the rhetoricians, Socrates. This time, however, I am inclined to think that the speaker who is chosen will not have much to say, for he has been called upon to speak at a moment's notice, and he will be compelled almost to improvise.
SOCRATES: But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say? Every rhetorician has speeches ready-made, nor is there any difficulty in improvising that sort of stuff. Had the orator to praise Athenians among Peleponnesians, or Peleponnesians among Athenians, he must be a good rhetorician who could succeed and gain credit. But there is no difficulty in a man's winning applause when he is contending for fame among the persons whom he is praising.
Source: Plato, *Menexenus*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 234c-235d.

Plato (ca. 385 BCE)
SOCRATES: Well then, Gorgias, the activity as a whole, it seems to me, is not an art, but the occupation of a shrewd and enterprising spirit, and of one naturally skilled in its dealings with men, and in sum and substance I call it 'flattery.' Now it seems to me that there are many other parts of this activity, one of which is cookery. This is considered an art, but in my judgment is no art, only a routine and a knack. And rhetoric I call another part of this general activity, and beautification, and sophistic—four parts with four distinct objects.
Source: Plato, *Gorgias*. Trans. W. D. Woodhead. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 463a-463b.

Plato (ca. 385 BCE)
SOCRATES: To the pair, body and soul, there correspond two arts—that concerned with the soul I call the political art; to the single art that relates to the body I cannot give a name offhand. But

this single art that cares for the body comprises two parts, gymnastics and medicine, and in the political art what corresponds to gymnastics is legislation, while the counterpart of medicine is justice. Now in each case the two arts encroach upon each other, since their fields are the same, medicine upon gymnastics, and justice upon legislation; nevertheless there is a difference between them. There are then these four arts which always minister to what is best, one pair for the body, the other for the soul. But flattery perceiving this—I do not say by knowledge but by conjecture—has divided herself also into four branches, and insinuating herself into the guise of each of these parts, pretends to be that which she impersonates. And having no thought for what is best, she regularly uses pleasure as a bait to catch folly and deceives it into believing that she is of supreme worth. Thus it is that cookery has impersonated medicine and pretends to know the best foods for the body, so that, if a cook and a doctor had to contend in the presence of children or of men as senseless as children, which of the two, doctor or cook, was an expert in wholesome and bad food, the doctor would starve to death. This then I call a form of flattery, and I claim that this kind of thing is bad—I am now addressing you, Polus—because it aims at what is pleasant, ignoring the good, and I insist that it is not an art but a routine, because it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to point to the cause of each thing it offers. And I refuse the name of art to anything irrational. But if you have any objections to lodge, I am willing to submit to further examination.

Cookery then, as I say, is a form of flattery that corresponds to medicine, and in the same way gymnastics is personated by beautification, a mischievous, deceitful, mean, and ignoble activity, which cheats us by shapes and colors, by smoothing and draping, thereby causing people to take on an alien charm to the neglect of the natural beauty produced by exercise.

To be brief, I will express myself in the language of geometricians—for by now perhaps you may follow me. Sophistic is to legislation what beautification is to gymnastics, and rhetoric to justice what cookery is to medicine. But, as I say, while there is this natural distinction between them, yet because they are closely related, Sophist and rhetorician, working in the same sphere and upon the same subject matter, tend to be confused with each other, and they know not what to make of each other, nor do others know what to make of them. For if the body was under the control, not of the soul, but of itself, and if cookery and medicine were not investigated and distinguished by the soul, but the body instead gave the verdict, weighing them by the bodily pleasures they offered, then the principle of Anaxagoras would everywhere hold good—that is something you know about, my dear Polus—and all things would be mingled in indiscriminate confusion, and medicine and health and cookery would be indistinguishable.

Well, now you have heard my conception of rhetoric. It is the counterpart in the soul of what cookery is to body.

Source: Plato, *Gorgias*. Trans. W. D. Woodhead. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 464a-465e.

Plato (ca. 370 BCE)

SOCRATES: Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the same art that is concerned with great issues and small, its right employment commanding no more respect when dealing with important matters than with unimportant?

Source: Plato, *Phaedrus*. Trans. R. Hackforth. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 261a-261b.

Plato (ca. 370 BCE)

SOCRATES: Then it is plain that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously proffers a scientific rhetoric, will, in the first place, describe the soul very precisely, and let us see whether it is single and uniform in nature or, analogously to the body, complex. For to do that is, we

maintain, to show a thing's nature.
PHAEDRUS: Yes, undoubtedly.
SOCRATES: And secondly he will describe what natural capacity it has to act upon what, and through what means, or by it can be acted upon.
PHAEDRUS: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Thirdly, he will classify the types of discourse and the types of soul, and the various ways in which souls are affected, explaining the reasons in each case, suggesting the type of speech appropriate to each type of soul, and showing what kind of speech can be relied on to create belief in one soul and disbelief in another, and why.
PHAEDRUS: I certainly think that would be an excellent procedure.
SOCRATES: Yes, in fact I can assure you, my friend, that no other scientific method of treating either our present subject or any other will ever be found, whether in the models of the schools or in speeches actually delivered. But the present-day authors of manuals of rhetoric, of whom you have heard, are cunning folk who know all about the soul but keep their knowledge out of sight. So don't let us admit their claim to write scientifically until they compose their speeches and writings in the way we have indicated.
PHAEDRUS: And what way is that?
SOCRATES: To give the actual words would be troublesome, but I am quite ready to say how one ought to compose if he means to be as scientific as possible.
PHAEDRUS: Then please do.
SOCRATES: Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence men's souls, the intending orator must know what types of soul there are. Now these are of a determinate number, and their variety results in a variety of individuals. To the types of soul thus discriminated there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse. Hence a certain type of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain type of speech to take such and such action for such and such reason, while another type will be hard to persuade. All this the orator must fully understand, and next he must watch it actually occurring, exemplified in men's conduct, and must cultivate a keenness perception in following it, if he is going to get any advantage out of the previous instruction that he was given in the school. And when he is competent to say what type of man is susceptible to what kind of discourse; when, further, he can, on catching sight of so-and-so, tell himself, 'That is the man, that character now actually before me is the one I heard about in school, and in order to persuade him of so-and-so I have to apply *these* arguments in *this* fashion'; and when, on top of all this, he has further grasped the right occasions for speaking and for keeping quiet, and had come to recognize the right and the wrong time for the brachylogy, the pathetic passage, the exacerbation, and all the rest of his accomplishments—then and not till then has he well and truly achieved the art.
Source: Plato, *Phaedrus*. Trans. R. Hackforth. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 271a-272a.

Plato (ca. 4th Century BCE)
STRANGER: Your decision is then, that the art which decides whether we learn a skill or not ought to have control of the art which actually teaches that skill.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, certainly.
STRANGER: Then in the same way the art which decides whether persuasion should or should not be used ought to control the operation of art of persuasion itself.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Undoubtedly.
STRANGER: Which is the art to which we must assign the task of persuading the general mass of the population by telling them suitable stories rather than by giving them formal instruction?
YOUNG SOCRATES: I should say that it is obvious that this is the province to be assigned to rhetoric.
STRANGER: But to which art must we assign the function of deciding whether in any particular situation we must proceed by persuasion, or by coercive measures against a group of men, or

whether it is right to take no action at all?
YOUNG SOCRATES: The art which can teach us how to decide that will be the art which controls rhetoric and the art of public speaking.
STRANGER: The activity can be none other than the work of the statesman, I suggest.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Excellent! That is exactly what it is.
STRANGER: Oratory, it seems, has been quickly set apart from statesmanship. It is distinct from statesmanship, and yet its auxiliary.
Source: Plato, *Statesman*. Trans. J. B. Skemp. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 304c-304d.

Plato (ca. 4th Century BCE)
Life abounds in good things, but most of those good things are infested by polluting and defiling parasites. Justice, for example, is undeniably a boon to mankind; it has humanized the whole of life. And if justice is such a blessing, how can advocacy be other than a blessing too? Well, both blessings are brought into ill repute by a vice which cloaks itself under the specious name of an art. It begins by professing that there is a device for managing such business of one's own and assisting another to manage his—and that this device will ensure victory equally whether the conduct at issue in the case, whatever it is, has been rightful or not. And it then adds that this art itself and the eloquence it teaches are to be had as a gift by anyone who will make a gift in money in return. Now this device—be it which it may, art or mere artless empirical knack—must not, if we can help it, strike root in our society.
Source: Plato, *Laws*. Trans. A. E. Taylor. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 11.937d-938a.

Aristotle (ca. 350 BCE)
Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science.
Source: Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York. Oxford UP, 1991. 1354a.

Aristotle (ca. 350 BCE)
Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art; for each of the others is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example, medicine about health and disease and geometry about the properties of magnitudes and arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive about "the given," so to speak. That, too, is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects].
Source: Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York. Oxford UP, 1991. 1355b.

***Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (ca. 4th Century BCE)**
Public speeches fall into three classes, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. They are of seven kinds, being employed in persuasion, dissuasion, eulogy, vituperation, accusation, defence, and inquiry either by itself or in relation to something else. Such are the different kinds of discourses and their number. We shall employ them in public harangues, in lawsuits about contracts, and in private conversation.
Source: *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Trans. E. S. Forster. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Vol. 2. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984. 1421b.

***Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 80 BCE)**
The task of the public speaker is to discuss capably those matters which law and custom have fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure as far as possible the agreement of his hearers.

Source: *Ad C. Herennium: De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium)*. Trans. Harry Caplan. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1954. 1.2.

Cicero (ca. 90 BCE)
For my own part, after long thought, I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and foremost, that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful.
Source: Cicero, *De inventione*. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. *De inventione/De optimo genere oratorum/Topica*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. I.i.1.

Cicero (ca. 90 BCE)
For there was a time when men wandered at large in the fields like animals and lived on wild fare; they did nothing by the guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical strength; there was as yet no ordered system of religious worship nor of social duties; no one had seen legitimate marriage nor had anyone looked upon children whom he knew to be his own; nor had they learned the advantages of an equitable code of law. And so through their ignorance and error blind and unreasoning passion satisfied itself by misuse of bodily strength, which is a very dangerous servant.

At this juncture a man—great and wise I am sure—became aware of the power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great achievements if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction. Men were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats when he assembled and gathered them in accordance with a plan; he introduced them to every useful and honourable occupation, though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, and then when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk.

To me, at least, it does not seem possible that a mute and voiceless wisdom could have turned men suddenly from their habits and introduced them to different patterns of life. Consider another point: after cities had been established how could it have been brought to pass that men should learn to keep faith and observe justice and become accustomed to obey others voluntarily and believe not only that they must work for the common good but even sacrifice life itself, unless men had been able by eloquence to persuade their fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason? Certainly only a speech at the same time powerful and entrancing could have induced one who had great physical strength to submit to justice without violence, so that he suffered himself to be put on a par with those among whom he could excel, and abandoned voluntarily a most agreeable custom, especially since this custom had already acquired through lapse of time the force of natural right.

This was the way in which at first eloquence came into being and advanced to greater development, and likewise afterward in greatest undertakings of peace and war it served the highest interests of mankind. But when a certain agreeableness of manner—a depraved imitation of virtue—acquired the power of eloquence unaccompanied by any consideration of moral duty, then low cunning supported by talent grew accustomed to corrupt cities and undermine the lives of men.
Source: Cicero, *De inventione*. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. *De inventione/De optimo genere oratorum/Topica*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. I.ii.2-3.

Cicero (ca. 90 BCE)
There is a scientific system of politics which includes many important departments. One of these departments—a large and important one—is eloquence based on the rules of art, which they call rhetoric. For I do not agree with those who think that political science has no need for eloquence, and I violently disagree with those who think that it is wholly comprehended in the power and skill of the rhetorician. Therefore we will classify oratorical ability as a part of political science. The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade

an audience, the end is to persuade by speech.
Source: Cicero, *De inventione*. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. *De inventione/De optimo genere oratorum/Topica*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. I.vi.6.

Cicero (55 BCE)
[Crassus:] [I]f we want to capture the true meaning of the word 'orator' in a complete definition, it is my opinion that an orator worthy of this grand title is he who will speak on any subject that occurs and requires verbal exposition in a thoughtful, well-disposed, and distinguished manner, having accurately memorized his speech, while also displaying a certain dignity of delivery.
Source: Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*. Ed. and trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. 1.64.

Cicero (55 BCE)
[Antonius:] For I declared that the skillful speaker was someone who could speak with reasonable intelligence and clarity before ordinary people in accordance with generally accepted views, but that the eloquent speaker was someone who could amplify and give distinction to whatever he wished in a more marvelous and magnificent way, and whose intellect and memory encompassed all the sources of all the subject that had any bearing on oratory.
Source: Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*. Ed. and trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. 1.94.

Cicero (55 BCE)
[Crassus:] To begin with, I shall not deny that I learned what befits a well-born and well-educated man, namely those hackneyed precepts that everybody knows. First, so the rules say, the duty of the orator is to speak in a manner suited to persuasion. Next every speech is concerned either with the investigation of an indefinite, general matter, in which the persons or occasions are unspecified, or with a matter that is tied to specific persons or occasions. Furthermore, in both cases, whatever the point as issue may be, the question always posed is either whether or not the deed was done, or, if it was, what its nature is, or again, by what name it should be called, or, as some add, whether or not it seems to have been done justly. Furthermore, issues also arise from the interpretation of written documents, if some part of the text gives rise to ambiguity or contradiction, or involves a point where the written word is at variance with the intent. Furthermore, to all of these divisions a number of arguments are specifically assigned. But of the cases that are distinct from general investigations, some have their sphere in lawsuits, others in deliberative situations; there is also a third class that is reserved for praising or blaming people. And there are specific commonplaces that we use in lawsuits, where justice is the aim; there are others for deliberations, which are all directed toward the interests of those to whom we are giving advice; and others, likewise, for laudatory speeches, in which the frame of reference is defined by the high standing of those concerned. And in accordance with their division of the entire force and skill of the orator into five categories (requiring him first to discover what to say; next to distribute and put together what he has discovered not only with an eye to its order, but also judging critically its relative importance; then to clothe the result in distinguished language; and after this, to enclose this in his memory; and finally to deliver it with dignity and charm), I also became acquainted with the following prescriptions: in the beginning, before addressing the issue at hand, the audience's minds must be won over; next the case must be described; then after this, the point of dispute should be presented; then the claim we are making must be proved; after this, the things said in opposition must be refuted; and in the final section of the speech, the things in out favor must be amplified and expanded upon, while in our opponents' favor must be invalidated and demolished. I also heard the teachings about the features that lend distinction to speech itself: the first precept we are given in this respect is to speak purely and in correct Latin; next clearly and lucidly; third, with distinction; and finally, in a way that is suitable and fitting, so to speak,

to the relative importance of our subject matter; and I learned rules for each of these four things. Actually, I saw that art was even applied to the areas that are most dependent on natural ability. For I got a taste of some precepts about delivery and memory, which were brief, but involved a great amount of practice.

With such things, as you know, the entire system of your experts is concerned, and if I should say that if offers no help, I would be lying. For it does have some features that may, so to speak, remind the orator of the points of reference for each occasion, which he must keep in sight in order not to stray from whatever the goal he has set for himself. But the essential nature of all these rules, as I understand it, is not that orators, by following them, have won a reputation for eloquence, but rather that certain people have observed and collected the practices that eloquent men followed of their own accord. Thus, eloquence is not the offspring of art, but art of eloquence. Even so, as I said before, I do not reject it. For even if art is unnecessary for good speaking, becoming acquainted with it is not unsuitable for a gentleman.

Source: Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*. Ed. and trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. 1.137-46.

Cicero (55 BCE)

[Antonius:] Now as to the orator, since he is the subject of our inquiry, my picture of him is different from the one Crassus gave, for he seemed to me to extend the single function and title of orator over all knowledge of all subjects and arts. I rather regard him as someone who, in cases such as commonly arise in the forum, is able to employ language pleasant to the ear, and thoughts suited to persuade. To this man I give the name orator, and I would also like him to be equipped with an appropriate voice and delivery, and a certain wit.

Source: Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*. Ed. and trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. 1.213-14.

Cicero (55 BCE)

[Antonius:] In conclusion, to return to our starting point, let us take the orator to be someone who, as Crassus described him, is able to speak in a manner that is suited to persuasion. Moreover, let his sphere be restricted to the ordinary practice of public life in communities; let him put aside all other pursuits, however magnificent and splendid they may be, and, so to speak, be hard pressed day and night in performing this one labor.

Source: Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*. Ed. and trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. 1.260.

Cicero (46 BCE)

The supreme orator, then, is the one whose speech instructs, delights, and moves the minds of his audience. The orator is in duty bound to instruct; giving pleasure is a free gift to the audience, to move them is indispensable.

Source: Cicero, *De optimo genere oratorum*. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. *De inventione/De optimo genere oratorum/Topica*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. 1.3-4.

Hortensia (42 BCE)

As befitted women of our rank addressing a petition to you, we had recourse to the ladies of your households; but having been treated as did not befit us, at the hands of Fulvia, we have been driven by her to the forum. You have already deprived us of our fathers, our sons, our husbands, and our brothers, whom you accused of having wronged you; if you take away our property also, you reduce us to a condition unbecoming our birth, our manners, our sex. If we have done you wrong, as you say our husbands have, proscribe us as you do them. But if we women have not voted any of you public enemies, have not torn down your houses, destroyed your army, or led another one against you; if we have not hindered you in obtaining offices and honours,—why do we share the penalty when we did not share the guilt?

Why should we pay taxes when we have no part in the honours, the commands, the state-

craft, for which you contend against each other with such harmful results? 'Because this is a time of war," do you say? When have there not been wars, and when have taxes ever been imposed on women, who are exempted by their sex among all mankind? Our mothers did once rise superior to their sex and made contributions when you were in danger of losing the whole empire and the city itself through the conflict with the Carthaginians. But then they contributed voluntarily, not from their landed property, their fields, their dowries, or their houses, without which life is not possible to free women, but only from their own jewellery, and even these not according to the fixed valuation, not under fear of informers or accusers, not by force and violence, but what they themselves were willing to give. What alarm is there now for the empire or the country? Let war with the Gauls or the Parthians come, and we shall not be inferior to our mothers in zeal for the common safety; but for civil wars may we never contribute, nor ever assist you against each other! We did not contribute to Caesar or to Pompey. Neither Marius nor Cinna imposed taxes upon us. Nor did Sulla, who held despotic power in the state, do so, whereas you say that you are re-establishing the commonwealth.
Source: Appian, *The Civil* Wars. Trans. Horace White. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1913. 4.32-33.

Hortensia (42 BC)
Why should we pay taxes when we have no part in the honors, the commands, the state-craft, for which you contend against each other with such harmful results?
Source: Appian, *The Civil* Wars. Trans. Horace White. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1913. 4.33.

Quintilian (95 CE)
These, roughly, are the most famous and most seriously discussed definitions [of rhetoric]. It would be irrelevant and impossible for me to deal with all that have been proposed. It seems to me that there has grown up a perverse desire in writers of textbooks never to formulate anything in words which some predecessor has used. I shall have no such pretensions. What I say will not necessarily be what I have discovered, but what I think right. In this case, it is that rhetoric is 'the science of speaking well.' Once the best answer is found, to look for another is to seek something worse.

This granted, we also have a clear answer to the question of what the end, or highest aim or ultimate goal of rhetoric is—the *telos* as it is called, to which all arts tend. For if the art is 'the science of speaking well,' its end and highest aim is 'to speak well.'
Source: Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*. Ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001. II.xv.37.

Quintilian (95 CE)
I cannot imagine how the founders of cities would have made a homeless multitude come together to form a people, had they not moved them by their skilful speech, or how legislators would have succeeded in restraining mankind in the servitude of the law had they not had the highest gifts of oratory. The very guiding principles of life, however intrinsically honourable they are, nevertheless possess more power to shape men's minds when the brilliance of eloquence illumines the beauty of the subject. And so, although the weapons of eloquence are powerful for good or ill, it is unfair to count as evil something which it is possible to use for good.
Source: Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*. Ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001. II.xvi.9-10.

Quintilian (95 CE)
So let the orator whom we are setting up be, as Cato defines him, "a good man skilled in speaking": but—and Cato put this first, and it is intrinsically more significant and important—let him at all events be "a good man."
Source: Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*. Ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001. XII.i.1.

Tacitus (ca. 100)

How is it that, whereas former ages were so prolific of great orators, men of genius and renown, on our generation a signal blight has fallen: it lacks distinction in eloquence, and scarce retains so much as the name of "orator," which we apply exclusively to the men of olden time, calling good speakers of the present day "pleaders," "advocates," "counsel"—anything rather than "orators."
Source: Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus*. Trans. W. Peterson and M. Winterbottom. *Agricola/Germania/Dialogus*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970. 1.

Tacitus (ca. 100)
[Aper:] No, I shall make [Maternus] sole defendant, to answer before everyone to the charge that, though born to the sturdy kind of practical eloquence which would enable him to make friendships and preserve them, to form extended connections, and to take whole provinces under his wing, he turns his back on a profession than which you cannot imagine any in the whole country more productive. Of practical benefits, or that carries with it a sweeter sense of satisfaction, or that does more to enhance a man's personal standing, or that brings more honour and renown here in Rome, or that secures a more brilliant reputation throughout the Empire and in the world at large.
Source: Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus*. Trans. W. Peterson and M. Winterbottom. *Agricola/Germania/Dialogus*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970. 5.

Tacitus (ca. 100)
[Maternus:] As for the woods and the groves and the idea of a quiet life, which came in for such abuse from Aper, so great is the joy they bring me that I count it among the chief advantages of poetry that it is not written amid the bustle of the city, with clients sitting in wait for you at your own front door, or in association with accused persons, shabbily dressed and with tearful faces: no, the poetic soul withdraws into the habitations of purity and innocence, and in these hallowed dwellings finds its delight. Here is the cradle of eloquence, here its holy of holies; this was the form and fashion in which the faculty of utterance first won its way with mortal men, streaming into hearts that were as yet pure and free from any stain of guilt; poetry was the language of the oracles. The gain-getting rhetoric now in vogue, greedy for human blood, is a modern invention, the product of a depraved condition of society.
Source: Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus*. Trans. W. Peterson and M. Winterbottom. *Agricola/Germania/Dialogus*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970. 12.

Tacitus (ca. 100)
[Maternus:] Great oratory is like a flame: it needs fuel to feed it, movement to fan it, and it brightens as it burns.
Source: Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus*. Trans. W. Peterson and M. Winterbottom. *Agricola/Germania/Dialogus*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970. 36.

Aristides (145-47)
What then is oratory by itself and the orator? I should not hesitate to say that he is the best speaker who is the best sort of man. If someone should be of such a nature so that he does not easily appear before the people with his oratory and engage in political disputes, since he sees that the government is now differently constituted, although as far as reputation, honor, and important distinctions are concerned, he is not among the last, but if he should speak in solitude, and show honor to oratory's nature and the beauty in it, and should enlist god as the leader and patron of his life and speech, not even this man would find it hard to answer Plato, but he would be well supplied with the fairest and most just arguments.
Source: Aristides, *To Plato: In Defense of Oratory*. *The Complete Works*. Vol. 1. Trans. Charles A. Behr. Leiden: Brill, 1986. II.429-30.

Tatian (ca. 155-ca. 165)

You have established rhetoric on a basis of injustice and chicanery, selling your freedom of speech for pay and often presenting what at one moment you think right as being wrong a moment later; while poetry you established only in order to describe battles and the amours of the gods and spiritual corruption.
Source: Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments*. Trans. Molly Whittaker. Oxford: Clarendon, 1982. 5.

Marcus Aurelius (ca. 167)
Rusticus made me realize that my life needed correction, my character training. He kept me from making a fool of myself by trying to impress others with clever sophistries, obscure speculations, and lofty exhortations, or by posing as a man above temptations or as the great lover of mankind.

He taught me to rid my speech of rhetorical devices and poetical flourishes and fancy conceits; not to walk around the house in lavish dress and to avoid other affectations of this sort; to write simple letters like the one he wrote my mother from Sinuessa; to be quick to accept the apology of anyone who has hurt or offended me; to read books for detailed understanding and not to settle for general summaries or accept uncritically the opinions of reviewers.
Source: Marcus Aurelius, *The Emperor's Handbook*. Trans. C. Scot Hicks and David V. Hicks. New York: Scribner, 2002. I.7.

Sextus Empiricus (ca. 200)
For since those who offer a concept of rhetoric assert that it is an art, or a science, of speech, or productive of speech and persuasion, holding fast to these three descriptions [of rhetoric by Plato, Xenocrates, and Aristotle] we shall endeavor to show its unreality.
Source: Sextus Empiricus, "Against the Rhetoricians." *Against the Professors*. Trans. R. G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. II.9.

Martianus Capella (ca. 410)
Meantime the trumpets sounded, their strident song pierced the sky and heaven reechoed with an unfamiliar din; the gods were frightened and confused, the host of heaven's minor inhabitants quaked; unaware of the reason, their hearts stood still, and they recalled the charges made about the battle of Phlegra long ago. Then the Rivers and the fauns, the Pales, Ephialta, and the Valley Nymphs looked at the chief gods and with astonishment saw no movement to rise amongst them; and each in turn uttered their wonderment at the peaceful calm in the hearts of the deities. Then first Silvanus put down his cypress tree and in a tremor of fear held out his defenseless right hand, begging for the bows of the Delians, the arms of Hercules, crying with longing for Portunos' trident, not daring to ask for the spear of Gradivus [Mars]; being used to rustic warfare, he was considering the scythe of Saturn and, distrusting his own strength, was eying the missiles of the Thunderer.

But while a great group of the earth-gods was disturbed by such thoughts, in strode a woman of the tallest stature and abounding self-confidence, a woman of outstanding beauty; she wore a helmet, and her head was wreathed with royal grandeur; in her hands the arms with which she used either to defend herself or to wound her enemies, shone with the brightness of lightning. The garment under her arms was covered by a robe wound about her shoulders in the Latin fashion; this robe was adorned with the light of all kinds of devices and showed the figures of them all, while she had a belt under her breast adorned with the rarest colors of jewels. When she clashed her weapons on entering, you would say that the broken booming of thunder was rolling forth with the shattering clash of a lightning cloud; indeed it was thought that she could hurl thunderbolts like Jove. For like a queen with power over everything, she could drive any host of people where she wanted and draw them back from where she wanted; she could sway them to tears and whip them to a frenzy, and change the countenance and senses not only of cities but of armies in battle. She was said to have brought under her control, amongst the people of Romulus, the senate, the public platforms, and the law courts, and in Athens had at

will swayed the legislative assembly, the schools, and the theaters, and had caused the utmost confusion throughout Greece.

What countenance and voice she had as she spoke, what excellence and exaltation of speech! It was worth even the gods' effort to hear such genius of argument, so rich a wealth of diction, so vast a store of memory and recollection. What order in structure, what harmonious delivery, what movement of gesture, what profundity of concept! She was light in treating small topics, ready with middling topics, and with exalted ones a firebrand. In discussion she made her whole audience attentive, in persuasion amenable, full of conflict in disagreements, full of pride in speeches of praise. But when she had, through the testimony of some public figure, proclaimed some matter of dispute, everything seemed to be in turbulence, confusion, and on fire. This golden-voiced woman, pouring out some of the jewels of crowns and kingdoms, was followed by a mighty army of famous men, amongst whom the two nearest her outshone the rest. These two were of different nationalities and styles of dress, one wearing the Greek pallium, the other the Roman trabea. Each spoke a different language, though one professed to have studied Greek culture at Athens and was considered quick in the studies of the Greek schools and in the constant disputes and discussions of the Academy. Both were men from poor families, who rose to fame from humble beginnings. And although a Roman *eques* fathered one, and a toiling workman the other, both grew to such fame through their oratorical prowess that after their destinies in public life and elicit unmerited deaths they rose by their excellence to the stars and now outlast the ages through their eternal glory. The one whom rise people of Athens and the whole stream of Greeks followed had the reputation of being most forceful, more vigorous than the storms and raging of the angry ocean. He was described in verse such as this: "A man to fear, who might find fault even with the innocent." But the other, who wore the purple of a consul, and a laurel wreath for suppressing a conspiracy, came into the senate of heaven, and, delighted to have come into Jove's presence, joyfully began to declaim: "How blessed we are, how fortunate the State, how brilliant the fame of my consulship!" After these two in different lines there came the great orators of the past: one could see Aeschines, Isocrates, and Lysias, bearing before them the highest honors and the rewards of their eloquence; and then, in the Roman ranks, the *Sosantii*, the Gracchi, Regulus, Pliny, and Fronto. But before them all, even before the woman who led the whole array, went an old man bearing the mark of office and the preceding rod, after the manner of a Roman lictor, and on the top of the rod there flew a golden-mouthed crow as a sign of the woman who was coming. But the man who was carrying the rod was called Tisias, and seemed older and more important than all of them; for with a glance at the crow perched above him, he called the others, his inferiors, their common bond, and the woman in the lead their daughter. Stirred by this thought, very many of the gods believed that this woman of high nobility was, if a Greek, then the sister of Apollo, and if one of Romulus' people [i.e., a Roman], one of the Corvinian family. Added to this mystery was the fact that fearlessly and with very ready self-confidence she kissed the breast of Pallas and of the Cyllenian himself, thus giving clear signs of her almost sisterly intimacy with them. Indeed some of the gods—who, in fear of the heralding trumpet and in wonder at her friendship with the heavenly beings, had long been uncertain, and wanted to learn from foresighted Phoebus, since great Jove was not yet making any inquiry—began with some perturbation to ask who she was.

Source: Martianus Capella, *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts*. Vol. 2. Trans. William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E. L. Burge. New York: Cornell UP, 1977. 155-59.

Martianus Capella (ca. 410)

My duty is to speak appropriately in order to persuade; my object is through speech to persuade the header of the subject proposed. I invoke the words of my Cicero, using whose examples I am going through all the branches of instruction in turn. My material is twofold—namely, in what circumstances and from what resources a speech is made: in what circumstances, when I approach the elements of the *quaestio* itself; from what resources, when the matter and words of a speech are put together.

Source: Martianus Capella, *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts*. Vol. 2. Trans. William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E. L. Burge. New York: Cornell UP, 1977. 160-61.

Martianus Capella (ca. 410)
There is no doubt that my duty has five parts: matter, arrangement, diction, memory, and delivery. For judgment, which some include, is required in all the parts, and therefore cannot itself properly be considered a part, although it is the province of judgment to weigh what should and what should not be said. Matter, or invention, is the prudent and searching collection of issues and arguments. Arrangement is that which puts the matter in order. Diction chooses words that are proper or figurative, invents new usages, and arranges words of traditional usage. Memory is the firm guardian of our matter and our diction. Delivery is the control of our voice, movement, and gesture according to the importance of our matter and our words. Of these, the most powerful surely is invention, which has the task of discovering the issues in a case and finding suitable arguments to prove it.
Source: Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*. *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts*. Vol. 2. Trans. William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E. L. Burge. New York: Cornell UP, 1977. 161-62.

St. Augustine (ca. 396)
There are two things upon which all treatment of the scriptures is aiming at: a way to discover what needs to be understood, and a way to put across to others what has been understood.
Source: St. Augustine, *Teaching Christianity: De doctrina christiana*. Ed. John E. Rotelle. Trans. Edmund Hill. Hyde Park, NY: New City, 1996. 1.1.

St. Augustine (ca. 426-427)
Rhetoric, after all, being the art of persuading people to accept something, whether it is true or false, would anyone dare to maintain that truth should stand there without any weapons in the hands of its defenders against falsehood; that those speakers, that is to say, who are trying to convince their hearers of what is untrue, should know how to get them on their side, to gain their attention and have them eating out of their hands by their opening remarks, while these who are defending the truth should not? That those should utter their lies briefly, clearly, plausibly, and these should state their truths in a manner too boring to listen to, too obscure to understand, and finally too repellent to believe? That while these should be incapable of either defending the truth or refuting falsehood? That those, to move and force the minds of their hearers into error, should be able by their style to terrify them, move them to tears, make them laugh, give them rousing encouragement, while these on behalf of truth stumble along slow, cold and half asleep?

Could anyone be so silly as to suppose such a thing? So since facilities are available for learning to speak well, which is of the greatest value in leading people either along straight or along crooked ways, why should good men not study to acquire the art, so that it may fight for the truth, if bad men can prostitute it to the winning of their vain and misguided cases in the service of iniquity and error?
Source: St. Augustine, *Teaching Christianity: De doctrina christiana*. Ed. John E. Rotelle. Trans. Edmund Hill. Hyde Park, NY: New City, 1996. 4.3.

St. Augustine (ca. 426-427)
After all, the universal task of eloquence, in whichever of these three styles, is to speak in a way that is geared to persuasion. The aim, what you intend, is to persuade by speaking. In any of these three styles, indeed, the eloquent man speaks in a way that is geared to persuasion, but if he doesn't actually persuade, he doesn't achieve the aim of eloquence.
Source: St. Augustine, *Teaching Christianity: De doctrina christiana*. Ed. John E. Rotelle. Trans. Edmund Hill. Hyde Park, NY: New City, 1996. 4.55.

(Pseudo) St. Augustine (ca. 5th Century)

The duty of the orator is to understand immediately, as soon as a civil question is brought up, whether general or specific, if it is simple or if it involves several issues, if it is to be treated on its own merits or as it relates to something else. After he has ascertained this, he must find out the appropriate divisions of the subject, so that he can properly arrange his observations about either the moral or the intrinsic issues. From this point he must proceed to evaluate what he has found pertinent, so that he can reject those points which seem vulnerable to attack; then what he deems worthy of retaining he must put in proper order. Even though there may be many quite relevant facts at his disposal, if each does not have its own place in the speech assigned to it according to its importance and length, those facts will probably hamper the case, or at best not further it very much. Immediately after this organization of material, the orator will have to prepare the exact text of his presentation of the issues; this involves two steps: the structure in which the ideas are put together, and the careful choice of words. He must then commit all this to memory; most of the Greeks insist that this is among the most necessary of the orator's duties, as also does the great teacher M. Tullius [Cicero], who writes in words something like this, I believe, in his first book about the orator: "I come now to memory, the storehouse for everything; if we do not use it to keep all we have thought of and put in order, then everything, no matter how familiar to the orator, will, as we know, perish." The next step after memory must be impressive delivery; Demosthenes considers this as either the first or the only concern among the duties of the orator. It consists of two elements: the movement of the body and the control of the voice.

Source: (Pseudo) St. Augustine, *De rhetorica quae supersunt (On Rhetoric: Additional Material)*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 7-8.

C. Chirius Fortunatianus (ca. 450)

Whoever wants to hasten down rhetoric's highway
Toward the handling of laws and cases first must master
This study of the art, that he may escape the traps of the maze.

What is rhetoric? The knowledge of how to speak well.

What is an orator? A good man skilled in speaking.

What is the function of the orator? To speak well on civil questions.

To what end? In order to persuade, insofar as the state of affairs and the attitude of the audience permits, in civil questions.

What are civil questions? Those which can be understood by ordinary intelligence; those which everyone can grasp, as an investigation whether something is just or good.

Source: C. Chirius Fortunatianus, *Artis Rhetoricae libri tres*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 25-26.

Boethius (ca. 522)

2. By genus, rhetoric is a faculty; by species, it can be one of three: judicial, demonstrative and deliberative. It is clear that the genus is what we have said. What we have said about the species, moreover, is true because rhetoric deals with all these processes. There is one special kind of rhetoric for judicial matters, based upon their special goals; there are other kinds for deliberative and demonstrative purposes. These species of rhetoric depend upon the circumstances in which they are used; all cases deal either with general principles or with the specific application of those principles, in either case using one of the three species we have already identified. For example, judicial rhetoric can treat either of general topics like rendering just honor or demanding satisfaction, or of individual cases, like paying honor to Cornelius or demanding satisfaction of Verres. Likewise, cases which involve deliberation fall under the heading of deliberative rhetoric in the same way: they may deal with general topics like war and peace or with specific issues like the Pyrrhic war and the peace which followed. Similarly, in

demonstrative oratory, we deal with what deserves praise or blame; we may do this either in a general way, as when we praise bravery, or in a particular case, as when we praise the bravery of Scipio.

3. The subject matter for the faculty is any subject at all which can be proposed by speaking; it is usually a question of civil importance.

Source: Boethius, "From *Overview of the Structure of Rhetoric*." Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 70-71.

Cassiodorus (ca. 551)

[Rhetoric] is said to be derived *apo tou rhetorieuein*, that is, from skill in making a set speech. The art of rhetoric, moreover, according to the teaching of professors of secular letters, is expertness in discourse on civil questions. The orator, then, is a good man skilled, as has just been said, in discourse on civil questions. The function of an orator is speaking suitably in order to persuade; his purpose is to persuade, by speaking on civil questions, to the extent permitted by the nature of things and persons.

Source: Cassiodorus, *An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings*. Trans. Leslie Weber Jones. New York: Octagon, 1966. 148-49.

Isidore of Seville (ca. 630)

I. Concerning rhetoric and its system of nomenclature.

1. Rhetoric is the science of speaking well: it is a flow of eloquence on civil questions whose purpose is to persuade men to do what is just and good. The word rhetoric comes from the Greek phrase *apou tou rhetorizein*; that is, a command of expression. For the Greek word *rhesis* means expression, and *rhetor* means orator.

2. Rhetoric goes hand in hand with the art of philology. In philology we teach the science of correct speaking, while in rhetoric we show how to make use of the knowledge we have taught.

II. Concerning the founders of the art of rhetoric.

1. The foundation of this subject were laid by the Greeks, Gorgias, Aristotle, and Hermagoras, and translated into Latin by Cicero, as everyone knows, and by Quintilian, with such wealth of detail, such variety of treatment, that while it is easy for the reader to marvel at it, it is impossible for him to grasp it.

2. For as long as he holds the manuscript, the order of the words clings to his mind, as it were, but as soon as the book is laid aside, all memory of it fades. A perfect knowledge of this subject makes the orator.

III. Concerning the title of orator and the parts of rhetoric.

1. The orator is the good man skilled in speaking. The good man, as we know, is formed by nature, by habits, and by his actions. Skill in speaking results from studied eloquence. It has five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and utterance. Its purpose is persuasion.

2. Skill in speaking depends upon three things: natural ability, training, and practice. Nature furnishes the bent; training, the knowledge; and practice the skill. These three things are required of the orator, to be sure, but no less of every creative person who wishes to accomplish anything.

Source: Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiæ (The Etymologies)*. Trans. Dorothy V. Cerino. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 80-82.

St. Bede the Venerable (ca. 701)

It is quite usual to find that, for the sake of embellishment, word order in written compositions is frequently fashioned in a figured manner different from that of ordinary speech. The grammarians use the Greek term "schema" for this practice, whereas we correctly label it a "manner," "form," or "figure," because through it speech is in some way clothed and adorned. Metaphorical language is also quite commonly found when, either from need or for adornment, a word's specific meaning is replaced by one similar but not proper to it. The Greeks pride

themselves on having invented these figures or tropes. But, my beloved child, in order that you and all who wish to read this work may know that Holy Writ surpasses all other writings not merely in authority because it is divine, or in usefulness because it leads to eternal life, but also for its age and artistic composition, I have chosen to demonstrate by means of examples collected from Holy Writ that teachers of secular eloquence in any age have not been able to furnish us with any of these figures and tropes which did not first appear in Holy Writ.
Source: The Venerable Bede, "Bede's *De Schematibus et Tropis*—A New Translation." Trans. Gussie Hecht Tanenhaus. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 48 (1962): 240.

Alcuin (ca. 794)
CHARLEMAGNE: From what did rhetoric get its name?
ALCUIN: Απο του ρητορευειν, that is, a fluency of discourse.
CHARLEMAGNE: To what end does it look?
ALCUIN: To the art of speaking well.
CHARLEMAGNE: In what affairs is it concerned?
ALCUIN: In public questions, that is, in questions adaptable to the ends of art, as can be inferred from the natural disposition of the mind.
Source: *The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne: A Translation, with an Introduction, the Latin Text, and Notes*. Ed. Wilbur Samuel Howell. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1941. 69.

Rabanus Maurus (ca. 9th Century)
Rhetoric is, as the ancients have told us, skill in speaking well concerning secular matters in civil cases. However, although this definition does apply to earthly knowledge, the topic is not for that reason foreign to ecclesiastical discipline. After all, any orator or speaker who wishes to treat the divine law adequately and skillfully in his teaching, or one who wishes to compose a literate and polished statement needs this skill; nor should one be considered a sinner who studies the art at the proper time and who observes its precepts in writing or speaking. The fact is that he is doing something very worth while if he studies it diligently so that he may be fitted to preach the word of God.
Source: Rabanus, *De clericorum institutione (On the Training of the Clergy)*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 125-26.

Walafrid Strabo (ca. 9th Century)
The first of rhetoric's parts is the wise choice of matter,
And clearly the second is proper arrangement of thoughts;
The third, a difficult task, demands the use of appropriate language;
Memory's fourth—be master of what you would say.
Then, fifth, be eloquent; this makes the system perfect.
Source: Walafrid Strabo, *De quinque partibus rhetoricae (Verse on the Five Parts of Rhetoric)*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 128.

Alberic of Monte Cassino (ca. 1087)
Until now we have nourished, as it were, the minds of infants with the milk of our instruction; but now it is time to strengthen the minds of grown men with bread. Until now we have rehearsed our hearers in the preliminary training of grammar; now that the period of practice is over, we must lead then to the battlefield of composition. After all, if we have omitted so much up to this point regarding the incredibly wide choice of words and regarding the appreciation of their melody as well, what else can we call our work but the milk of learning, the training of a child? Thus far we have looked at the rudiments of education; now we move into the full manly power of knowledge. The first is infancy; the second is adulthood. Any art one can think of must proceed in ordered stages; that is, one must move from basics to comprehensiveness. Therefore

let the sincere soul develop, let it eat and drink and grow from within, let flaws and triviality vanish, let the juices not be drawn too soon; at last, touched by the rod of Phoebus, the mind will bear fruit. Here Alberic soars high, expects to gain the palm of victory; now his adversary becomes silent, mute, agape, stunned with admiration; here integrity and dependability thrive. We will put into a few brief words a discussion that is far from brief; by wiping away confusion, we will become effective. What figures there are and how they fit together in complex as well as simple matters will be clear. And now let us move to the topic itself; let us begin weaving the fabric of our proem.
Source: Alberic of Monte Cassino, *Flowers of Rhetoric*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 132-33.

Honorius of Autin (ca. 12th Century)
The second city through which the road toward home passes is rhetoric. The gate of the city is civil responsibility, and the highway is the three ways of exercising that responsibility: demonstrative oratory, deliberative, and judicial. On the first approach we see the rulers of the Church, who proclaim the laws of God and the Church; on the other two we find earthly kings and judges issuing their decrees. The former consider the common good, the latter deal with the laws of equity between men. Cicero instructs those journeying to this city to speak eloquently; he regulates their lives by four virtues, which are prudence, courage, justice, and moderation. The citizens who live here are histories, romances, and books written to deal in an oratorical or ethical way with their subjects. Through these the mind is directed along the road to its homeland.
Source: Honorius of Autin, *De animae exsilio et patria: alias, de artibus (Concerning the Exile of the Soul and its Fatherland; Also Called, About the Arts)*. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 201.

Hugh of St. Victor (ca. 1120)
Invention and judgment are integral parts running through the whole theory of argument, whereas demonstration, probable argument, and sophistic are its divisive parts, that is, mark distinct and separate subdivisions of it. Demonstration consists of necessary arguments and belongs to philosophers; probable argument belongs to dialecticians and rhetoricians; sophistic to sophists and quibblers. Probable argument is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, both of which contain invention and judgment as integral parts: for since invention and judgment integrally constitute the whole genus, that is, of argumentative logic, they are necessarily found in all of its species at once. Invention teaches the discovery of arguments and the drawing up of lines of argumentation. The science of judgment teaches the judging of such arguments and lines of argumentation.
Source: Hugh of St. Victor, *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts*. Ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor. New York: Columbia UP, 1961. 81.

Hugh of St. Victor (ca. 1120)
[R]hetoric is the discipline of persuading to every suitable thing.
Source: Hugh of St. Victor, *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts*. Ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor. New York: Columbia UP, 1961. 82.

Anonymous of Bologna (ca. 1135)
A written composition is a setting-forth of some matter in writing, proceeding in a suitable order. Or, a written composition is a suitable and fitting treatment of some matter, adapted to the matter itself. Or a written composition is a suitable and fitting written statement about something, either memorized or declared by speech or in writing.
Source: Anonymous of Bologna, *The Principles of Letter-Writing (Rationes dictandi)*. Trans. James J. Murphy. *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley: U of California P, 1971. 6.

John of Salisbury (ca. 1159)

According to the Cornificians, "Rules of eloquence are superfluous, and the possession of lack of eloquence is dependent on nature." What could be farther from the truth? What is eloquence but the faculty of appropriate and effective verbal expression? As such, it brings to light and in a way publishes what would otherwise be hidden in the inner recesses of man's consciousness. Not everyone who speaks, not even one who says what he wants to in some fashion, is eloquent. He alone is eloquent who fittingly and efficaciously expresses himself as he intends. This appropriate effectiveness postulates a faculty (so called from facility), to follow our wont of imitating the concern of the Stoics about the etymologies of words as a key to easier understanding of their meanings. One who can with facility and adequacy verbally express his mental perceptions is eloquent. The faculty of doing this is appropriately called "eloquence." For myself, I am at a loss to see how anything could be more generally useful: more helpful in acquiring wealth, more reliable for winning favor, more suited for gaining fame, than is eloquence. Nothing, or at least hardly anything, is to be preferred to this [precious] gift of nature and grace. Virtue and wisdom, which perhaps, as Victorinus believes, differ in name rather than in substance, rank first among desiderata, but eloquence comes second. Third is health, and after this, in fourth place, the good will of one's associates and an abundance of good, to provide the material instruments of action.

Source: John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*. Trans. Daniel D. McGarry. Berkeley: U of California P, 1955. 26-27.

Alain de Lille (ca. 1181-1184)

No way inferior in refinement and appearance, taking second place to none among the arts, the third maiden does not defraud the chariot of her service. She calls her mind into action; when it has answered the call, she fixes it on the projected work and directs her hand under the guidance of her mind. She applies those hands which give the finishing touch, brings the work of her sisters to perfection and adds embellishment to the thing just produced. She raises to the superlative degree what on its production was in the positive degree and did not attain the glory of the upper limits but was restricted to a secondary position. It is no wonder that, in giving added embellishment to things previously produced, she perfects them and gives the charm of further refinement, since beauty and grace of form smile on her, because she outstrips her peers in many of the painter's skills and enfolds in her bosom the complete art of the painter.

Her locks reflecting the gloss of gold lie adorned with wondrous artistry: her hair falls down to cover her neck. Her countenance is steeped in radiant colour: a brilliant red glow tints her face with roseate lustre but a foreign glitter haunts her face to some extent and tries to combine with the native hue. Now a many-streamed flood of tears bedews her face; now the oft-changing smile of dawn makes it fair, as it chases away the tears of sorrow; now the maid adopts a countenance stern with a dignified inflexibility; now her eyes turn their gaze on high; now this high gaze is lowered; now turning her full keen glance to the side, she seeks the shade of digression. In her right hand she bears a trumpet, her left she decks with a horn and on it she gives the signal for the preliminary exercises of the war. A garment covers her: painted in various colours, it rejoices that it is overlaid with various hues. Here with the painter's aid gleams a picture of Rhetoric's power of colour and thus a picture adds colour to a picture. Here, as in a book, one reads: what is the end in view; who is the orator; what are Rhetoric's species; what is its role; what is a lawsuit; what is arrangement; what is the special domain of Rhetoric; what is its special excellence; how at one time it thunders over us with threats, again flashes with the light of words, now pours forth prayers, now fills the ear with praise, what establishes the genera in Rhetoric: what the aim of Rhetoric is; to what terminal point it is making its way when it discusses the useful, decides what is just, confirms the right, designates the honourable; what are the parts of the art, by what arrangement they are connected; how at first the art discovers arguments, then arranges them, gets the fitting style, memorises them, delivers them, so that in the regular scheme of arrangement, arrangement may make a fitting arrangement for itself;

what and how many parts the orator's speech has and by what sequence they are knit together; how the exordium stirs the judge's mind, makes him prick his ears, sharpens his attention, conditions his heart so that the auditor becomes more attentive, more tractable, more kindly disposed and devotes his attention to what he hears; how the narrative is a brief exposition of the truth or of the falsehood lurking beneath the guise of truth; how the partition brings together in summary fashion all that is to follow, collecting together what is scattered, compressing what is prolix; how a statement favouring our side high-lights the arguments, establishes them, sets them forth, structures them, draws inferences from them; how a refutation is a blow to the opposite side, ruins them, weakens them, breaks them up, puts pressure on them; in what way the peroration, rounding out the several parts, brings the speech to a close with a regular end and reins in the discourse; which deed or type of deed or alleged deed does a point at issue look for when it is supported by several lines of argument, which suit involves a dispute about a fact, which a question of law, what and how many kinds of issues are there, which issue is simple, which has a connection with something else and what are the constituents of this connection, why this aspect intensifies the charges in the accusation, that calls for a change of court, another rebuts, still another, weighing advantages and disadvantages, finds them equal; how a case on either side gains strength when a law clashes with and opposes a kindred law or the intent disagrees with and conflicts with the letter of the law or an ambiguous sentence in the written law gives rise to a doubt or when a word can be so defined that the undisputed definition removes the ambiguity or when by a judicial point of place, person, time, the case itself is changed to another court and will cause confusion elsewhere or if a claim, covered by no definite law, is being urged and obtains support by an argument from analogy; in what way a person's character arms and strengthens the arguments, while arguments based on name, disposition, mode of life, fortune showing harassed face, habit, feeling, plan that miscarried, interests, accident, speeches, achievements, fail as they have only the appearance of strength; what things have sequels; what does a question of fact include, what are inseparable adjuncts of a deed or what, as circumstances demand, follows it in the normal course of events; what is the manner of performing the deed, what are the constituents of the deed, what is the place, time, occasion, motive, opportunity.
Source: Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus; or The Good and Perfect Man*. Ed. and trans. James J. Sheridan. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973. 96-101.

Alain de Lille (ca. 1181-1184)
At hand are the refinements of Rhetoric and its ornaments of style by which words shine like stars, a discourse clothes itself in beauty and the conclusion shines in a flood of light. These resources for a discourse, these refinements and beauty of speech, the power of Rhetoric spreads abroad. It adorns the youth's speech and makes his words distinguished by many a change of style. She tells him to make his utterances concise, to compress deep thoughts within a brief discourse, to encompass much in few words, not to ramble on in a prolix harangue but work towards the end that his speech be brief, the ideas rich in meaning, the discourse eloquent and fruitful in a large offspring of ideas. Or if, perhaps, the discourse runs on in a torrent of words, let the ideas flash farther still, let the abundant harvest serve as an excuse for the forest of foliage, the yield of rich grain compensate for the floating chaff and the sense for the loquacity.
Source: Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus; or The Good and Perfect Man*. Ed. and trans. James J. Sheridan. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973. 181-82.

Alain de Lille (ca. 12th Century)
Preaching is an open and public instruction regarding behavior and belief proposed for the formation of men, rooted in reason and growing from the spring of the sacred text.
Source: Alain de Lille, "*A Compendium on the Art of Preaching*, Preface and Selected Chapters." Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973. 228.

Marie de France (ca. 12th/13th Century)
Anyone who has received from God the gift of knowledge and true eloquence has a duty not to remain silent: rather should one be happy to reveal such talents. When a truly beneficial thing is heard by many people, it then enjoys its first blossom, but if it is widely praised its flowers are in full bloom.
Source: Marie de France, "Prologue," *The Lais of Marie de France*. Ed. and trans. Glyn S. Burgess and Keith Busby. New York: Penguin, 1986. 41.

(Pseudo) St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 13th Century)
Preaching, then, is the fitting and suitable dispensation of the Word of God.
Source: Harry Caplan, "A Late Mediaeval Tractate on Preaching." *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric*. Ithaca: Cornell, 1970. 54.

(Pseudo) St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 13th Century)
Thus preaching by word or voice—our present subject—is open and public instruction in faith and morals, devoted to the informing of men, and proceeding along the path of reasoning and from the source of authorities. It will be open preaching, since, if it were secret, it would be subject to suspicion and would seem to let loose heretical dogmas. It will be public, because it is to be set before the many, not one individual. If it were set before the one, it would properly be not preaching, but exposition of doctrine. That is why preaching is termed instruction in faith and morals.
Source: Harry Caplan, "A Late Mediaeval Tractate on Preaching." *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric*. Ithaca: Cornell, 1970. 55.

(Pseudo) St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 13th Century)
Also, the art of preaching is the science which teaches address on some subject. The subject of this art is the Word of God. The subject of the sermon, on the other hand, is the preacher's purpose—and the like that can be added.
Source: Harry Caplan, "A Late Mediaeval Tractate on Preaching." *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric*. Ithaca: Cornell, 1970. 56.

Brunetto Latini (ca. 1266)
A city is no more than a group of people assembled to live under one law and one governor. Tully says that the greatest science of governing cities is rhetoric, which is the science concerned with speaking; without speech there would be neither cities, nor stabilized justice, nor an established human society. Although the ability to talk is given to all men, Cato said that wisdom is given to few. For this reason, I say that there are four kinds of speakers: the first is provided with great sense and a good manner to speech, and this is the most desirable; others are devoid of good speaking and sense, and this is a great pity; others are devoid of sense but do very well in speaking, and this is a great danger; and others are full of sense but they remain silent because of the weaknesses of their speaking, and this group requires assistance.
Source: James East Robert, "Book Three of Brunetto Latini's *Tresor*: An English Translation and Assessment of its Contribution to Rhetorical Theory." Diss. Stanford U, 1960. 107-08.

Brunetto Latini (ca. 1266)
Rhetoric is a science that teaches one to speak well, carefully and completely on common and personal matters, and its aim is to establish words in such a manner that one makes believable what he says to those who hear him. You should know that, according to what Aristotle says in his book, which was translated into Romance some time ago, rhetoric is under the science of governing the city just as the art of making bits and saddles is included under the art of cavalry.

The function of this art, according to what Tully says, is to speak sensibly in order to make believable what is said. Between the function and the object there is this difference, that in the function the speaker must think what is suited to the object, so that he speaks in such a manner

that it is believed; and in the object he considers what is suited to his function, so that he makes himself believed through his speaking. For example, the function of a physician is to give medicines and cures in such a way as to make the patient well, and his end is to speak sensibly according to the principles of art, and the end is the purpose for which he speaks.
Source: James East Robert, "Book Three of Brunetto Latini's Tresor: An English Translation and Assessment of its Contribution to Rhetorical Theory." Diss. Stanford U, 1960. 109-10.

Dante Alighieri (1294-1307)
The heaven of Venus may be compared to Rhetoric because of two properties: one is the brightness of its aspect, which is sweeter to look upon than that of any other star; the other is its appearance now in the morning, now in the evening. And these two properties are found in Rhetoric: for Rhetoric is sweeter than all of the other sciences, since this is what it principally aims at; and it appears in the morning when the rhetorician speaks before the face of his hearer, and it appears in the evening (that is, behind) when the rhetorician speaks through writing, from a distance.
Source: Dante Aligheri, *Dante's Il convivio (The Banquet)*. Trans. Richard H. Lansing. New York: Garland, 1990. II.13.

Robert of Basevorn (1322)
First, we must show what preaching is. Preaching is the persuasion of many, within a moderate length of time, to meritorious conduct. For, when some determine questions, even theological questions, such determination is not preaching, because it is not persuasion by intent, but rather an investigation of truth. When one exhorts one person or two to goodness, that is not properly preaching, but admonition or exhortation or the like. Therefore, it is improper to say that Christ preached to the woman.

Similarly, an orator or narrator who is a good man, experienced in talking, or a speaker who publicly persuades many to fight bravely, commending the brave and disparaging the cowardly, or doing the like, is not properly a preacher, because that serves the end of preserving the State, not of acting meritoriously, as we now speak of the merit which pertains to eternal life. And if he does achieve this end, he does so accidentally, because it is not his special business. The same must also be said about a lawyer or a narrator or others whose function this purpose is accidental.

In like manner, if someone with one small reason persuades many of something which pertains to the merits of eternal life, that is not properly preaching, for I could then write on this page forty sermons, a thing that is hardly possible. Therefore, preaching requires time that is not too short, nor too much beyond the customary. Just as to know how many particulars make a universal, which is the beginning of art, or to know precisely how many beautiful days make a beautiful summer (for example, if there were relatively few beautiful days, they would not make a beautiful summer), so it is difficult to know how many acts of preaching properly entitle one to be called a preacher, or precisely how much time is needed in order that it should properly be called preaching.
Source: Robert of Basevorn, *Forma praedicandi (The Form of Preaching)*. Trans. Leopold Krul. *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley: U of California P, 1971. 120-21.

Petrarch (1333/1350-51)
The care of the mind requires a philosopher; the education of the tongue belongs to the orator. Neither one should be neglected by us if, as they say, we are to rise up from the earth and soar on the lips of men. But I will speak of the former elsewhere, for it is an important subject which, though involving immense labor, promises a very rich harvest. Here, lest I go off on some matter other than the one that led me to write, I will encourage and admonish that we correct not just our life and conduct, although that is the first thing necessary for virtue, but also our habit of speaking, something we can accomplish through the study of the art of eloquence. For speech is

no small index of the mind, and the mind, no small guide for speech. Each depends on the other, but while the one is hidden away in our breasts, the other emerges into the outside world. The mind adorns what is about to appear and forms it as it wishes to, while speech, as it comes out, declares what the mind is like. People obey the judgment of the mind, which gains their credence through the testimony of speech. Therefore, both are to be cultivated in such a way that the mind may learn to be reasonably severe in managing speech, and speech may learn to be truthfully magnificent in expressing the mind. However, we cannot really be neglecting speech when we are caring for the mind, just as, on the other hand, dignity cannot be present in speech unless its majesty is also present in the mind.
Source: Petrarch, "Letter to Tommaso da Messina Concerning the Study of Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 15.

Petrarch (1333/1350-51)
I will not repeat to you now what Cicero says about this subject at great length in his *De inventione*—for the passage is extremely well known—nor will I bring up the fables of Orpheus and of Amphion, the first of whom is said to have moved monstrous beasts by his songs, and the latter, trees and rocks, which he was able to lead wherever he wished, except to say that, by relying on their superior eloquence, the first is believed to have induced gentleness and patient endurance in lustful, savage beings whose behavior resembled that of brute animals, while the second did the same thing for beings who were rustic, intractable, and hard as rocks. Add to this that by means of this art we are permitted to be useful to many people who live far away, for our speech reaches those with whom we will perhaps never share the riches of our social intercourse. Finally, just how much we will be able to bestow on our posterity through speech can best be judged by remembering how much the words of our forefathers have bestowed on us.
Source: Petrarch, "Letter to Tommaso da Messina Concerning the Study of Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 16-17.

Petrarch (1333/1350-51)
I should think that the study of eloquence is the best and most beneficial thing for us ourselves, not something to be held in the lowest esteem.
Source: Petrarch, "Letter to Tommaso da Messina Concerning the Study of Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 17.

Coluccio Salutati (1374)
I have reserved praise for [eloquence] until the end since, in my judgment, it seems the greatest thing there is. For what can be better than to be the master of the emotions, to bend your auditor to go wherever you might want, and to bring him back from that place, filled with gratitude and love? Unless I am deceived, this is the strength of eloquence, this is its work; rhetors strive with all their power to reach this end. It is certainly a great thing to embellish one's writings with words and ideas, but the greatest accomplishment, and indeed the most difficult, is to bend the souls of one's listeners as one wishes by means of a polished and weighty oration. Eloquence accomplishes all these things at one and the same time. In this connection, I want you to consider how man has been created for the sake of others and how God has placed reason above all the human appetites, letting it, as leader and guide, regulate our turbulent emotions from its seat in the lofty citadel of the mind. Consider also how eloquence has in addition been bestowed on the same creature, something which man shares with no other animal, so that through it, he might be able to awaken by means of the fires of mutual love the reason of his fellows, when that reason has been lulled to sleep by perverted moral behavior or by the heaviness of our gross bodies, and so that, whatever one man might lack by nature or have ruined through his wicked habits, the eloquence of his fellow man could build and restore.
Source: Coluccio Salutati, "On Petrarch's Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 20.

Coluccio Salutati (1374)
And those who study only eloquence, as Cicero himself says, are never going to be of use; indeed, without wisdom, they will generally be very harmful.
Source: Coluccio Salutati, "On Petrarch's Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 26.

Christine de Pizan (1405)
"Quintus Hortensius, a great rhetorician and consummately skilled orator in Rome, did not share this opinion [that it is not good for women to be educated]. He had a daughter, named Hortensia, whom he greatly loved for the subtlety of her wit. He had her learn letters and study the science of rhetoric, which she mastered so thoroughly that she resembled her father Hortensius not only in wit and lively memory but also in her excellent delivery and order of speech—in fact, he surpassed her in nothing. As for the subject discussed above, concerning the good which comes about through women, the benefits realized by this woman and her learning were, among others, exceptionally remarkable. That is, during the time when Rome was governed by three men, this Hortensia began to support the cause of women and to undertake what no man dared to undertake. There was a question whether certain taxes should be levied on women and on their jewelry during a needy period in Rome. This woman's eloquence was so compelling that she was listened to, no less readily than her father would have been, and she won her case.

"Similarly, to speak of more recent times, without searching for examples in ancient history, Giovanni Andrea, a solemn law professor in Bologna not quite sixty years ago, was not of the opinion that it was bad for women to be educated. He had a fair and good daughter, named Novella, who was educated in the law to such an advanced degree that when he was occupied by some task and not at leisure to present his lectures to his students, he would send Novella, his daughter, in his place to lecture to the students from his chair. And to prevent her beauty from distracting the concentration of her audience, she had a little curtain drawn in front of her. In this manner she could on occasion supplement and lighten her father's occupation. He loved her so much that, to commemorate her name, he wrote a book of remarkable lectures on the law which he entitled *Novella super Decretalium*, after his daughter's name."
Source: Christine de Pizan, *Le livre de la cite des dames (The Book of the City of Ladies)*. Trans. Earl Jeffrey Richards. New York: Persea, 1982. II.36.2-II.36.3.

George of Trebizond (1433/1434)
[Rhetoric is] a science of civic life in which, with the agreement of the audience insofar as possible, we speak on civil questions.
Source: Quoted in George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular from Ancient to Modern Times*. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1999. 235.

George of Trebizond (1433/1434)
Hence, if speech is proper to man and because of it he is especially differentiated from the other animals, then I think no one will doubt that ornamentation is the finest thing that nature has bestowed on the human race. Indeed, unless reason itself, which has been hidden away in the inner recesses of the mind, is drawn forth by means of speech, it will have only as much brilliance as fire does that is hidden in flint, something no one will call fire until it is called forth by steel.
Source: George of Trebizond, "From *Five Books on Rhetoric*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 28-29.

George of Trebizond (ca. 15th Century)
Although the essence of humanity is reason, this reason seems to be of absolutely no use to men

unless it is brought into common use by means of speech. For what benefit can derive from a subtle mind, what advantage from sharp thinking, what utility from the best invention, unless the power of speech reveals one's subject, having dragged it out of the obscure places where all such things lie hidden? Thus we must confess that nothing was ever given to us by God that is better than speech.

But speech, according to the nature of things, has been divided into two parts. Just as some things are extremely removed from our ordinary civil life and are considered merely for the sake of knowledge, while others are established directly in the social intercourse of men, so that part of speech by means of which we pry into the secrets of nature is called dialectic whereas that other part, which is necessary for civic affairs and without which no one ever carried on his business with distinction, especially in the state, was called rhetoric by our ancestors, both the Latins and the Greeks. Indeed, rhetoric excels the other arts inasmuch as it alone embraces almost every aspect of human life. For some arts investigate the revolution of the earth, others the motions of the stars and magnitudes in astronomy, still others the force of sounds and their relationships, and yet others strive to explain the nature of individual entities—all of these things are both difficult and honorable, but neither are they capable of being adequately understood nor, if we actually held them in our hands, would they prove all that useful to civic life. Meanwhile, rhetoric alone has undertaken the managing of private as well as public matters. For what could be thought up or said in the conduct of our affairs that does not require the power of oratory? In court, it defends what is right. In the Senate, it shows you both the useful and the useless. In public meetings, it has always protected the state as a whole. It teaches us to be provident and to avoid adverse things before they happen. If they should happen through chance or ignorance, rhetoric alone will come to our aid and will support us with hope or consolation. It adorns our successes and mitigates our disasters. It intimidates our enemies and strengthens our friends. It founds, preserves, and enlarges cities. It both promulgates and abrogates laws. But it is really foolish to want to enumerate all this, for the number of things that men have drawn from rhetoric, as from a divine fountain, is almost infinite.

Thus, our ancestors seem to me to have been most correct in calling this the art of humanity. Indeed, Aristotle, whom Cicero follows in his rhetorical teaching, thought that this was the greatest and noblest part of political science, which is the teacher and mistress of all human affairs. But if I may be permitted to say openly what I feel, I do not think that eloquence in all its richness is contained as a part within political science; rather, I maintain that the entirety of that science is contained and guarded within eloquence. For, although things placed under some general category often merely overlap, nothing will ever be found in political science that eloquence does not order, arrange, and complete. "What about the military?" you'll say. But this art urges soldiers on into battle; it excites them to destroy the enemy; it drives forward those who hold back, and calls back those who are running away "What about economics?" You will never be able to engage in business transactions with another unless you persuade him. "And legal science?" By means of this art, laws are passed and preserved for a long time, and although they are mute in themselves, they are given a voice by the orator's flowing eloquence. Moreover, he confirms the moral behavior of men by means of praise, reinforces it through examples, establishes it by appealing to custom, and corroborates it through appeals to equity and the good—or by means of vituperation and every other technique at his disposal he reproves, refutes, weakens, and destroys it. Nor is he less used to exhorting and inflaming people to embrace virtue than he is accustomed to deterring them from vice. Therefore, if rhetoric embraces, guards, and discharges all the parts of politics, one should not think that it is contained in political science rather than the reverse. Nevertheless, the longer I think about the matter, this oratorical faculty seems to me neither to be the genus to which politics belongs, nor to be entirely identical to it. Rather, it is such a unique, singular, and most noble instrument of politics that it seems less to serve all the individual parts of politics than to be their master. For the orator, I say, declares war, makes peace, honors brave men, punishes deserters, celebrates

marriages, disparages divorces, warns freemen, consoles slaves, entertains the speaker's followers, and terrifies his opponents. Indeed, that singular part of rhetoric we call invention seems to me identical with politics itself, for it is the function of rhetoric alone to investigate methodically whatever is to be said or done in any given affair. Indeed, we judge that person to be a politician who by his actions can easily maintain the name of rhetor for himself. Therefore, if things are this way—just as you all surely know they are—it seems one must concede that through this single one of its parts, invention, the orator's office includes politics within it, on which when it lavishes its other parts as instruments, it shows that nothing nobler, better, or more divine can be found in human affairs than aptness of speech.
Source: George of Trebizond, "An Oration in Praise of Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 31-33.

George of Trebizond (ca. 15th Century)
Therefore, most distinguished men, unless we want to be mute, let us emphasize eloquence. With it we will govern best both the state and our private affairs, for political science has no other instrument. Accordingly, apply yourselves to eloquence so that we may bestow Ciceronian ornaments on it, since nothing is worthier of a free state and a free people. This alone from among the liberal arts knows how to succor the afflicted, is able to encourage those who are cast down, does not hesitate to offer safety to the despairing, is not ignorant of ways to free people from dangers and preserve men in their city and their very own homes. Cowards are spurred on by its dignity, men are inflated by its vehemence, and finally, the hot-tempered are calmed by its gravity. Apply yourselves to it and take pains with it, for, believe me, it will adorn, embellish, and amplify you and all yours in a marvelous manner.
Source: George of Trebizond, "An Oration in Praise of Eloquence." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 34.

William Caxton (1481)
The therde of the vii sciences is callyd Rethoryque, whyche conteyneth in substaunce rightwisnes, Rayson and ordynaunce of wordes. And ought not to be holden for folye; ffor the droytes and lawes by whiche the iugements be made, and that by rayson and after right ben kept and mayntened in the court of kynges, of princes and of barons, come and procede of Rethoryque. Of this science were extrayt and drawen the laws and decrees whiche by need serue in alle causes and in alle rightes and droytes.

Who wel knewe the science of Rethoryque, he shold knowe the right and the wronge; ffor to doo wronge to another, who so doth it is loste and dampned, and for to doo right and reson to euery man, he is saued and geteth the loue of God his creatour.
Source: William Caxton, *Caxton's* Mirrour of the World. Ed. Oliver H. Prior. London: Oxford UP, 1913. 35-36.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1485)
There is such a great opposition between the functions of the orator and the philosopher that they could not contradict one another more. For what is the office of the rhetor other than to lie, deceive, circumvent, practice sleight-of-hand tricks. It's your business, as you say, to turn black into white and white into black as you will; by means of speech to raise up, cast down, amplify, and diminish whatever you wish; and finally, to transform things themselves, as if by the magical force of eloquence, which you boast about, so that they assume whatever face and dress you wish, not appearing what they are in actuality, but what your will wants them to be—and even though they are not really transformed, they nevertheless appear that way to your auditors. All this is nothing other than sheer lying, sheer imposture, sheer trickery, since by its nature it enlarges things through amplification or reduces them through diminishment, and by producing the deceptive harmony of words, like so many masks and simulacra, it dupes the minds of your auditors while it flatters them. Can there be any affinity between this and the philosopher whose entire activity is consumed in discovering the truth and demonstrating it to others?

Source: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, "Letter to Ermolao Barbaro." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 59.

Anonymous (ca. 1490-1495)
[Rhetoric] is the science which refreshes the hungry, renders the mute articulate, makes the blind see, and teaches one to avoid every lingual ineptitude.
Source: Quoted in Harry Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching." *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Anne King and Helen North. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1970. 109.

(Pseudo) Henry of Hesse (ca. 15th Century)
The Art of Preaching is the science which teaches how to say something about something. The subject of this art is the Word of God.
Source: Harry Caplan, "'Henry of Hesse' on the Art of Preaching." *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. Anne King and Helen North. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1970. 143.

Desiderius Erasmus (1511)
Here I might add that I am amazed at the…ingratitude should I say, or is it rather laziness?…of mankind: they all cultivate me avidly and are very glad to benefit from my goodwill, but in all these centuries there has never been a single soul who has celebrated the praises of Folly in a thankful oration—though there has been no lack of speechwriters who have spent sleepless nights burning the midnight oil to work out elaborate encomia of Busiris, <Phalaris,> the quartan fever, flies, baldness, and other dangerous nuisances. From me, therefore, you will hear an extemporaneous speech, unpremeditated but all the truer for that. I say this because I wouldn't want you to think that I made it up just to show off my cleverness, as ordinary speechmakers generally do. For you know that such orators, even though they have labored over a speech for thirty whole years (and plagiarized some of it at that), will still swear that they dashed it off in a couple of days, or even dictated it, as a mere exercise. As for me, the method I like best of all is simply '*to blurt out whatever pops into my head*.'
Source: Desiderius Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*. Ed. and trans. Clarence H. Miller. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. 12.

Desiderius Erasmus (1511)
As for rhetoricians, though they do indeed put up a false front by their specious alliance with the philosophers, nevertheless it is clear that they too belong to our party, as is shown by many indications, but especially this one: besides many other trivial topics, they have written so much and so meticulously about how to make jokes. In fact, the author who wrote to Herennius about rhetoric, whoever he was, even goes so far as to list folly among the types of wit. And Quintilian, who is clearly the prince of rhetoricians, has a chapter that is longer than the whole *Iliad*. Finally, they think so highly of folly as to hold that oftentimes an argument which cannot be refuted in any other way should be glossed over with laughter—unless someone imagines it is not the prerogative of Folly to provoke horselaughs with funny sayings, and to do it by the book at that.
Source: Desiderius Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*. Ed. and trans. Clarence H. Miller. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. 81-82.

Desiderius Erasmus (1513)
Just as there is nothing more admirable or more splendid than a speech with a rich copia of thoughts and words overflowing in a golden stream, so it is, assuredly, such a thing as may be striven for at no slight risk, because, according to the proverb,

Not every man has the luck to go to Corinth.

Whence we see it befalls not a few mortals that they strive for this divine excellence diligently, indeed, but unsuccessfully, and fall into a kind of futile and amorphous loquacity, as with a multitude of inane thoughts and words thrown together without discrimination, they alike obscure the subject and burden the ears of their wretched hearers. To such a degree is this true that a number of writers, having gone so far as to deliver precepts concerning this very thing, if

it please the gods, seem to have accomplished nothing else than, having professed copia (abundance) to have betrayed their poverty. And in truth this thing has so disturbed us, that partly selecting those from among the precepts of the art of Rhetoric suitable to this purpose, and partly adapting those which we have learned by a now long-continued experience speaking and writing and have observed in our varied reading
of a great many authors, we here set forth concerning each kind of copia, a number of principles, examples, and rules.
Source: Desiderius Erasmus, *On Copia of Words and Ideas*. Ed. and trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix. Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1963. 11.

Rudolph Agricola (1521)
Every speech on whatever subject, indeed, every conversation by means of which we bring forth our thoughts has as its function and its first and essential duty to teach something to the listener. Of this what more certain and intimate proof can one have than the fact that God, the parent and author of all things, granted to man alone of all animals, a being capable of reason and learning, the gift of language and speech? For if speech is a sign of the things that are contained within the speaker's mind, then it follows that its proper function is to display and unfold that which is its task to express. Nor has it escaped my notice that the greatest authors believed that a perfect oration should accomplish three things: teaching, moving, and delighting.
Source: Rudolph Agricola, "From *Three Books Concerning Dialectical Invention*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 43.

Rudolph Agricola (1521)
I call an exposition a speech that merely unfolds the thinking of the speaker, nothing having been added to it to gain the faith of the listener, whereas an argument is a speech in which someone strives to awaken belief in the matter about which he is speaking.
Source: Rudolph Agricola, "From *Three Books Concerning Dialectical Invention*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 43-44.

Philip Melanchthon (1523)
You see with what arguments I commend the study of eloquence to you; we cannot explain what we ourselves want, or understand correctly the extant writings of our ancestors, unless we have learned thoroughly an artful method of speaking. For my part, I do not see how people are even going to seem human to others if they cannot explain what they are thinking or follow that which is spoken correctly. In fact, even if eloquence had no dignity or grace, nevertheless it has power that is such that we do not make use of fire, air, or water, as they say, in more places. For how could human affairs continue if eloquence should abandon its protection of both sacred and profane law, if oratory should not exhibit what can he understood in public and private consultations, if men's deeds could not be transmitted to posterity in writing? Would any vestige of humanity be left in such a state? In fact, how little did the preceding age differ from such a state, for then almost no one actually understood the language of the sacred books, and sacred laws were made and annulled on a daily basis because of the judgment of foolish sophists? The deeds of those times lay buried in eternal darkness, for there was no one who could shine the light of letters on them. All the disciplines were so darkened because of their mode of speech that not even the learned themselves knew with sufficient certainty what they were professing.
Source: Philip Melanchthon, "From *The Praise of Eloquence*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 101-02.

Baldesar Castiglione (1528)
I have found a universal rule which in this matter seems to me valid above all others, and in all human affairs whether in word or deed: and that is to avoid affectation in every way possible as though it were some very rough and dangerous reef; and (to pronounce a new word perhaps) to practice in all things a certain *sprezzatura*, so as to conceal all art and make whatever is done or

said to appear to be without effort and almost without any thought about it. And I believe much grace comes of this: because everyone knows the difficulty of things that are rare and well done; wherefore facility in such things causes the greatest wonder; whereas, on the other hand, to labor and, as we say, drag forth by the hair of the head, shows an extreme want of grace, and causes everything, no matter how great it may be, to be held in little account.
Source: Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*. Trans. Charles S. Singleton. New York: Anchor, 1959. 43.

Baldesar Castiglione (1528)
But in the end all these qualities in our Courtier will still not suffice to win him universal favor with lords and cavaliers and ladies unless he have also a gentle and pleasing manner in his daily conversation. And, truly, I think it difficult to give any rule in this, because of the infinite variety of things that can come up in conversation, and because, among all men on earth, no two are found that have minds totally alike. Hence, whoever had to engage in conversation with others must let himself be guided by his own judgment and must perceive the differences between one man and another, and change his style and method from day to day, according to the nature of the person with whom he undertakes to converse.
Source: Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*. Trans. Charles S. Singleton. New York: Anchor, 1959. 109.

Baldesar Castiglione (1528)
And since words that have no subject matter of importance are vain and puerile, the Court Lady must have not only the good judgment to recognize the kind of person with whom she is speaking, but must have knowledge of many things, in order to entertain that person graciously; and let her know how in her talk to choose those things that are suited to the kind of person with whom she is speaking, and be careful lest, unintentionally, she might sometimes utter words that could offend him. Let her take care not to disgust him be indiscreet praise of herself or by being too prolix. Let her not proceed to mingle serious matters with playful or humorous discourse, or mix jests and jokes with serious talk. Let her not show ineptitude in pretending to know what she does not know, but let her seek modestly to do herself credit in what she does know—in all things avoiding affectation, as has been said. In this way she will be adorned with good manners; she will perform with surpassing grace the bodily exercises that are proper to women; her discourse will be fluent and most prudent, virtuous, and pleasant; thus, she will be not only loved but revered by everyone, and perhaps worthy of being considered the equal of this great Courtier, both in qualities of mind and of body.
Source: Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*. Trans. Charles S. Singleton. New York: Anchor, 1959. 209.

Desiderius Erasmus (1528)
Let's not ignore the teaching of rhetoric, for it helps us greatly in finding out, arranging, and managing arguments, and in avoiding things that are irrelevant to or hinder our case.
Source: Desiderius Erasmus, "From *Ciceronianus*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 73.

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1531)
Moreover, although the art may be defined as a collection of precepts all aiming at one end, rhetoricians still debate what that end is, whether to persuade or to speak well. Moreover, not confident with true matters, they think up new and feigned ones. They have found out so many theses, hypotheses, figures, tropes, periods, characters, persuasive speeches, disputes, declamations, introductions, insinuations, means to render the audience benevolent, and artificial ways to state arguments that one can scarcely count them—and still they deny that the end of rhetoric has been achieved.
Source: Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, "From *The Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 77.

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1531)

To confess the truth, it is generally granted that the entire discipline of rhetoric from start to finish is nothing other than an art of flattery, adulation, and, as some say more audaciously, lying, in that, if it cannot persuade others through the truth of the case, it does so by means of deceitful speech.
Source: Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, "From *The Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 77.

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1531)
In short, it appears that rhetoric is nothing other than the art of persuading and moving the emotions, seizing the spirits of the thoughtless by subtle eloquence, exquisite deception, and the cunning appearance of probability, leading them into the prison of error while perverting the sense of the truth.
Source: Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, "From *The Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 80.

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1531)
[N]othing was more hateful to [the Spartans] than the affected verbal skill of a man who has no concern for the discovery of the truth, but who, when propounding a straightforward matter, dresses it up with bawdy verbal disguises and bombastic words in order to deceive the spirits of his auditors with the sweetness of speech and to lead them away tied to his tongue by their ears.
Source: Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, "From *The Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 80.

Philip Melanchthon (1542)
Rhetoric then is truly that Art which teaches the way and method of speaking correctly and well. For this reason I say that Rhetoric means those principles which are taught to young people, for it is necessary to know them, even though many other things concerned with both nature and doctrine, are required also. All educated men, even those who are beginners, maintain these principles, for they are just as necessary to them in forming judgements in this Art as is Dialectics, which everyone needs in forming judgments. Just as the reason for Dialectics is to judge whether in teaching everything is consonant with everything else and likewise to follow a particular path in teaching, so let us now set down the following as the ends of rhetoric: to evaluate a long speech, to see the sequence of the various parts of it, what are its salient points and what are simple embellishments. Likewise, even for those who are not disposed by nature in speaking make it possible for them to prepare an oration that has defined parts; that does not gloss over important things too briefly, as in dialectics, but which provides some verbal elaboration.
Source: Philip Melanchthon, *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*. Ed. and trans. Sister Mary Joan La Fontaine. "A Critical Translation of Philip Melanchthon's *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*." Diss. U of Michigan, 1968. 79-80.

Sperone Speroni (1546)
[Brocardo:] Thus, to begin at the beginning, rhetoric is nothing other than a noble art of arranging well and attractively those words by means of which men signify to one another the concepts in their hearts.
Source: Sperone Speroni, "From *Dialogue on Rhetoric*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 114.

Sperone Speroni (1546)
[Brocardo:] Thus, judicial rhetoric, for which the high style is appropriate, can be justly connected to moving and invention; deliberative rhetoric, with its low and detailed style, to disposition and teaching; and finally, epideictic rhetoric, which involves the middle style, to elocution and delight.
Source: Sperone Speroni, "From *Dialogue on Rhetoric*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 120.

Peter Ramus (1547)
Reason and speech are the two universal gifts of the gods granted to men, and the source of almost all the others. Dialectic is the theory of reason. Therefore whatever is the property of reason and mental ability and can be handled and practised without speech, attribute this by right to the art of dialectic.

Dialectic has three parts—invention of stratagems and arguments, arrangement of these through the syllogism and method, and then memory. All of these exist in men who are dumb and lack all power of speech. For they think matters over, judge them, organize them, and remember them; at times everyone generally does these things better when silent rather than talking. To repeat, then, let there be these three parts of the art of dialectic: invention, arrangement, and memory.

Let us now consider the special qualities of speech according to our rule, and let us first of all assign grammar its parts. Grammar indeed is concerned with purity and elegance of speech. This will be seen in single words because of etymology, in groups of words because of syntax, in the quantity of syllables and in accent because of prosody, and in the shaping and delineation of letters, syllables and words because of orthography. Let grammar's whole, proper estate be here; do not let dialectic or rhetoric consider anything here to be their own.

Yet what then will be left for rhetoric? Not only style in tropes and figures, which you consider here the only property of the orator, but also delivery. This alone is the proper virtue of rhetoric, its ability to diversify through the brilliance of tropes, to embellish with the beauties of figures, to charm by the modulation of the voice, and to arouse by the dignity of gesture. This is indeed the greatest, most magnificent virtue. You see, Marcus Tullius, the manner in which I argue. I do not wrongly use the opinion or authority of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates or of any other man. I seek the first, basic causes of things from their furthest sources, and, as Apollo once replied to you, I follow nature as my leader rather than the opinion of the multitude. I teach that the arts must be separated according to their precepts and rules, but I want them to be joined in use. For as a result of this separation they will be more easily learned, and in a shorter time they will be put to use.

Thus, since the parts of delivery and style comprise the boundaries of rhetoric, we must define the orator as a man skilled in speaking well; by well I mean speech that is elegant due to excellence of style and delivery. I am putting forward this fundamental principle of my thought to you from the start, so that the rest of the dispute can be drawn from it.
Source: Peter Ramus, *Peter Ramus's Attack on Cicero: Text and Translation of Ramus's* Brutinae Quaestiones. Ed. James J. Murphy. Trans. Carole Newlands. Davis, CA: Hermagoras, 1992. 16-18.

John Jewel (ca. 1548)
Truly serious and substantial causes have moved me to change my direction at this time, for I finally see, I really do see, that the entire time that I have spent thus far on eloquence has been wasted in a useless, base pursuit.
Source: John Jewel, "Oration against Rhetoric." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 163.

John Jewel (ca. 1548)
For a long time now I have known from experience that rhetoric confers on us neither benefit nor dignity. The entire pursuit of eloquence, I say, which so many Greek and Latin writers enriched, which I myself embraced so eagerly, and into which I drove you with my encouragement—I openly proclaim here that it offers neither dignity nor benefit, and is entirely idle, empty, futile, and trifling.
Source: John Jewel, "Oration against Rhetoric." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 163.

John Jewel (ca. 1548)
Therefore, those who have composed so-called arts of speaking, which they claim they are going to teach, behave no less imprudently and absurdly than if they had composed and professed arts of seeing, hearing, and walking. Why do they think there is a greater discipline for the tongue than for the feet, the eyes, or the ears?
Source: John Jewel, "Oration against Rhetoric." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 163.

John Jewel (ca. 1548)
We have all been taught to speak well enough by nature, for we learned it long ago on our own initiative without a master or a teacher, and by this gift of nature alone we excel the wild beasts and the dumb cattle. We do not surpass them by our spiritual virtues or the strength of our bodies, nor by any specific virtue such as prudence, cleverness, reason, or cunning, but by the sole power of speech.
Source: John Jewel, "Oration against Rhetoric." Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 164.

Peter Ramus (1548)
Rhetoric is the theory of expressing oneself well, as is evident from the origin of the name; for *heirēkenai*, from which derive *rhētor* and *rhētorikē*, means to speak and be eloquent.
Source: Quoted in Peter Ramus, *Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian.* Ed. James J. Murphy. Trans. Carole Newlands. Dekalb: Northern Illinois UP, 1986. 27.

Peter Ramus (1549)
There are two universal, general gifts bestowed by nature upon man, Reason and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter. Dialectic therefore should draw on the general strengths of human reason in the consideration and the arrangement of the subject matter, while grammar should analyze purity of speech in etymology, syntax, and prosody for the purpose of speaking correctly, and also in orthography for the purpose of writing correctly. Rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery. Next, from these general, universal so-called instruments other arts have been formed: arithmetic with its numbers, geometry with its diagrams, other arts with their other subjects. If these arts have been kept separate and enclosed within their own proper limits, then certainly what grammar will teach in its rightful province will not he confused with rhetoric, and dialectic will not encroach upon what each of the others has clearly described. In use these should be united, so that the same oration can expound purely, speak ornately, and express thought wisely. However, the precepts of pure diction, ornate delivery, and intelligent treatment must he kept separate and should not he confused.
Source: Peter Ramus, *Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian.* Ed. James J. Murphy. Trans. Carole Newlands. Dekalb: Northern Illinois UP, 1986. 86.

Thomas Wilson (1560)
Man (in whom is poured the breath of life) was made at his first being an ever-living creature unto the likeness of God, endued with reason and appointed lord over all other things living. But after the fall of our first father, sin so crept in that our knowledge was much darkened, and by corruption of this our flesh man's reason and intendment were both overwhelmed. At what time God, being sore grieved with the folly of one man, pitied of his mere goodness the whole state and posterity of mankind. And therefore (whereas through the wicked suggestion of our ghostly enemy the joyful fruition of God's glory was altogether lost) it pleased our heavenly father to repair mankind of his free mercy and to grant an ever-living inheritance unto all such as would by constant faith seek earnestly thereafter. Long it was ere that man knew himself, being destitute of God's grace, so that all things waxed savage: the earth unfilled, society neglected, God's will not known, man against man, one against another, and all against order. Some lived by spoil; some like brute beasts grazed upon the ground; some went naked; some roamed like

woodwoses; none did anything by reason, but most did what they could by manhood. None, almost, considered the ever-living God, but all lived most commonly after their own lust. By death they thought that all things ended; by life they looked for none other living. None remembered the true observation of wedlock; none tendered the education of their children; laws were not regarded; true dealing was not once used. For virtue, vice bare place; for right and equity, might used authority. And therefore, whereas man through reason might have used order, man through folly fell into error. And thus for lack of skill, and for want of grace, evil so prevailed that the devil was most esteemed, and God either almost unknown among them all or else nothing feared among so many. Therefore even now, when man was thus past all hope of amendment, God, still tendering his own workmanship, stirred up his faithful and elect to persuade with reason all men to society. And gave his appointed ministers knowledge both to see the natures of men, and also granted them the gift of utterance, that they might with ease win folk at their will and frame them by reason to all good order.

And therefore, whereas men lived brutishly in open fields—having neither house to shroud them in, nor attire to clothe their backs, nor yet any regard to seek their best avail—these appointed of God called them together by utterance of speech and persuaded with them what was good, what was bad, and what was gainful for mankind. And although at first the rude could hardly learn, and either for strangeness of the thing would not gladly receive the offer, or else for lack of knowledge could not perceive the goodness, yet being somewhat drawn and delighted with the pleasantness of reason and the sweetness of utterance, after a certain space they became through nurture and good advisement of wild, sober; of cruel, gentle; of fools, wise; and of beasts, men. Such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of eloquence and reason, that most men are forced even to yield in that which most standeth against their will. And therefore the poets do feign that Hercules, being a man of great wisdom, had all men linked together by the ears in a chain to draw them and lead them even as he lusted. For his wit was so great, his tongue so eloquent, and his experience such, that no one man was able to withstand his reason, but everyone was rather driven to do that which he would, and to will that which he did, agreeing to his advice both in word and work in all that ever they were able.

Neither can I see that men could have been brought by any other means to live together in fellowship of life, to maintain cities, to deal truly, and willingly to obey one another, if men at the first had not by art and eloquence persuaded that which they full oft found out by reason. For what man, I pray you, being better able to maintain himself by valiant courage than by living in base subjection, would not rather look to rule like a lord than to live like an underling, if by reason he were not persuaded that it behooveth every man to live in his own vocation, and not to seek any higher room than whereunto he was at the first appointed? Who would dig and delve from morn till evening? Who would travail and toil with the sweat of his brows? Yea, who would for his king's pleasure adventure and hazard his life, if wit had not so won men that they thought nothing more needful in this world, nor anything whereunto they were more bounden, than here to live in their duty and to train their whole life according to their calling? Therefore, whereas men are in many things weak by nature, and subject to much infirmity, I think in this one point they pass all other creatures living: that they have the gift of speech and reason.

And among all others. I think him most worthy fame, and amongst men to be taken for half a god, that therein doth chiefly, and above all others, excel men wherein men do excel beasts. For he that is among the reasonable of all most reasonable, and among the witty of all most witty and among the eloquent of all most eloquent—him think I among all men not only to be taken for a singular man, but rather to be counted for half a god. For in seeking the excellency hereof, the sooner he draweth to perfection, the nigher he cometh to God who is the chief wisdom, and therefore called God because he is most wise, or rather wisdom itself.

Source: Thomas Wilson, *The Art of Rhetoric.* Ed. Peter E. Medine. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. 41-43.

Thomas Wilson (1560)

Rhetoric is an art to set forth by utterance of words matter at large, or as Cicero doth say, it is a learned, or rather an artificial, declaration of the mind in the handling of any cause called in contention, that may through reason largely be discussed.
Source: Thomas Wilson, *The Art of Rhetoric.* Ed. Peter E. Medine. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. 45.

Francesco Patrizi (1562)
[PATRIZI:] Cicero said: [...] the profession of the orator always flourished and was the master in every free people and especially in quiet, tranquil cities. Also it seems to me that Longinus said the orator has always been held in high esteem and considered of great worth among the people.
Source: Francesco Patrizi, "From *Ten Dialogues on Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 184.

Francesco Patrizi (1562)
[PATRIZI:] Let's start with that remark of Cicero's, that orators began to appear after the tyrants had been removed in Sicily and the people began to take one another to court over the property taken from them by both the tyrants and their neighbors.
Source: Francesco Patrizi, "From *Ten Dialogues on Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 184.

Francesco Patrizi (1562)
[PATRIZI:] The orator, then, [...] is not a man to be valued.
Source: Francesco Patrizi, "From *Ten Dialogues on Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 191.

Francesco Patrizi (1562)
PATRIZI: From these two perspectives, then, the orator is a liar and a con man.
MARESIO: That seems to be the case.
PATRIZI: And from the other two, he's a base or tyrannical man.
Source: Francesco Patrizi, "From *Ten Dialogues on Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 192.

Cypriano Soárez (1568)
Rhetoric is the art or the theory of speaking well. An art consists in the knowledge and clear perception of facts that aim at a single conclusion and cannot be misleading. It is very clear, moreover, that there is an art of eloquence. The reason is, although the majority argue cases in court recklessly and without any method, still some of them as a result of some kind of habit speak more cleverly than others. Without doubt, if anyone considers the reason why some men speak better than others, he can express it. A man, then, who had made a study of the whole field, if he does not clearly discover an art, at least he will find a kind of art.

Speaking well means to speak the best of thoughts with carefully chosen words.

The function of rhetoric is to speak suitably for persuasion. Its purpose is to persuade by speech.
Source: Lawrence J. Flynn, "The *De Arte Rhetorica* (1568) by Cyprian Soarez, S. J.: A Translation with Introduction and Notes." Diss. U of Florida, 1955. 116-18.

Jacques Amyot (ca. 1570-1580)
Now, since we have been placed above all the animals and have, as by hereditary right, the gift of being able to talk and discourse among ourselves, revealing our thoughts to one another by means of language, we should certainly value that ability highly and should take pains to acquire this further advantage, namely verbal power, the very thing that, beyond all else, lets us triumph over the beasts, and that will be what allows us to triumph over other men.
Source: Jacques Amyot, "From *An Epitome of Royal Eloquence, Composed for Henry III, King of France.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 129.

Jacques Amyot (ca. 1570-1580)
For one should not, according to the ancient proverb, take the wolf by the ears; rather, one should take all the peoples and cities that way, for they let themselves be led in that manner by an eloquent prince.
Source: Jacques Amyot, "From *An Epitome of Royal Eloquence, Composed for Henry III, King of France*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 130.

Jacques Amyot (ca. 1570-1580)
I will not mention here our widely celebrated Gallic Hercules whom people followed, drawn by a cord from his tongue. It will suffice for me to say that if eloquence is the queen of everything, as a certain poet has said in writing, there is no king, no matter how great and powerful, who should not desire to have her as his companion.
Source: Jacques Amyot, "From *An Epitome of Royal Eloquence, Composed for Henry III, King of France*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 131.

Henry Peacham (1577)
When we consider and call to mind (right Reuerend) the great might and worthinesse of wisedome, then do we perfectly perceaue, & euidently see, that god of his goodnesse hath poured forh his deuine virtue into the minde of man, farre more largely, and much more aboundauntly, then in any other creature vpon the face of the whole earth. Whereby he hath made man able, not onelye to gouerne himselfe, and to lieu after a most goodly order, but also to subdue the monstrous beastes to his will. By this diuyne virtue, & intellectiue power, man doth meditate and muse vppon the wonderfull workes of God, he searcheth out the secreates of nature, & clymeth vp to the knowledge of Sapience supernaturall, he learneth the cunning reasons of numbers, the Mathematical demonstrations, the motions of stars, the course & alteration of tymes, the musical content of harmonies, & diuersity of tunes, he conceiueth trim deuises, & is ful of many profitable and pleasant inuentions, he seeth what is comely for his dignity, and to what ende he is created, which no other is able to do. And to the end that this soueraign rule of reason might spread abroade her bewtifull branches, & that wisdome might bring forth most plentifully her sweete and pleasaunt fruites, for the comon vse & vtility of mankind, the Lord God hath ioyned to the mind of man speech, which he hath made the instrument of our vndertstanding, & key of conceptions, whereby we open the secreates of our hartes, & declare our thoughts to other, and herein it is that we do so far passé and excel all other creatures, in that we haue the gifte of speech and reason, and not they, for we see what difference there is betweene those men in whome these two virtues do smally appeare, & brute Beastes that haue not vnderstanding. Therefore how worthy of high commendations are those men, that perceiuing this, do bestowe their studies, their trauayle, and their tyme, to obtayne Wysedome, and Eloquence, the onelye Ornamentes, whereby mannes lyfe is bewtifyed, and a prayse moste precious purchased. For by these manner of studies, we see that many haue attained to a great excelency in their kinde, who haue got to themselues & their countrey many commodities: cloathed themselues with ample honoures: and deserued by their worthy works to be praysed for euer of posteritie.
Source: Henry Peacham, *The Garden of Eloquence*. Menston, UK: Scolar, 1971. i-ii.

Anton Maria de' Conti (1514-1555), *A Dialogue on Eloquence* (1582)
After all, who do you think first found out the laws—let us trace things back to their roots here—by means of which cities are ruled, or who persuaded the people that they should not refuse to obey the laws? Does it seem to you that it was someone totally incapable of speech and entirely unequipped with eloquence? Does it make sense that they would have obeyed a person who, because of his inability to speak, could not supply an explanation as to why the laws might seem good? Or did an uncivilized people, most desirous of living freely, place the laws like a yoke on its own neck? It really seems to me more likely that it was a most eloquent man who explained

why it was best to live in one city together and to use laws as the best means to do so, thus softening the spirits of the people with most eloquent speech and transforming them so that he forced them to obey his will.
Source: Anton Maria de' Conti, "From *A Dialogue on Eloquence*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 149-50.

Juan de Guzman (1589)
[Master Fernando:] If this [i.e. eloquence] were not a matter of enormous sweetness, both for the one who practices it and the one who hears it, how could it have happened that when humans were wandering through the fields in the manner of wild animals, sustaining themselves not according to what reason dictates but what each one could do by means of his own power, I say, how could it have happened that they were brought together and led to live in towns and cities?
Source: Juan de Guzman, "From *The First Part of Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 242.

Juan de Guzman (1589)
[Master Fernando:] Therefore, when the power Aristides considered deeply the good things that flowed from this faculty [eloquence], he did not hesitate to contradict Plato who was seeking to defame rhetoric, and thus he fashioned that elegant fiction in which Prometheus, who interceded with Jupiter on behalf of men, grieved to see the human race wasting away in the desert without any defense and persecuted by the beasts, and he begged Jupiter to send a remedy to the world. Nothing seemed better or more effective to Jupiter than to send his son Mercury, the god of eloquence, so that by distributing that faculty among men, the human race might be preserved.
Source: Juan de Guzman, "From *The First Part of Rhetoric.*" *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric.* Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 242.

George Puttenham (1589)
A Poet is as much to say as a maker. And our English name well conformes with the Greek word: for of poiyin to make, they call a maker Poeta. Such as (by way of resemblance and reuerently) we may say of God: who without any trauell to his diuine imagination, made all the world of nought, nor also by any paterne or mould as the Platonicks with their Ideas do phantastically suppose. Euen so the very Poet makes and contriues out of his owne braine both the verse and matter of his poeme, and not by any foreine copie or example, as doth the translator, who therefore may well be sayd a versifier, but not a Poet. The premises considered, it giueth to the name and profession no smal dignitie and preheminence, aboue all other artificers, Scientificke or Mechanicall. And neuerthelesse without any repugnancie at all, a Poet may in some sort be said a follower or imitator, because he can expresse the true and liuely of euery thing is set before him, and which he taketh in hand to describe: and so in that respect is both a maker and a counterfaitor: and Poesie an art not only of making, but also of imitation. And this science in his perfection, can not grow, but by some diuine instinct, the Platonicks call it furor: or by excellencie of nature and complexion: or by great subtiltie of the spirits & wit or by much experience and obseruation of the world, and course of kinde, or peraduenture by all or most part of them. Otherwise how was it possible that Homer being but a poore priuate man, and as some say, in his later age blind, should so exactly set foorth and describe, as if he had bene a most excellent Captaine or Generall, the order and array of battels, the conduct of whole armies, the sieges and assaults of cities and townes? or as some great Princes maiordome and perfect Surueyour in Court, the order, sumptuousnesse and magnificence of royal bankers, feasts, weddings, and enteruewes? or as a Polititian very prudent, and much inured with the priuat and publique affaires, so grauely examine the lawes and ordinances Ciuill, or so profoundly discourse in matters of estate, and formes of all politique regiment? Finally how could he so

naturally paint out the speeches, countenance and maners of Princely persons and priuate, to wit, the wrath of Achilles, the magnanimitie of Agamemnon, the prudence of Menelaus, the prowesse of Hector, the maiestie of king Priamus, the grauitie of Nestor, the pollicies and eloquence of Vlysses, the calamities of the distressed Queenes, and valiance of all the Captaines and aduenturous knights in those lamentable warres of Troy? It is therefore of Poets thus to be conceiued, that if they be able to deuise and make all these things of them selues, without any subiect of veritie, that they be (by maner of speech) as creating gods. If they do it by instinct diuine or naturall, then surely much fauoured from aboue. If by their experience, then no doubt very wise men. If by any president or paterne layd before them, then truly the most excellent imitators & counterfaitors of all others. But you (Madame) my most Honored and Gracious: if I should seeme to offer you this my deuise for a discipline and not a delight, I might well be reputed, of all others the most arrogant and iniurious: your selfe being alreadie, of any that I know in our time, the most excellent Poet. Forsooth by your Princely purse fauours and countenance, making in maner what ye list, the poore man rich, the lewd well learned, the coward couragious, and vile both noble and valiant. Then for imitation no lesse, your person as a most cunning counterfaitor liuely representing Venus in countenance, in life Diana, Pallasfor gouernement, and Iuno in all honour and regall magnificence.
Source: George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*. Ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1936. 3-5.

George Puttenham (1589)
The profession and vse of Poesie is most ancient from the beginning, and not as manie erroniously suppose, after, but before any ciuil society was among men. For it is written, that Poesie was th'originall cause and occasion of their first assemblies, when before the people remained in the woods and mountains, vagarant and dispersed like the wild beasts, lawlesse and naked, or verie ill clad, and of all good and necessarie prouision for harbour or sustenance vtterly vnfurnished: so as they litle diffred for their maner of life, from the very brute beasts of the field. CONTINUE.
Source: George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*. Ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1936. 6.

George Puttenham (1589)
[Poets] were aged and graue men, and of much wisedome and experience in th'affaires of the world, they were the first lawmakers to the people, and the first polititiens, deuising all expedient meanes for th'establishment of Common wealth, to hold and containe the people in order and duety by force and vertue of good and wholesome lawes, made for the preseruation of the publique peace and tranquilitie. The same peraduenture not purposely intended, but greatly furthered by the aw of their gods, and such scruple of conscience, as the terrors of their late inuented religion had led them into.
Source: George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*. Ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1936. 7.

George Puttenham (1589)
Vtterance also and language is giuen by nature to man for perswasion of others, and aide of them selues, I meane the first abilitie to speake. For speech it selfe is artificiall and made by man, and the more pleasing it is, the more it preuaileth to such purpose as it is intended for: but speech by meeter is a kind of vtterance, more cleanly couched and more delicate to the eare then prose is, because it is more currant and slipper vpon the tongue, and withal tunable and melodious, as a kind of Musicke, and therfore may be tearmed a musicall speech or vtterance, which cannot but please the hearer very well. Another cause is, for that it is briefer & more compendious, and easier to beare away and be retained in memorie, then that which is contained in multitude of words and full of tedious ambage and long periods. It is beside a

maner of vtterance more eloquent and rethoricall then the ordinarie profe, which we vse in our daily talke: because it is decked and set out with all maner of fresh colours and figures, which maketh that it sooner inuegleth the iudgement of man, and carieth his opinion this way and that whither soeuer the heart by impression of the eare shalbe most affectionatly bent and directed. The vtterance in prose is not of so great efficacie, because not only it is dayly vsed, and by that occasion the eare is ouerglutted with it, but is also not so voluble and slipper vpon the tong, being wide and lose, and nothing numerous, nor contriued into measures, and sounded with so gallant and harmonical accents, nor in fine alowed that figuratiue conueyance, nor so great license in choise of words and phrases as meeter is. So as the Poets were also from the beginning the best perswaders and their eloquence the first Rethoricke of the world. Euen so it became that the high mysteries of the gods should be reuealed & taught, by a maner of vtterance and language of extraordinarie phrase, and briefe and compendious, and aboue al others sweet and ciuill and the Metricall is. The same also was meetest to register the liues and noble gests of Princes, and of the great Monarkes of the world, and all other the memorable accidents of time: so as the Poet was also the first historiographer.
Source: George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*. Ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1936. 8-9.

Guillaume du Vair (1594)
For my part, I believe that there is nothing in this world that pleases God so much as well-ordered assemblies of people and communities tied together by the knot of just and holy laws. And I certainly think it was eloquence that first softened the manners of men, tempered their savage emotions, and brought them together with their different wills in civil society. It is she without doubt who built cities, established kingdoms and empires, and inspired good laws there as their soul and the source of their life. It is she who impels and inspires nations to do beautiful and noble deeds, turns them away from evil and injustice, and pacifies people possessed by fury, leading them back to peace and repose. It is the lyre of Amphion that drags forests, rocks, and rivers after it. It is the caduceus of Mercury that enables him through persuasion to command the powers of heaven, earth, and hell.
Source: Guillaume du Vair, "From *On French Eloquence and the Reasons Why It Has Remained So Inferior*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 248.

Michel de Montaigne (1595)
So we see that in the gift of eloquence some have facility and promptness, and, as they say, can get it out so easily that at every turn they are ready; whereas others, slower, never speak except with elaboration and premeditation.

As they instruct ladies to select games and bodily exercises that will set off to advantage what is most beautiful about them, so if I had to give advice regarding these two diverse abilities in eloquence, which seems in our time to be the profession principally of preachers and lawyers, the slow man would do better as a preacher, it seems to me, and the other better as a lawyer. For the former's calling gives him all the leisure he pleases to prepare himself, and then his course is run in a straight continuous line, without interruption; whereas the opportunities of the lawyer press him at every moment to enter the lists, and the unforeseen replies of his adversary force him off his course, so that he must immediately take up a new line.
Source: Michel de Montaigne, "Of Prompt or Slow Speech." *The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*. Ed. and Trans. Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1957. 25-26.

Michel de Montaigne (1595)
A rhetorician of times past said that his trade was to make things appear and be thought great. That's a shoemaker who can make big shoes for a small foot. They would have had him whipped in Sparta for professing a deceitful and lying art. And I believe that Archidamus, who was king of Sparta, did not hear without astonishment the answer of Thucydides when he asked him who

was better in wrestling, Pericles or he: "That," he said, "would be hard to establish; for when I have thrown him in wrestling, he persuades those who saw it happen that he did not fall, and he wins the prize." Those who mask and make up women do less harm, for it is a matter of small loss not to see them in their natural state; whereas the other men make a profession of deceiving not our eyes but our judgment, and of adulterating and corrupting the essence of things. The commonwealths that kept themselves regulated and well governed, like the Cretan and the Lacedaemonian, made little account of orators.

Aristo wisely defines rhetoric as the science of persuading the people; Socrates and Plato, as the art of deceiving and flattering. And those who deny this in the general definition verify it everywhere in their precepts. The Mohammedans forbid its being taught to their children, because of its uselessness. And the Athenians, perceiving its perniciousness, for all its complete prestige in their city, ordained that the principal part of it, which is to stir the emotions, should be eliminated, together with the exordiums and perorations.

It is an instrument invented to manipulate and agitate a crowd and a disorderly populace, and an instrument that is employed only in sick states, like medicine. To those states where the vulgar, or the ignorant, or all men held all power—such as Athens, Rhodes, and Rome—and where things were in a perpetual turmoil, there orators flocked. And in truth, we see few persons in those republics who have pushed themselves into great credit without the aid of eloquence. Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, Lucullus, Lentulus, Metellus, derived from it the great strength needed to rise to height of authority that they finally attained, and helped themselves by it more than by arms; contrary to the opinion of the best times. For L. Volumnius, speaking publicly in favor of the election of Q. Fabius and P. Decius to the consulship, said: "They are men born for war, great in deeds; at combat in prattle, clumsy; truly consular minds. The subtle, eloquent, and learned are good for city life, as praetors to administer justice."

Eloquence flourished most at Rome when affairs were in the worst state and agitated by the storm of civil wars; as a free and untamed field bears the lustiest weeds. From that it seems that monarchical governments need it less than others: for all the stupidity and facility that is found in the common people, which makes them subject to be led by the ears to the sweet sound of this harmony without weighing things and coming to know their truth by force of reason—this facility, I say, is not so easily found in a single ruler; it is easier to safeguard him, by good education and advice, from the effects of that poison. No orator of renown was ever seen to come out of Macedonia or Persia.

Source: Michel de Montaigne, "Of the Vanity of Words." *The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*. Ed. and Trans. Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1957. 221-22.

Sir Philip Sidney (1595)

There is no art delivered unto mankind that hath not the works of nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature will have set forth. So doth the astronomer look upon the stars, and, by that he seeth, set down what order nature hath taken therein. So do the geometrician and arithmetician in their divers sorts of quantities. So doth the musician in times tell you which by nature agree, which not. The natural philosopher thereon hath his name, and the moral philosopher standeth upon the natural virtues, vices, and passions of man; and "follow nature," saith he, "therein, and thou shalt not err." The lawyer saith what men have determined, the historian what men have done. The grammarian speaketh only of the rules of speech, and the rhetorician and logician, considering what in nature will soonest prove and persuade, thereon give artificial rules, which still are compassed within the circle of a question, according to the proposed matter. The physician weigheth the nature of man's body, and the nature of things helpful or hurtful unto it. And the metaphysic, though it be in the second and abstract notions, and therefore be counted supernatural, yet doth he, indeed, build upon the depth of nature.

Source: Sir Philip Sidney, *A Defence of Poetry*. 1595. Ed. J. A. Van Dorsten. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966. 23.

Sir Philip Sidney (1595)
Orator fit, poeta nascitur.
Source: Sir Philip Sidney, *A Defence of Poetry*. 1595. Ed. J. A. Van Dorsten. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966. 62.

Sir Philip Sidney (1595)
For my part, I do not doubt, when Antonius and Crassus, the great forefathers of Cicero in eloquence, the one (as Cicero testifieth of them) pretended not to know art, the other not to set by it, because with a plain sensibleness they might win credit of popular ears, which credit is the nearest step to persuasion, which persuasion is the chief mark of oratory,—I do not doubt, I say, but that they used these knacks, very sparingly; which who doth generally use any man may see doth dance to his own music, and so be noted by the audience more careful to speak curiously than truly. Undoubtedly (at least to my opinion undoubtedly) I have found in divers small-learned courtiers a more sound style than in some professors of learning; of which I can guess no other cause, but that the courtier following that which by practice he findeth fittest to nature, therein, though he know it not, doth according to art—though not by art; where the other, using art to show art and not to hide art as in these cases he should do—flieth from nature, and indeed abuseth art.

But what? Methinks I deserve to be pounded for straying from poetry to oratory. But both have such an affinity in the wordish consideration, that I think this digression will make my meaning receive the fuller understanding: which is not to take upon me to teach poets how they should do, but only, finding myself sick among the rest, to show some one or two spots of the common infection grown among the most part of writers, that, acknowledging ourselves somewhat awry, we may bend to the right use both of matter and manner: whereto our language giveth us great occasion, being indeed capable of any excellent exercising of it. I know some will say it is a mingled language. And why not so much the better, taking the best of both the other?
Source: Sir Philip Sidney, *A Defence of Poetry*. 1595. Ed. J. A. Van Dorsten. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966. 71-72.

Angel Day (1599)
Forasmuch as we have here endeauoured to lay downe a platforme or method for writing of Epistles. It shall not be amisse, that following the order of all other writers, wee first define unto you what an Epistle is. An Epistle therefore, is that which usually we in our vulgar, doe tearme a Letter, and for the respectes thereof is called the messenger, or familiar speech of the absent, for that therein is discouered whatsoeuer the minde wisheth to have deliuered. The diuersities of Epistles are manifold, as wherof ensueth a platforme to euerie motion, being in truth so infinite as are imaginations of each ones fantasie, seeing the declaration of euerie, is no more then what the minde willeth in all occasions to be perfourmed, and according to such instigations wherewith at that instant men are fed when they write, taketh his formall substance, whether it be to require counsel, exhort, command, informe, commend, entreat, aduertise, gratulate, or whatsoeuer other purpose therein pretended, as cause and matter maie fall out to bee required.
Source: Angel Day, *The English Secretary, or Methods of Writing* Epistles *and* Letters. 1599. Ed. Robert O. Evans. Gainesville, FL: Scholars', 1967. 1.

***Ratio studiorum* (1599)**
Rules for the Teacher of Rhetoric

The scope of this class is not easily defined. Its purpose is the development of the power of self-expression. Its content spans two major fields, oratory and poetry, with oratory taking the place of honor. The purpose of the formation is both practical and cultural.

It may be said in general that this class is concerned mainly with the art of rhetoric, the refinement of style, and erudition.

Although the precepts may be studied in many authors, the daily prelection shall be confined to the oratorical works of Cicero, to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and, if desired, his *Poetics*.

Source: Allan P. Farrell, "The Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599." Diss. U of Detroit, 1970.

Francis Bacon (1605)

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little about the Rootes of this Science, as we haue done of the rest; The dutie and Office of *Rhetoricke* is, *To apply Reason to Imagination*, for the better moouing of the will; For wee see *Reason* is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three means; by *Illaqueation*, or *Sophisme*, which pertains to *Logicke*; by *Imagination* or *Impression*, which pertains to *Rhetoricke*; and by *Passion* or *Affection*, which pertains to *Moralitie*. And as in Negotiation with others; men are wrought by cunning, by Importunitie, and by vehemencie; So in this Negotiation within our selues; men are vndermined by *Inconsequences*, sollicited and importuned by *Impressions* or *Obseruations*: and transported by *Passions*: Neither is the Nature of Man so vnfortunately built, as that those Powers and Arts should haue force to disturbe Reason, and not to establish and aduance it: For the end of *Logicke* is to teach a fourme of Argument, to secure reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of *Moralitie*, is to procure the Affections to obey Reason, and not to inuade it. The end of *Rhetoricke*, is to fill the Imagination to second reason, and not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but *Ex obliquo*, for Caution.

Source: Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*. Ed. Michael Kiernan. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000. 127-28.

Nicholas Caussin (1630)

Eloquence is truly a heavenly seed and a ray taken from the fountain of eternal light. Thanks to it, those who excel in everything else approach nearer to the divine and seem to have an almost direct connection to it. Let me say it more clearly and plainly: as the human mind has an affinity with God, so eloquence, the queen of the earth, claims the same affinity for itself with the mind, The mind is the image of God; God is the mind; eloquence is divine. As God is in the world, and the mind is in the body, so eloquence is in civil life. God has been separated from any mortal materiality; the mind is entirely spirit; eloquence is the bright offspring of a special mind, God sees all things, nor is He seen; the mind discerns all things, nor is it discerned; eloquence takes possession of all things, nor does anything really take possession of it, God flows into things with the speed of the winds; the mind does so on the wings of love; but all the power of persuasion is carried by the emotions as by a vehicle, and it penetrates and permeates the breast. God has been diffused through all the regions of the universe; the mind has been distributed through all the parts of the body; but eloquence, having tied all the arts and disciplines together by means of a certain common chain, glides through all of them. The first has His kingdom in heaven; the second in the heart; the last in the brain. The heavens worship God, the souls of the dead observe Him, He makes the world turn, causes the sun to shine, rules the world, treads on the damned. The highest parts of the body submit to the mind, while the lowest ones are its slaves; the head moves the muscles as though they were taut strings, kindles the light of the eyes, bends the body, and is lord over all the members. But kings fear eloquence, and subjects stand in awe of it; it curbs the wills of men, adorns geniuses, administers cities, and looks down on all things as inferior to itself.

We have fashioned many arts after what the brute animals do and share many in common with them—I will say nothing here of brickmakers, stone cutters, bedmakers, and architects—for through the example of the beasts we have learned to sing with our voices and to make music with strings, to dye wool, weave cloth, make medicine, wage war, and administer empires. But truly, to speak—that is, to speak copiously, ornately, and wisely, something which is great in and of itself—that belongs exclusively to us. The mute herds cannot join the society of those who have this praiseworthy quality, and the angels themselves grant us our palm of victory, although they would strive with us for it if they were confined within the frame of the human body. For this reason, the ancients believed eloquence was invented by the gods; the Greeks ascribed it to Mercury, whom Orpheus calls "the minister of speech" and the French identify with their Hercules Ogmios—though it would he better if all of them said they got ii from God, the fountain

of knowledge.
Source: Nicholas Caussin, "From *On Sacred and Profane Eloquence*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 277.

Nicholas Caussin (1630)
The origin of eloquence is very ancient. States are held together by two things in particular, justice and speech. Hence, eloquence began with the founding of towns and the forming of societies by men who came in together from the countryside. Aristides tells how there was a great confusion in the cradle of the world at its birth. Almost all the animals surpassed man, who was naked and defenseless, in many ways, and they harassed him, causing him all sorts of troubles and anguish, which he was forced to put up with because he lacked counsel. And men themselves, like wild beasts, lived in the most disgusting chaos. Pitying this condition, Prometheus, as fables tell, went up to heaven to bring back help to make man safe as well as to enhance his dignity. In response, Jupiter, partly allured by Prometheus's chamr and partly moved profoundly by the misery of men, who were in a daily state of decay, sent Rhetoric to the world under Mercury's escort and ordered her to give abundantly of herself to mortals. Nevertheless, he did not want her lavishly bestowed on everyone in promiscuous fashion, like money flung in a theater; instead, he wanted her to select certain truly choice and noble minds and to enrich them with the resources of superior knowledge, both for their own benefit and for that of many others. Hence, the first societies, characterized by industry, deliberation, cunning, art, and wealth, began to flourish.
Source: Nicholas Caussin, "From *On Sacred and Profane Eloquence*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 281.

René Descartes (1637)
I held eloquence in high regard and I loved poetry, but I believed that they were both gifts of the mind—not fruits of study. Those who possess the most forceful power of reasoning and who best order their thoughts so as to render them clear and intelligible can always best persuade one of what they are proposing, even if they speak only the dialect of Lower Brittany and have never learned rhetoric. And those who are in possession of the most pleasing rhetorical devices and who know how to express them with the greatest of embellishment and sweetness will not fail to be the greatest poets, even if the art of poetry be unknown to them.
Source: René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One's Reason and for Seeking Truth in the* Sciences. Trans. Donald A. Cress. *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*. 3rd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. 4.

Thomas Hobbes (1637)
Rhetorique, is that Faculty, by which wee understand what will serve our turne, concerning any subject, to winne beliefe in the hearer.
Source: Thomas Hobbes, *A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique*. 1637. *The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy*. Ed. John T. Harwood. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1986. 40.

John Smith (1657)
Rhetorique is a faculty by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer: hereby likewise the end of the discourse is set forward, to wit, the affecting of the heart with the sense of the matter in hand.

It has two parts, *viz*.

1. Garnishing of speech, called *Elocution*.
2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called *Pronunciation*.

Elocution, or the garnishing of speech, is the first and principal part of Rhetorique, whereby the speech itself is beautified and made fine: And this is either

The fine manner of words called a *Trope*: or,

The fine shape or frame of speech, called a *Figure*.

Source: John Smith, *The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvailed*. New York: Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim, 1973. 1-2.

Jean-François Le Grand (1658)
I intend to speak of that imperious habit of speaking that reigns absolutely in the heart, exercises a legitimate power over the will, and is no less the foundation of empires than the source of triumphs. I mean that sovereign eloquence of the first order that casts its light down into the center of the soul, carries its warmth right to the bottom of the heart, has flashiness for the crowd and solidity for the wise, presides over political negotiations, decides religious controversies, and illuminates the obscurities of philosophy.
Source: Jean-François Le Grand, "From *A Discourse on French Rhetoric*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 284-85.

Jean-François Le Grand (1658)
With this foundation now established, let us boldly conclude that poetry is nothing other than the most constrained and strictly observed part of the art of oratory, and thus we will remain in agreement with Cicero that great Homer was a great orator; we will admit with Hermogenes that that Homer was an excellent rhetorician; and we will confess finally with Demetrius that that same Homer was the master of eloquence. Moreover, let us add that just as the first poets were the first priests and the first legislators of their nations, they also assumed the profession of interpreter of the gods. They made use of a kind of language that was more ornate and formal than that of the crowd, and with this language, which they called the language of the gods, they refined men who were stupid and savage, and made peoples civilized who wandered lost in the forests and mountains.
Source: Jean-François Le Grand, "From *A Discourse on French Rhetoric*." *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000. 287.

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole (1662)
To make this assortment more useful, we did not borrow examples from the sciences at random. Instead we selected the most important points that could best serve as rules and principles for finding the truth in matters we could not discuss here.

For example, we thought that rhetoric is not very helpful for finding thoughts, expressions, and embellishments. The mind furnishes enough thoughts, and usage provides the expressions. And there are too many metaphors and figures of speech. So the main idea is to avoid certain bad styles of writing and speaking, and above all the artificial rhetorical style made up of false and exaggerated thoughts and forced metaphors, which is the worst vice.
Source: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *Logic or the Art of Thinking [The Port-Royal Logic]*. Ed. and trans. Jill Vance Buroker. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 16.

Samuel Butler (1663)
For *Rhetorick*, he could not ope
His mouth but out there flew a Trope;
And when he hapned to break off
I'th' middle of his speech, or cough,
H' had hard words ready, to shew why,
And tell what Rules he did it by.
Else when with greatest Art he spoke,
You'd think he talk'd like other foke;
For all a Rhetoricians Rules
Teach nothing but to name his Tools.
His ordinary Rate of Speech
In loftiness of sound was rich,
A *Babylonish* dialect,
Which learned Pedants much affect.

It was a particolour'd dress
Of patch'd and pyball'd Languages:
'Twas *English* cut on *Greek* and *Latin*,
Like Fustian heretofore on Sattin.
It had an odde promiscuous Tone,
As if h' had talk'd three parts in one.
Which made some think, when he did gabble,
Th' had heard three Labourers of *Babel*;
Or *Cerberus* himself pronounce
A Leash of Languages at once.
This he as volubly would vent,
As if his stock would ne're be spent.
And truly to support that charge
He had supplies as vast and large.
For he could coyn or counterfeit
New words, with little or no wit:
Words so debas'd and hard, no stone
Was hard enough to touch them on.
And when with hasty noise he spoke 'em,
The Ignorant for currant took 'em.
That had the Orator who once,
Did fill his Mouth with Pebble stones
When he harangu'd; but known his Phrase
He would have us'd no other ways.

Source: Samuel Butler, *Hudibras*. Ed. John Wilders. Oxford: Clarendon, 1967. 3-4.

Bernard Lamy (1675)

Our common Idea of Rhetorick is this, That to speak Eloquently, it suffices to cram our Memory with such Precepts as are precrib'd by it.

Source: Bernard Lamy, *De l'art de parler*. 1675. *The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy*. Ed. John T. Harwood. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1986. 175.

John Locke (1689)

Since Wit and Fancy finds easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, *figurative Speeches*, and allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as *an* imperfection or *abuse* of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the world, will instruct those, who want to be informed: Only I cannot but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and preferred. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick, that powerful instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. *Eloquence*, like the fair Sex, has too

prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer it self ever to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find fault with those Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be Deceived.
Source: John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Ed. Peter Niddich. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 508.

Mary Astell (1697)
As Nature teaches us Logic, so does it instruct us in Rhetoric much better than Rules of Art, which if they are good ones are nothing else but those Judicious Observations which Men of Sense have drawn from Nature, and which all who reflect on the Operations of their own Minds will find out 'em selves. The common Precepts of Rhetoric may teach us how to reduce Ingenious ways of speaking to a certain Rule, but they do not teach us how to Invent them, this is Natures work and she does it best; there is as much difference between Natural and Artificial Eloquence as there is between Paint and True Beauty. So that as a good Author well observes, all that's useful in this Art, "is the avoiding certain evil ways of Writing and Speaking, and above all an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile Compos'd of false Thoughts, Hyperboles and forc'd Figures which is the greatest fault in Rhetoric."

I shall not therefore recommend under the name of Rhetoric an Art of speaking floridly on all Subjects, and of dressing up Error and Impertinence in a quaint and taking garb; any more than I did that Wrangling which goes by the name of Logic, and which teaches to dispute *for* and *against* all Propositions indefinitely whether they are True or False. It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press 'em into the Service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and a mistake to think that any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent that does not illustrate and inforce Truth. For the design of Rhetoric is to remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth, to Reduce the Passions to the Government of Reasons; the place our Subject in a Right Light, and excite our Hearers to a due consideration of it. And I know not what exactness of Method, pure and proper Language, Figures, insinuating ways of Address and the like signify, any farther than as they contribute to the Service of Truth by rendring our Discourse Intelligible, Agreeable and Convincing. They are indeed very serviceable to it when they are duly managed, for Good Sense loses much of its efficacy by being ill express'd, and an ill stile is nothing else but the neglect of some of these, or over doing other of 'em.
Source: Mary Astell, *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies: Parts I and II*. Ed. Patricia Springborg. London: Pickering and Chatto, 1997. 137-38.

Mary Astell (1697)
Every Author almost has some beauty or blemish remarkable in his Style from whence it takes its name; and every Reader has a peculiar tast of Books as well as Meats. One wou'd have the Subject exhausted, another in pleas'd if somewhat be not left to enlarge on in his own Meditations. This affects a Grave that a Florid Style; One is for Easiness, a second for Plainness, a third for Strength, and a fourth for Politeness. And perhaps the great secret of Writing is the mixing all these in so just a proportion that every one may tast what he likes without being disgusted by its contrary. And may find at once that by the Solidity of the Reason, the purity and propriety of Expression, and insinuating agreeableness of Address, his Understanding is Enlightned, his Affections subdued and his Will duly regulated.
Source: Mary Astell, *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies: Parts I and II*. Ed. Patricia Springborg. London: Pickering and Chatto, 1997. 140.

Giambattista Vico (1709)
As for eloquence, the same men assert that the modern study methods, far from being detrimental, are most useful to it. "How much preferable it is," they say, "to induce persuasion by solid arguments based on truth, to produce such an effect on the mind that, once that truth coalesces with reason, it can never again be separated from it, rather than to coerce the listener's soul by meretriciously eloquent allurements, by blazes of oratorical fire which, as soon as they are extinguished, cause him to revert to his original disposition!"

The answer is that eloquence does not address itself to the rational part of our nature, but almost entirely to our passions. The rational part in us may be taken captive by a net woven of purely intellectual reasonings, but the passional side of our nature can never be swayed and overcome unless this is done by more sensuous and materialistic means. The role of eloquence is to persuade; an orator is persuasive when he calls forth in his hearers the mood which he desires. Wise men induce this condition in themselves by an act of volition. This volition, in perfect obedience, follows the dictates of their intellect; consequently, it is enough for the speaker to point their duty to such wise men, and they do it. But the multitude, the *vulgus*, are overpowered and carried along by their appetite, which is tumultuous and turbulent; their soul is tainted, having contracted a contagion from the body, so that it follows the nature of the body, and is not moved except by bodily things. Therefore, the soul must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love; for once it loves, it is easily taught to believe; once it believes and loves, the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to *will*. Unless the speaker can compass these three things, he has not achieved the effect of persuasion; he has been powerless to convince.
Source: Giambattista Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time: With a Translation of* The Academies and the Relation between Philosophy and Eloquence. Ed. and trans. Elio Gianturco. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990. 38.

Giambattista Vico (1709)
What is eloquence, in effect, but wisdom, ornately and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion of mankind. Shall the professor of eloquence, to whom no student may have access unless previously trained in all sciences and arts, be ignorant of those subjects which are required by his duties? The main who is deputed to exhort young students to grapple with all kinds of disciplines, and to discourse about their advantages and disadvantages, so that they may attain those and escape these, should he not be competent to expound his opinions on such knowledge?
Source: Giambattista Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time: With a Translation of* The Academies and the Relation between Philosophy and Eloquence. Ed. and trans. Elio Gianturco. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990. 78.

Giambattista Vico (1711-1741)
Rhetoric or eloquence, however, is "the faculty of speaking appropriate to the purpose of persuading."
Source: Giambattista Vico, *The Art of Rhetoric (Institutiones oratoriae, 1711-1741)*. Ed. and trans. Giorgio A. Pinton and Arthur W. Shippee. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984. 5.

Adam Smith (ca. 1763)
'Tis however from the consideration of these figures, and the divisions and subdivisions of them, that so many systems of retorick both ancient and modern have formed. They are generally a very silly set of Books and not at all instructive.
Source: Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. J. C. Bryce. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983. 26.

Adam Smith (ca. 1763)
The end of every discourse is either to narrate some fact or prove some proposition. When the design is to set the case in the clearest light; to give every argument its due force, and by this means persuade us no farther than our unbiassed judgement is Convinced; this is no<t to> make use of the Rhetoricall Stile. But when we propose to persuade at all events, and for this purpose adduce those arguments that make for the side we have espoused, and magnify these to the utmost of our power; and on the other hand make light of and extenuate all those which may be brought on the other side, then we make use of the Rhetoricall Stile.
Source: Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. J. C. Bryce. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983. 89.

Adam Smith (ca. 1763)
And in generall in every sort of eloquence[e] the choise of the arguments and the proper

arrangement of them is the least difficult matter. The Expression and Stile is what requires most skill and is alone capable of any particular discourse. We see accordingly that Cicero, Quinctilian and all the best authors who treat Rhetoricall composition, treat of the Invention of arguments, or Topicks, and the composition or arrangement of them, as very slight matter and of no great difficulty, and never see[e]m to be in ernest unless when they give us directions concerning the ornaments of Language and Expression; and even this in the maner the<y> have handled it does not appear to be of very great importance, tho it might without doubt be treated of so as to be both entertaining and instructive.
Source: Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. J. C. Bryce. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983. 138.

Adam Smith (ca. 1763)
Every discourse proposes either barely to relate some fact, or to prove some proposition. In the first [is the end] the discourse is called a narrative one. The latter is the foundation of two Sorts of Discourse: The Didactick and the Rhetoricall. The former proposes to put before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to perswade no farther than the arguments themselves appear convincing. The Rhetoricall again endeavours by all means to perswade us; and for this purpose it magnifies all the arguments on the one side and diminishes or conceals those that might be brought on the side conterary to that which it is designed that we should favour. Persuasion which is the primary design in the Rhetoricall is but the secondary design in the Didactick. It endeavours to persuade us only so far as the strength of the arguments is convincing, instruction is the main End. In the other Persuasion is the main design and Instruction is considered only so far as it is subservient to perswasion, and no farther.
Source: Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. J. C. Bryce. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983. 149.

George Campbell (1776)
But there is no art whatever that hath so close a connexion with all the faculties and powers of the mind, as eloquence, or the art of speaking, in the extensive sense in which I employ the term. For in the first place, that it ought to be ranked among the polite or fine arts, is manifest from this, that in all its exertions, with little or no exception, (as will appear afterwards,) it requires the aid of the imagination. Thereby it not only pleases, but by pleasing commands attention, rouses the passions, and often at last subdues the most stubborn resolution. It is also a useful art. This is certainly the case if the power of speech be a useful faculty, as it professedly teaches us how to employ that faculty with the greatest probability of success. Further, if the logical art, and the ethical, be useful, eloquence is useful, as it instructs us how these arts must be applied for the conviction and the persuasion of others. It is indeed the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes. Nay, without this, the greatest talents, even wisdom itself, lose much of their lustre, and still more of their usefulness. "The wise in heart," saith Solomon, "shall be called prudent, but the sweetness of the lips increaseth learning." By the former a man's own conduct maybe well regulated, but the latter is absolutely necessary for diffusing valuable knowledge, and enforcing right rules of action upon others.
Source: George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Ed. Lloyd Bitzer. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988. lxxiii.

George Campbell (1776)
In speaking there is always some end proposed, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer. The word *eloquence* in its greatest latitude denotes, "That art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end."

All the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.
Source: George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Ed. Lloyd Bitzer. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988. 1.

Joseph Priestley (1777)
The use of speech is common to all mankind. For we find none of the human race but who are capable of expressing their ideas, sentiments, and intentions to others, in a more or less adequate manner, by words: and this capacity was necessary to that manual *intercourse*, and free communication, without which beings of our social nature could be happy.

It is the province of *art* to improve upon *nature*, by adding to her powers and advantages: and, for exercise of our intellectual and active powers, all the gifts of nature are little more than the bare unwrought materials of those accomplishments, from which result the dignity and refined happiness of social life.

This ORATORY is the natural faculty of speech improved by art; whereby the use of it is perfected, facilitated, and extended; and consequently its *value* and *influence* greatly increased. And the excellence of this art is the more generally acknowledged, and its effects the more admired, because, language being common to us all, all men can the more easily conceive both the importance, and the difficulty of the improvements of which it is capable.
Source: Joseph Priestly, *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism*. Ed. Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1965. 1-2.

Hugh Blair (1783)
To speak or to write perspicuously and agreeably with purity, with grace and strength, are attainments of the utmost consequence to all who purpose, either by speech or writing, to address the Public.
Source: Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloran. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2005. 5.

Hugh Blair (1783)
Of Eloquence, in particular, it is the more necessary to ascertain the proper notion, because there is not any thing concerning which false notions have been more prevalent. Hence, it has been so often, and is still at this day in disrepute with many. When you speak to a plain man of Eloquence, or in praise of it, he is apt to hear you with very little attention. He conceives Eloquence to signify a certain trick of Speech; the art of varnishing weak arguments plausibly; or of speaking so as to please and tickle the ear. “Give me good sense,” says he, “and keep your Eloquence for boys.” He is in the right, if Eloquence were what he conceives it to be. It would be then a very contemptible art indeed, below the study of any wise or good man. But nothing can be more remote from truth. To be truly eloquent, is to speak to the purpose. For the best definition which, I think, can be given of Eloquence, is the Art of Speaking in such a manner as to attain the end for which we speak. Whenever a man speaks or writes, he is supposed, as a rational being, to have some end in view; either to inform, or to amuse, or to persuade, or, in some way or other, to act upon his fellow-creatures. He who speaks, or writes, in such a manner as to adapt all his words most effectually to that end, is the most eloquent man. Whatever then the subject be, there is room for Eloquence; in history, or even in philosophy as well as in orations. The definition which I have given of Eloquence, comprehends all the different kinds of it; whether calculated to instruct, to persuade, or to please. But, as the most important subject of discourse is Action, or Conduct, the power of Eloquence chiefly appears when it is employed to influence Conduct, and persuade to Action. As it is principally with reference to this end, that it becomes the object of Art, Eloquence may, under this view of it, be defined, The Art of Persuasion.
Source: Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Ed. Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloran. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2005. 264-65.

Immanuel Kant (1790)
The arts of SPEECH are *rhetoric* and *poetry*. *Rhetoric* is the art of transacting a serious business

of the understanding as if it were a free play of the imagination; *poetry* that of conducting a free play of the imagination as if it were a serious business of the understanding.

Thus the *orator* announces a serious business, and for the purpose of entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere *play* with ideas. The *poet* promises merely an entertaining *play* with ideas, and yet for the understanding there inures as much as if the promotion of its business had been his intention.

Source: Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement." *The Critique of Judgement*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon, 1952. 184-85.

Immanuel Kant (1790)

Rhetoric, so far as this is taken to mean the art of persuasion, i.e. the art of deluding by means of a fair semblance (as *ars oratoria*), and not merely excellence of speech (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as is necessary to win over men's minds to the side of the speaker before they have weighed the matter, and to rob their verdict of its freedom. Hence it can be recommended neither for the bar nor the pulpit.

Source: Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement." *The Critique of Judgement*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon, 1952. 192.

John Witherspoon (1801)

Eloquence is undoubtedly a very noble art, and when possessed in a high degree has been, I think, in all ages one of the most admired and envied talents. It has not only been admired in all ages, but if I am not mistaken among all ranks. Its power is universally felt, and therefore probably the talent more universally esteemed than either genius or improvement in several other kinds of human excellence. Military skill and political wisdom have their admirers, but far inferior in number to those who admire, envy, or would wish to imitate him that has the power of persuasion.

Source: John Witherspoon, *Lectures on Eloquence*. *The Selected Writings of John Witherspoon*. Ed. Thomas Miller. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990. 231.

John Witherspoon (1801)

Language is what in a great measure distinguishes man from the inferior creatures. Not but that almost all animals have certain sounds by which they can communicate something to one another. But these sounds are evidently only simple, and sometimes single exertions, differing in one creature from another according to the different conformation of their organs. Articulate speech has a far greater compass and is able to express not only a vast multitude of complex, as well as simple ideas; perhaps we may even say that articulate speech is little less extensive than thought itself, there being hardly any idea that can be formed but it may be expressed, and by that means communicated. In this there is a wide and manifest distinction between the rational and irrational creatures.

Source: John Witherspoon, *Lectures on Eloquence*. *The Selected Writings of John Witherspoon*. Ed. Thomas Miller. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990. 248.

John Witherspoon (1801)

Articulate language is intended to communicate our sentiments one to another. This may be considered as fully explained by saying it includes information and persuasion. A conception in my mind, when spoken, its excellence consists in making another perceive what I perceive, and feel towards it as I feel. They may be afterwards amplified and extended, but these two particulars show the true original purpose of speech. Eloquence is commonly called the art of persuasion, but the other must be taken in. We must inform before we can persuade, or if there be any such thing as persuasion without information, it is only a blind impulse.

Source: John Witherspoon, *Lectures on Eloquence*. *The Selected Writings of John Witherspoon*. Ed. Thomas Miller. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990. 248.

John Quincy Adams (1810)
The definition, adopted by Quintilian from some former writer, whom he does not name, is more correct, more precise, and comprehensive. Rhetoric in his judgment is the science of speaking well. The principal reason, which he assigns for preferring this definition to all the rest, may perhaps be controverted, for he contends, that it includes the moral character of the speaker, as well as the excellence of the speech; because none but an honest man can speak well. I shall on a future occasion examine impartially, and endeavor to ascertain precisely the true value of this opinion, which is so warmly advocated by all the great orators of antiquity. At present I shall only remark, that admitting the maxim in its fullest latitude, it does not appear to me to be necessarily implied in this definition; nor can I admit the argument, as decisive for giving it the preference.

The reasons, which I deem far more conclusive for adopting it, are its comprehensive simplicity, and its remarkable coincidence with that virtual definition of the art, contained in the holy scriptures. The art of speaking well embraces the fewest possible words the whole compass of the subject. You can imagine no species of rhetorical excellence, which would not be included in the idea, and the idea involves nothing beyond the boundaries of the art. It is full without redundance, and capacious without obscurity.

It has also the sanction of holy writ. Observe the force of the expressions, used in the solemn interview between the supreme Creator and

> "That shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed,
> "In the beginning, how the heavens and earth
> "Rose out of chaos."

And Moses said unto the Lord, O my Lord, I am not eloquent, neither heretofore, nor since thou hast spoken unto thy servant. What is the eventual reply? Is not Aaron the Levite thy brother? I know that he can speak well. In the language of sacred inspiration itself, to speak well is precisely the equivalent to the art of eloquence, and in this definition the words of Quintilian are ratified by the voice of heaven.
Source: John Quincy Adams, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1997. 37-39.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1818)
Eloquence is the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing, or our opinion about it, of kindling in them our feeling concerning it, and thus of putting them in sympathy with us. And all this by our conducting the stream of our thought into their minds, through the medium of words, with such force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already taken, and sweep it along with ours in its course. The more their previous course of thought differs from ours, the greater is this achievement. From this it is easily understood how personal conviction and passion make a man eloquent; and in general, eloquence is more the gift of nature than the work of art; yet here, also, art will support nature.
Source: Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*. Vol. 2. Trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1884. 305.

Richard Whately (1828)
Of Rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers; who, however, seem not so much to have disagreed in their conceptions of the nature of the same things, as to have had different things in view while they employed the same term. Not only the word Rhetoric itself, but also those used in defining it, have been taken in various senses; as may be observed with respect to the word "Art" in Cicero's *De Oratore*, where a discussion is introduced as to the applicability of that term to Rhetoric; manifestly turning on the different senses in which "Art" may be understood.

To enter into an examination of all the definitions that have been given, would lead to much uninteresting and uninstructive verbal controversy. It is sufficient to put the reader on his guard against the common error of supposing that a general term has some real object, properly corresponding to it, independent of our conceptions;—that, consequently, some one definition in every case is to be found which will comprehend everything that is rightly designated by that term;—and that all others must be *erroneous*: whereas, in fact, it will often happen, as in the present instance, that both the wider, and the more restricted sense of a term, will be alike sanctioned by use (the only competent authority), and that the consequence will be a corresponding variation in the definitions employed; none of which perhaps may be fairly chargeable with error, though none can be framed that will apply to every acceptation of the term.
Source: Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*. Ed. Douglas Ehninger. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1963. 1-2.

Richard Whately (1828)
In the present day, however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation of that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all "Composition in Prose"; in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive Speaking."

I propose in the present work to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; and to treat of "Argumentative Composition," *generally*, and *exclusively*; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an off-shoot from Logic.
Source: Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*. Ed. Douglas Ehninger. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1963. 4.

Richard Whately (1828)
The *finding* of suitable ARGUMENTS to prove a given point, and the skillful *arrangement* of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone.

The business of Logic is, as Cicero complains, to *judge* of arguments, not to *invent* them: ("in inveniendis argumentis muta nimium est; in judicandis, nimium loquax"). The knowledge, again, in each case, of the subject in hand, is essential; but it is evidently borrowed from the science or system conversant about that subject-matter, whether Politics, Theology, Law, Ethics, or any other. The art of addressing the feelings, again, does not belong exclusively to Rhetoric; since Poetry has at least as much to do with that branch. Nor are the considerations relative to Style and Elocution confined to argumentative and persuasive compositions. The art of *inventing* and *arranging Arguments* is, as has been said, the only province that Rhetoric can claim entirely and exclusively.
Source: Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*. Ed. Douglas Ehninger. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1963. 39-40.

Thomas De Quincey (1829)
By Eloquence we understand the overflow of powerful feelings upon occasions fitted to excite them. But Rhetoric is the art of aggrandizing and bringing out into strong relief, by means of various and striking thoughts, some aspect of truth which of itself is supported by no spontaneous feelings, and therefore rests upon artificial aids.
Source: Thomas De Quincey, "Rhetoric." *Essays on Style, Rhetoric, and Language*. Ed. Fred N. Scott. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1893. 147.

Thomas Carlyle (1831)
Again, in the difference between Oratory and Rhetoric, as indeed everywhere in that superiority of what is called the Natural over the Artificial, we find a similar illustration. The Orator persuades and carries all with him, he knows not how; the Rhetorician can prove that he ought to have persuaded and carried all with him: the one is in a state of healthy unconsciousness, as if he "had no system;" the other, in virtue of regimen and dietetic punctuality, feels at best that "his system is in high order." So stands it, in short, with all the forms of Intellect, whether as

directed to the finding of truth, or to the fit imparting thereof; to Poetry, to Eloquence, to depth of Insight, which is the basis of both these; always the characteristic of right performance is a certain spontaneity, an unconsciousness; "the healthy know not of their health, but only the sick." So that the old precept of the critic, as crabbed as it looked to his ambitious disciple, might contain in it a most fundamental truth, applicable to us all, and in much else than Literature: "Whenever you have written any sentence that looks particularly excellent, be sure to blot it out." In like manner, under milder phraseology, and with a meaning purposely much wider, a living Thinker has taught us: "Of the Wrong we are always conscious, of the Right never."
Source: Thomas Carlyle, "Characteristics." *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays: Collected and Republished, Vol. 2*. Vol. 14 of *Carlyle's Complete Works*. 20 vols. Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1885. 349-50.

Samuel P. Newman (1835)
By the philosophy of rhetoric, I here refer to those principles in the science of the philosophy of language, on which are founded those conclusions and directions which are applicable to literary criticism, and to the formation of style. Obviously, then, it may be answered, that an acquaintance with the science of intellectual philosophy, and with the philosophy of language, should precede the study of rhetoric.
Source: Samuel P. Newman, *A Practical System of Rhetoric, or the Principles and Rules of Style*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1995. iii.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1836)
These facts suggest the advantage which the country-life possesses for a powerful mind, over the artificial and curtailed life of cities. We know more from nature than we can at will communicate. Its light flows into the mind evermore, and we forget its presence. The poet, the orator, bred in the woods, whose sense have been nourished by their fair and appeasing changes, year after year, without design and without heed,—shall not lose their lesson altogether, in the roar of cities or the broil of politics. Long hereafter, amidst agitation and terror in national councils,—in the hour of revolution,—these solemn images shall reappear in their morning luster, as fit symbols and words of the thoughts which the passing events shall awaken. At the call of a noble sentiment, again the woods wave, the pines murmur, the river rolls and shines, and the cattle low upon the mountains, as he saw and heard them in his infancy. And with these forms, the spells of persuasion, the keys of power are put into his hands.
Source: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature." *Nature, Addresses, and Lectures*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971. Vol. 1 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Ed. Joseph Slater, et al. 6 vols. to date. 1971-. 21.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1837)
The poet, in utter solitude remembering his spontaneous thoughts and recording them, is found to have recorded that which men in crowded cities find true for them also. The orator distrusts at first the fitness of his frank confessions,—his want of knowledge of the persons he addresses,—until he finds that he is the complement of his hearers; that they drink his words because he fulfils for them their own nature; the deeper he dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds this is the most acceptable, most public, and universally true. The people delight in it; the better part of every man feels, This is my music; this is myself.
Source: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar." *Nature, Addresses, and Lectures*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971. Vol. 1 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Ed. Joseph Slater, et al. 6 vols. to date. 1971-. 63.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
I am persuaded that when the minds of men and women become emancipated from the thralldom of superstition and "traditions of men," the sentiments contained in the Pastoral Letter will be recurred to with as much astonishment as the opinions of Cotton Mather and other distinguished men of his day, upon the subject of witchcraft; nor will it be deemed less wonderful, that a body of divines would gravely assemble and endeavor to prove that woman has no right to "open her mouth for the dumb," than it now is that judges would have sat on the

trials of witches, and solemnly condemned nineteen persons and one dog to death for witchcraft.
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 37.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
What but these views, so derogatory to the character of woman, could have called forth the remark contained in the Pastoral Letter? "We especially deplore the intimate acquaintance and promiscuous conversation of *females* with regard to things 'which ought not to be names,' by which that modesty and delicacy, which is the charm of domestic life, and which constitutes the true influence of woman, is consumed." How wonderful that the conceptions of man relative to woman are so low, that he cannot perceive that she may converse on any subject connected with the improvement of her species, without swerving in the least from that modesty which is one of her greatest virtues!
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 42-43.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
The woman who goes forth, clad in the panoply of God, to stem the tide of iniquity and misery, which she beholds rolling through our land, goes not forth to her labor of love as a female. She goes as the dignified messenger of Jehovah, and all she does and says must be done and said irrespective of sex. She is in duty bound to communicate with all, who are able and willing to aid her in saving her fellow creatures, both men and women, from that destruction which awaits them.

So far from woman losing any thing of the purity of her mind, by visiting the wretched victims of vice in their miserable abodes, by talking with them, or of them, she becomes more and more elevated and refined in her feelings and views. While laboring to cleanse the minds of others from the malaria of moral pollution, her own heart becomes purified, and her soul rises to nearer communion with her God. Such a woman is infinitely better qualified to fulfil the duties of a wife and a mother, than the woman whose *false delicacy* leads her to shun her fallen sister and brother, and shrink from *naming those sins* which she knows exist, but which she is too fastidious to labor by deed and by word to exterminate.
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 43.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus, was distinguished for virtue, learning, and good sense. She wrote and spoke with uncommon elegance and purity. Cicero and Quintilian bestow high praise upon her letters, and the eloquence of her children was attributed to her careful superintendence. This reminds me of a remark made by my brother, Thomas S. Grimké , when speaking of the importance of women being well educated, that "educated men would never make educated women, but educated women would make educated men." I believe the sentiment is correct, because if the wealth of latent intellect among women was fully evolved and improved, they would rejoice to communicate to their sons all their own knowledge, and inspire them with desires to drink from the fountain of literature.

I pass over many interesting proofs of the intellectual powers of women; but I must not omit glancing at the age of chivalry, which has been compared to a golden thread running through the dark ages. During this remarkable era, women who, before this period, had been subject to every species of oppression and neglect, were suddenly elevated into deities, and worshipped with a mad fanaticism. It is not improbable, however, that even the absurdities of chivalry were beneficial to women, as it raised them from that extreme degradation to which they had been condemned, and prepared the way for them to be permitted to enjoy some scattered rays from the sun of science and literature. As the age of knight-errantry declined, men began to take pride

in learning, and women shared the advantages which this change produced. Women preached in public, supported controversies, published and defended theses, filled the chairs of philosophy and law, harangued the popes in Latin, wrote Greek and read Hebrew. Nuns wrote poetry, women of rank became divines. and young girls publicly exhorted Christian princes to take up arms for the recovery of the holy sepulcher. Hypatia, daughter of Theon of Alexandria, succeeded her father in the government oaf the Platonic school, and filled with reputation a seat, where many celebrated philosophers had taught. The people regarded her as an oracle, and magistrates consulted her in all important case. No reproach was ever uttered against the perfect purity of her manners. She was unembarrassed in large assemblies of men, because their admiration was tempered with the most scrupulous respect. In the 13th century, a young lady of Bologna pronounced a Latin oration at the age of twenty-three. At twenty-six, she took the degree of doctor of laws, and began publicly to expound Justinia. At thirty, she was elevated to a professor's chair, and taught the law to a crowd of scholars from all nations. Italy produced many learned and gifted women, among whom, perhaps none was more celebrated than Victoria Colonna, Marchioness of Pescara. In Spain, Isabella of Rosera converted Jews by her eloquent preaching; and in England the names of many women, from Lady Jane Gray down to Harriet Martineau, are familiar to every reader of history. Of the last mentioned authoress, Lord Brougham said that her writings on political economy were doing more than those of any man in England. There is a contemporary of Harriet Martineau, who has recently rendered valuable services to her country. She presented a memorial to Parliament, stating the dangerous parts of the coast, where light-houses were needed, and at her suggestion, several were erected. She keeps a life-boat and sailors in her pay, and has been the means of saving many lives. Although she has been deprived of the use of her limbs since early childhood, yet even when the storm is unusually severe, she goes herself on the beach in her carriage, that she may be sure her men perform their duty. She understands several languages, and is now engaged in writing a work on the Northern languages of Europe. "In Germany, the influence of women on literature is considerable, though less obvious than in some other countries. Literary familiars frequently meet at each others houses, and learned and intelligent women are often the brightest ornaments of these social circles." France has produced many distinguished women, whose names are familiar to every lover of literature. And I believe it is conceded universally, that Madame de Stael was intellectually the greatest woman that ever lives. The United States have produced several female writers, some of whom have talents of the highest order. But women, even in this free republic, do not enjoy all the intellectual advantages of men, although there is a perceptible improvement within the last ten or twenty years; and I trust there is a desire awakened in my sisters for solid acquirements, which will elevate them to their "appropriate sphere," and enable them to "adorn the doctrine of God our Savior in all things."
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 65-67.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
I should not mention this subject again, if it were not to point out to my sisters what seems to me an irresistible conclusion from the literal interpretation of St. Paul, without reference to the context, and the peculiar circumstances and abuse which drew forth the expressions, "I suffer not a woman to teach"—"Let your women keep silence in the church," [1 Cor. 14:34], i.e. congregation. It is manifest, that if the apostle meant what his words imply, when taken in the strictest sense, then women have no right to *teach* Sabbath or day schools, or to open their lips to sing in the assemblies of the people; yet young and delicate women are engaged in all these offices; they are expressly trained to exhibit themselves, and raise their voices to a high pitch in the choirs of our places of worship. I do not intend to see, that they are as really infringing a *supposed* divine command, by instruction their pupils in the Sabbath or day schools, and by singing in the congregation, as if they were engaged in preaching the unsearchable riches of Christ to a lost and perishing world. Why, then, are we permitted to break this injunction in

some points, and so sedulously warned not to overstep the bounds set for us by our *brethren* in another? Simply, as I believe, because in the one case we subserve *their* views and *their* interests, and act *in subordination to them*; whilst in the other, we come in contact with their interests, and claim to be on an equality with them in the highest and most important trust ever committed to man, namely, the ministry of the world. It is manifest, that if women were permitted to be ministers of the gospel, as they unquestionably were in the primitive ages of the Christian church, it would interfere materially with the present organized system of spiritual power and ecclesiastical authority, which is now vested solely in the hands of men. It would either show that all the paraphernalia of theological seminaries, &c. &c. to prepare men to become evangelists, is wholly unnecessary, or it would create a necessity for similar institutions in order to prepare women for the same office; and this would be an encroachment on that learning, which our kind brethren have so ungenerously monopolized.
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 97.

Sarah Grimké (1838)
I have blushed for my sex when I have heard of their entreating ministers to attend their associations, and open them with a prayer. The idea is inconceivable to me, that Christian women can be engaged in doing God's work, and yet cannot ask his blessing on their efforts, except through the lips of a man. I have known a whole town scoured to obtain a minister to open a female meeting, and their refusal to do so spoken of as quite a misfortune. Now, I am not glad that the ministers do wrong; but I am glad that my sisters have been sometimes compelled to act for themselves: it is exactly what they need to strengthen them, and prepare them to act independently. And to say the truth, there is something ludicrous in seeing a minister enter the meeting, open it with prayer, and then take his departure.
Source: Sarah Grimké, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, and the Condition of Woman." *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. 101.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841)
The thought of genius is spontaneous; hut the power of picture or expression, in the most enriched and flowing nature, implies a mixture of will, a certain control over the spontaneous states, without which no production is possible. It is a conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought, under the eye of judgment, with a strenuous exercise of choice. And yet the imaginative vocabulary seems to be spontaneous also. It does not flow from experience only or mainly, but from a richer source. Not by any conscious imitation of particular forms are the grand strokes of the painter executed, but by repairing to the fountain-head of all forms its his mind.
Source: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Intellect." *Essays: First Series*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1979. Vol. 2 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Ed. Joseph Slater, et al. 6 vols. to date. 1971-. 199.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841)
Thus, historically viewed, it has been the office of art to educate the perception of beauty. We are immersed in beauty, but our eyes have no clear vision. It needs, by the exhibition of single traits, to assist and lead the dormant taste. We carve and paint, or we behold what is carved and painted, as students of the mystery of Form. The virtue of art lies in detachment, in sequestering one object from the embarrassing variety. Until one thing comes out front the connection of things, there can be enjoyment, contemplation, but no thought. Our happiness and unhappiness are unproductive. The infant lies in a pleasing trance, but his individual character, and his practical power depend on his daily progress in the separation of things, and dealing with one at a time. Love and all the passions concentrate all existence around a single form. It is the habit of certain minds to give an all-excluding fulness to the object, the thought, the word, they alight

upon, and to make that for the time the deputy of the world. These are the artists, the orators, the leaders of society. The power to detach, and to magnify by detaching, is the essence of rhetoric in the hands of the orator and the poet. This rhetoric, or power to fix the momentary eminency of an object,—so remarkable in Burke, in Byron, in Carlyle,— the painter and sculptor exhibit in color and in stone. The power depends on the depth of the artist's insight of that object he contemplates. For every object has its roots in central nature, and may of course be so exhibited to us as to represent the world. Therefore, each work of genius is the tyrant of the hour, and concentrates attention on itself.
Source: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Art." *Essays: First Series*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1979. Vol. 2 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Ed. Joseph Slater, et al. 6 vols. to date. 1971-. 210-11.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1844)
Art is the path of the creator to his work. The paths, or methods, are ideal and eternal, though few men ever see them, not the artist himself for years, or for a lifetime, unless he come into the conditions. The painter, the sculptor, the composer, the epic rhapsodist, the orator, all partake one desire, namely, to express themselves symmetrically and abundantly, not dwarfishly and fragmentarily. They found or put themselves in certain conditions, as, the painter and sculptor before some impressive human figures; the orator, into the assembly of the people; and the others, in such scenes as each has found exciting to his intellect; and each presently feels the new desire. He hears a voice, he sees a beckoning. Then he is apprised, with wonder, what herds of daemons hem him in. He can no more rest; he says, with the old painter, "By God, it is in me, and must go forth of me." He pursues a beauty, half seen, which flies before him. The poet pours out verses in every solitude. Most of the things he says are conventional, no doubt; but by and by he says something which is original and beautiful. That charms him. He would say nothing else but such things. In our way of talking, we say, "That is yours, this is mine;" but the poet knows well that it is not his; that it is as strange and beautiful to him as to you; he would fain hear the like eloquence at length. Once having tasted this immortal ichor, he cannot have enough of it, and, as an admirable creative power exists in these intellections, it is of the last importance that these things get spoken. What a little of all we know is said! What drops of all the sea of our science are baled up! and by what accident it is that these are exposed, when so many secrets sleep in nature! Hence the necessity of speech and song; hence these throbs and heart-beatings in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end, namely, that thought may be ejaculated as Logos, or Word.
Source: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Poet." *Essays: Second Series*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1983. Vol. 3 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Ed. Joseph Slater, et al. 6 vols. to date. 1971-. 22-23.

George Winfred Hervey (1853)
We have a variety of works on Rhetoric, which teach the art of speaking in public, but not one sufficient treatise on the art of speaking in the sundry circumstances of private and social life. Hitherto we have sought to make orators of *the few*, rather than conversers of *the many*; not duly considering that it is every way more desirable that the multitude of private citizens should talk well in their daily intercourse, than that a small number of orators should know how to address them on stated occasions. Even public speakers themselves would not find it amiss to acquire some skill in this art. Whatever design they would compass by their powers of utterance, they will, in the course of a life-time, make as many, if not as deep marks, on their generation by their frequent talks as by their few speeches; nor let them indulge the notion that the gifts and acquirements which make them orators do necessarily make them conversers also. The two characters are not often united in the same person; for this reason, among others, that the habit of addressing public bodies, though favorable in some respects, is unfavorable in others to excellence in conversation.

As all our great authorities in Rhetoric hold that the orator should be a good man, so we affirm, a little more explicitly, that the conversationist should be a man of evangelical piety.

Whether the assertion of Theremin that "eloquence is a virtue," be true or untrue, depends on the meaning he attaches to the word *eloquence*: thus much, however, we do hazard, that the highest style of colloquial eloquence is the result of many virtues.
Source: George Winfred Hervey, *The Rhetoric of Conversation: Or, Bridles and Spurs for the Management of the Tongue*. New York: Harper, 1853. iv.

Edward T. Channing (1856)
Without attempting a formal definition of the word, I am inclined to consider rhetoric, when reduced to a system in books, as a body of rules derived from experience and observation, extending to all communication by language and designed to make it efficient. It does not ask whether a man is to be a speaker or writer,—a poet, philosopher, or debater, but simply,—is it his wish to be put in the right way of communicating his mind with power to others, by words spoken or written. If so, rhetoric undertakes to show him rules or principles which will help to make the expression of his thoughts effective; and effective, not in any fashionable or arbitrary way, but in the way that nature universally intends, and which man universally feels. For all genuine art is but the helpmate of nature.
Source: Edward T. Channing, *Lectures Read to the Seniors in Harvard College*. Ed. Dorothy I. Anderson and Waldo W. Braden. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1968. 30-32.

Henry Noble Day (1868)
Rhetoric has been correctly defined to be the ART OF DISCOURSE.

This definition presents Rhetoric as an art, in distinction from a science. There are divers fundamental respects in which an art of discourse differs from a science. An art directly and immediately concerns itself with the faculty of discoursing as its proper subject. It fastens upon that and keeps it ever in its view as it teaches how that may be developed, trained, and guided. A science, on the other hand, regards rather the product of this faculty; and, keeping its view directly upon that, proceeds to unfold its nature and proper characteristics. In perfect accordance with this primary distinction, Art aims ever at skill as its one governing end and object; whereas, Science aims only at knowledge. Still further, and in perfect keeping with these distinctions, the method of Art is synthetic, constructive; while that of Science is analytic and critical. Art takes element by element, marks out stage by stage successively, and constructs and develops into a composite, harmonious whole of power and skill; while Science dissects the given whole of discourse, and leaves it unfolded, explicated into its several parts and elements. In outer form there will be much that is common in a true art and a true science of Discourse, inasmuch as all art must proceed in intelligence, that is, in science; the product of a faculty must partake of the proper character of the faculty. Skill involves knowledge; and analysis implies synthesis. But a proper art will be developed in a very different spirit from a science; it will ever be putting the learner upon practice, and abound in cautions and rules, while a science will not suffice to make an artist; and a certain skill and tact may exist in comparative ignorance of principles. There will be more or less of difference, thus, in the matter which makes up the body of an art and that of a science. An art will, in particular, present exercises for the practical application of its rules, which would be entirely foreign to the design and nature of a science. In respect of immediate subject, therefore, as also of aim, of method, and of matter, a proper art will differ from a science.

The definition also presents discourse as the limiting or specific subject-matter of the art of Rhetoric. This term, *discourse*, like many others in language, is used in different connections, for three different purposes: to denote the faculty, the exertion or operation of the faculty, and the result or product of the operation. By earlier writers it was employed to denote the discursive faculty of intelligence, in distinction from the original faculties,—from the presentative, or the intuitive in the broader import of the word as including both the perceptive and the proper intuitive; as

"It adds to my calamity that I have *Discourse* and *Reason*." —Massinger

"Reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive; *discourse*
Is oftest yours, the latter is most ours." —Milton

The term is used also to denote the exercise of this faculty as thus discriminated from the faculties of original knowledge. Thus Chillingworth: "By *discourse* no man can possibly be led to error; but if he err in his conclusions, he must of necessity either err in his principles, or commit some error in his *discourse*; that is, indeed, not *discourse*, but seem to do so."

The use of the term to denote the product of this faculty is too familiar to require exemplification.

Source: Henry Noble Day, *The Art of Discourse: A System of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1998. 1-3.

Alexander Bain (1869)

Rhetoric discusses the means whereby language, spoken or written, may be rendered effective.

In speaking there are three principal ends,—to inform, to persuade, to please. They correspond to the three departments of the human mind, the Understanding, the Will, and the Feelings. The means being to some extent different for each, they are considered under separate heads.

But as there are various matters pertaining to all modes of address, it is convenient to divide the entire subject into the two following parts.

Part First, which relates to Style generally, embraces the following topics:—I. The Figures of Speech, and the consideration of the Number and the Order of Words. II. The explanation of the various Attributes or Qualities of Style. III. The Sentence and the Paragraph.

Part Second treats of the different kinds of Composition.

Those that have their object to inform the UNDERSTANDING, fall under three heads—Description, Narration, and Exposition. The means of influencing the WILL are given under one head, Persuasion. The employing of language to excite pleasurable FEELINGS, coincides with the most characteristic function of Poetry.

The Will can be moved only through the Understanding or through the Feelings. Hence, there are at bottom but two Rhetorical ends.

Source: Alexander Bain, *English Composition and Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1996. 19.

Erastus Otis Haven (1869)

Rhetoric is both a science and an art. In this respect, it is like all other subjects which embrace practice, founded upon rules that grow out of certain facts in the nature of things: such as Grammar, Architecture, Music, Painting, Medicine, and Surgery, Land-surveying, Engineering, Navigation.

Source: Erastus Otis Haven, *Rhetoric: A Text-Book, Designed for Use in Schools and Colleges*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 2000. ix.

Simon Kerl (1869)

Rhetoric teaches how to speak or write promptly, elegantly, and effectively.

Source: Simon Kerl, *Elements of Composition and Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Ann Arbor, MI: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 2000. 8.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1872-1873)

Generally speaking, the feeling for what is *true* in itself is much more developed: rhetoric arises among a people who still live in mythic images and who have not yet experienced the unqualified need of historical accuracy: they would rather be persuaded than instructed. In addition, the *need* of men for forensic eloquence must have given rise to the evolution of the

liberal art. Thus, it is an essentially *republican* art: one must be accustomed to tolerating the most unusual opinions and points of view and even to taking a certain pleasure in their counterplay; one must be just as willing to listen as to speak; and as a listener one must be able more or less to appreciate the art being applied. The education of the ancient man customarily culminates in rhetoric: it is the highest spiritual activity of the well-educated political man—an odd notion for us!
Source: Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Concept of Rhetoric." *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*. Ed. and trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. 3.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1872-1873)
What is called "rhetorical," as a means of conscious art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language and its development, indeed, that the rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of the understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in language. There is obviously no unrhetorical "naturalness" of language to which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is, at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things.
Source: Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Relation of the Rhetorical to Language." *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*. Ed. and trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. 21.

A. D. Hepburn (1875)
Rhetoric is the Science of the Laws and Forms of Prose. It investigates the method and general principles to which every discourse must conform that is designed to instruct, convince, or persuade.
Source: A. D. Hepburn, *Manual of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 2001. 13.

David Jayne Hill (1877)
All worthy discourse aims at producing some change in the mind addressed. It may be a change of opinions, or conviction; a change of disposition, or persuasion; or a change of the passing emotion for its own sake, or mere entertainment. Whatever this change be, it is produced by *ideas*. These ideas are effective in producing the change only when they are assimilated to the dominant ideas of the mind addressed. The rhetorical process extends farther than the mere *presentation* of ideas; it is complete only when those ideas *are referred to the preexisting ideas* of the person addressed in such a manner that they will effect the desired change. All mental changes take place in accordance with certain laws. As an *art*, Rhetoric communicates ideas according to these laws; as a *science*, it discovers and establishes these laws. Rhetoric is, therefore, the science of the laws of effective discourse.
Source: David Jayne Hill, *The Science of Rhetoric: An Introduction to the Laws of Effective Discourse*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1999. 37.

James De Mille (1878)
The study of rhetoric may be regarded as an analytical examination of literature. In this way the student is led to investigate the qualities of style, and the various forms of expression employed by different writers. He searches into the causes of literary success or failure; and endeavors to find out why it is that one author writes with clearness, another with persuasiveness; one expresses himself with energy, another with elegance; one is distinguished for vivacity, another for sonorous rhythm. He also makes himself familiar with the modes by which the material for composition is collected, set forth in proper order, unfolded in due course of discussion, amplified, illustrated, and enforced, till the purpose of the writer is attained. Besides this, he pays attention to those higher qualities of writing which appeal to the taste and influence the emotions. It will not fail to heighten his apprehension of literature thus to examine it from

within and from without, to mark its frame-work and observe its adornment, to become acquainted with its beauties and its defects, to tell wherein these consist, to have the nomenclature of criticism and use it intelligently. Such a study, if properly pursued, must surely tend to true culture, and blend with this a fine educational discipline, awakening the more delicate sensibilities of the mind, and calling forth its more robust faculties into active exercise.
Source: James De Mille, *The Elements of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Ann Arbor, MI: Scholar's Facsimiles and Reprints, 2000. v-vi, 14.

James De Mille (1878)
The term rhetoric is of Greek origin, and was first used to signify that which belongs to the ρητωο (*rhetor*, i.e. orator), a word with is derived from ρεω, to speak. The ancient rhetoricians discussed chiefly the art of oratory, leaving to grammarians the investigation of the beauties of style in general prose composition. In all their definitions of rhetoric they make it the art of persuasion. Isocrates calls it "the worker of persuasion." Plato makes Gorgias define it as "the power of persuasion by speaking." Aristotle defines it as "a faculty of considering all the possible means of persuasion on every subject." Quintilian, after enumerating many definitions similar to these, finally gives his own, and calls it "the art of speaking well."

At the present day the meaning of the word is less restricted; and popular usage involves two separate and distinct ideas. The one refers to arguments, and appeals to the emotions, by which the speaker or writer seeks to convey his own sentiments to others. The abuse of this sort of rhetoric is ascribed by Milton to Belial:

> "His tongue
> Dropp'd manna, and could make the worse appear
> The better reason, to perplex and dash
> Maturest counsels."

On the other hand, writing is said to be rhetorical when it exhibits more than usual ornament. The abuse of this is popularly stigmatized as "rhetorical artifice," "mere rhetoric," and the like; thus conveying the idea that rhetoric is only an aggregation of plausible words or euphonious sounds, without any adequate sense. The popular idea, though often exaggerated, nevertheless contains the truth, and it is from this that the materials of a proper definition of rhetoric may best be gathered.

From this we see that the term rhetoric has now a twofold meaning, referring both to the subject-matter and to the mode of its presentation.

In the first case it relates to the subject-matter, its choice and arrangement, where the writer's aim is to instruct, convince, or persuade. Here it may be defined as the art of persuasion.

In the second case it relates to the manner of expression, where the writer treats his subject with conscious ornament, not so much in order to win assent as to stimulate the attention and gratify the taste. Here it may be defined as the art of ornamental composition.
Source: James De Mille, *The Elements of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Ann Arbor, MI: Scholar's Facsimiles and Reprints, 2000. 13-14.

Adams Sherman Hill (1878)
For the purposes of this treatise, Rhetoric may be defined as the art of efficient communication by language. It is not one of several arts out of which a choice may be made; it is the art to the principles of which, consciously or unconsciously, a good writer or speaker must conform.

It is an *art*, not a science: for it neither observes, nor discovers, nor classifies; but it shows how to convey from one mind to another the results of observation, discovery, or classification; it uses knowledge, not as knowledge, but as power.

Logic simply teaches the right use of reason, and may be practised by the solitary inhabitant of a desert island; but Rhetoric, being the art of *communication* by language, implies the presence,

in fact or in imagination, of at least two persons,—the speaker or the writer, and the person spoken to or written to. Aristotle makes the very essence of Rhetoric to lie in the distinct recognition of a hearer. Hence, its rules are not absolute, like those of logic, but relative to the character and circumstances of those addressed; for though truth is one, and correct reasoning must always be correct, the ways of communicating truth are many.

Being the art of communication by *language*, Rhetoric applies to any subject matter that can be treated in words, but has no subject matter peculiar to itself. It does not undertake to furnish a person with something to say; but it does undertake to tell him how best to say that with which he has provided himself. "Style," says Coleridge, "is the art of conveying the meaning appropriately and with perspicuity, whatever that meaning may be"; but some meaning there must be: for, "in order to form a good style, the primary rule and condition is, not to attempt to express ourselves in language before we thoroughly know our own meaning."

Source: Adams Sherman Hill, *The Principles of Rhetoric and Their Application*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1994. iii-iv.

Brainerd Kellogg (1882)

WHAT RHETORIC IS—We talk and we write to make known our thoughts, and we do it in sentences, the sentence being the universal and necessary form of oral and of written communication. In every sentence there are the words arranged in a certain order and addressed to the ear or to the eye; and there is that which these words express and impart, itself unheard and unseen, but reaching the mind of the hearer or reader through the words which he hears or sees. That which these words express we call a thought, and hence

A sentence is the verbal expression of a thought.

Now; rhetoric deals with the thought of the sentence and with the words which express it, and so its function is twofold. It teaches us how to find the thought, and how best to express it in words. In this, its twofold function, rhetoric works near neighbor to grammar and to logic. Grammar, as well as rhetoric, deals with the words of a sentence; and logic, as well as rhetoric, deals with thought; but the fields of the three, though lying side by side, are distinct.

The better to see the field which rhetoric tills, it is needful without attempting complete definitions, to say that **grammar** teaches us the offices of single words in the sentence, and of those groups of words called phrases and clauses, and shows us what forms the inflected words must have in their various relations. It teaches, also, how to construct correct sentences containing the parts of speech in their several relations. **Logic** deals with thought, but not with the thought in single and detached sentences. It does not decide whether this thought or that thought are true, but what conclusion follows from them if we assume them to be true. It teaches us to reason correctly, to make right inferences, to draw just conclusions.

In what **rhetoric** has to do with *words*, it begins its work where that of grammar ends. It teaches us how in the choice and arrangement of words to express the thought clearly or forcibly or gracefully—in a word, how to express it most happily for the special purpose at hand. And teaching us to find the thought with which we reason, its work with the *thought* ends where that of logic begins. Rhetoric, then, lies in between grammar and logic. The *word* side of its field touches the field of grammar, the *thought* side of it touches the field of logic, and hence

Rhetoric is the study which teaches us how to invent thought, and how to express it most appropriately in words.

Source: Brainerd Kellogg, *A Text-Book on Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reproductions, 1990. 13-14.

John Bascom (1883)

Rhetoric is an art. It strives to render aid to action, to prescribe its methods. What is the action whose rules are furnished by rhetoric? It is the mind's action, we answer, in communicating itself, its thoughts, conceptions, feelings, through language. There has been a general tendency to limit rhetoric to direct address—oratory, so called. We cannot regard this as desirable, since,

in that case, we must have an additional art to guide the mind in other forms of composition—an art, the body of whose precepts must be identical with those already given in rhetoric. Expression of thought in language in all its varieties is but one department, governed by the same fundamental principles. The differences between the several forms of composition are those of species, rather than those of genera, giving rise to a varied adaptation of rules to something diverse, but not radically new, in methods or in ends.

We define rhetoric as the art which teaches the rules of composition. By composition we understand the expression in language of thoughts, emotions, for some definite end.
Source: John Bascom, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reproductions, 1998. 13-14.

Timothy Whiting Bancroft (1884)
Rhetoric may be defined as the science or the art of discourse. As a science, it is a system of laws deduced from a critical study standard literary works; as an art, it embraces rules for the application of its laws to practise both in criticism and composition.
Source: Timothy Whiting Bancroft, *A Method of English Composition*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reproductions, 2004. 3.

Charles William Bardeen (1884)
Rhēt'o-rīc, *n*. The art of speaking or writing with elegance, propriety, and force.
Source: Charles William Bardeen, *A System of Rhetoric*. Ed. Charlotte Downey. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reproductions, 2002. 672.

***Encyclopedia Britannica* (1910-1911)**
RHETORIC (Gr. ρητορικη τεχνε, the art of the orator), the art of using language in such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or reader. The object is strictly persuasion rather than intellectual approval or conviction; hence the term, with its adjective "rhetorical," is commonly used for a speech or writing in which matter is subservient to form or display.
Source: Richard C. Jebb, "Rhetoric." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. 11th ed. 1910-1911.

Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Villiers Denney (1911)
To put one's thoughts into words that are clear, orderly, and connected, is to compose, and the result is called a composition.

A composition may consist of a single sentence, a proverb for instance, or a maxim, or an item of news. It may be completed in a single paragraph,—a series of sentences that belong together, or a sentence-group. It may require for completeness a number of these groups or paragraphs.
Source: Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Villiers Denney, *The New Composition-Rhetoric*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1911. 1.

Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Villiers Denney (1911)
By argumentation a person tries to convince others that they ought to believe or to act as he wishes them to believe or to act. The very fact that he makes the attempt implies that there are at least two ways, more or less reasonable, or believing or acting in regard to the matter which he has at heart. There would be no room for argument about the matter if all thought alike about it.
Source: Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Villiers Denney, *The New Composition-Rhetoric*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1911. 353.

Charles Sears Baldwin (1911-1913)
Rhetoric is the theory of composition. These two terms, rhetoric and composition, and their equivalents in several other languages, have become synonyms; for few teachers have ever concerned themselves with the theory except in some immediate connection with the practice, and the practice of even children in school has always demanded some guidance from theory.

Such elementary theory, as well as the practice, is often in modern English usage called composition; but the term rhetoric has persisted. Indeed, it is valuable for precision. Composition being equally applicable to all the fine arts, the useful art of composition in words has through many generations been distinguished as rhetoric.
Source: Charles Sears Baldwin, "Rhetoric." *A Cyclopedia of Education*. Ed. Paul Monroe. Vol. 5. New York: Macmillan, 1911-1913. 173.

Carlo Michelstaedter (1913)
For himself a man knows or does not know; but he says he knows for others. His knowing is in life, for the sake of life, but when he says, "I know," "he tells others he is alive," in order to have from others something not given to him for his living affirmation. He wants "to constitute a *persona*" for himself with the affirmation of the absolute *persona* he does not have: *it is the inadequate affirmation of individuality: rhetoric*.

Men speak always and call their speaking reasoning. But οποι αγ τιζ ποτε λεγη ουδευ λεγει αλλ απολογεται, 'no matter what one says, one says nothing, only justifies himself'; no matter what one says, one says nothing, only justifies himself'; no matter what someone says, he is not saying but attributing voice to himself for speaking, flattering himself.
Source: Carlo Michelstaeder, *Persuasion and Rhetoric*. Ed. and trans. Russell Scott Valentino, Cinzia Sartini Blum, and David J. Depew. New Haven: Yale UP, 2004. 67-68.

T. S. Eliot (1920)
The death of Rostrand is the disappearance of the poet whom, more than any other in France, we treated as the exponent of "rhetoric," thinking of rhetoric something recently out of fashion. And as we find ourselves looking back rather than tenderly upon the author of *Cyrano* we wonder what this vice or quality is that is associated as plainly with Rostrand's merits as with his defects. His rhetoric, at least, suited him at times so well, and so much better than it suited a much greater poet, Baudelaire, who is at times as rhetorical as Rostrand. And we being to suspect that the word is merely a vague term of abuse for any style that is bad, that is so evidently bad or second-rate that we do not recognize the necessity for greater precision in the phrases we apply to it.
Source: T. S. Eliot, "'Rhetoric' and Poetic Drama." *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism*. London: Methuen, 1920. 78.

T. S. Eliot (1920)
In any case, we may take our choice: we may apply the term "rhetoric" to the type of dramatic speech which I have instanced, and then we must admit that it covers good as well as bad. Or we may choose to except this type of speech from rhetoric. In that case we must say that rhetoric is any adornment or inflation of speech which is *not done for a particular effect* but for a general impressiveness. And in that case, too, we cannot allow the term to cover all bad writing.
Source: T. S. Eliot, "'Rhetoric' and Poetic Drama." *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism*. London: Methuen, 1920. 84-85.

John Morley (1921)
It may be true, if we will, that, as a great critic sardonically hints, 'eloquence without being precisely a defect, is one of the worst dangers that can beset a man.' Yet after all, to disparage eloquence is to depreciate mankind.
Source: John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan, 1921. 594.

Hoyt Hudson (1923)
In this sense, plainly, the man who speaks most persuasively uses the most, or certainly the best, rhetoric; and the man whom we censure for inflation of style and strained effects is suffering not from too much rhetoric, but from a lack of it.
Source: Hoyt Hudson, "The Field of Rhetoric." *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education* 9 (1923): 171.

Herbert A. Wichelns (1925)
Rhetorical criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) and literature; its atmosphere is that of the public life, its tools are those of literature, its concern is with the ideas of the people as influenced by their leaders. The effective wielder of public discourse, like the military man, belongs to the social and political history because he is one of its makers. Like the soldier, he has an art of his own which is the source of his power; but the soldier's art is distinct from the life which his conquests affect. The rhetorician's art represents a natural and normal process within that life. It includes the work of the speaker, of the pamphleteer, of the writer of editorials, and of the sermon maker. It is to be thought of as the art of popularization. Its practitioners are the Huxleys, not the Darwins, of science; the Jeffersons, not the Lockes and the Rousseaus, of politics.
Source: Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory." *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans*. New York: Century, 1925. 215-16.

Antonio Gramsci (ca. 1930)
In his essay "On the Athenian Orators," [Thomas Babington] Macaulay attributes the facility with which even the most educated Greeks let themselves be dazzled by almost puerile sophisms to the predominance of live and spoken discourse in Greek life and education. The habit of conversation in oratory generates a certain ability to find very quickly arguments that are apparently brilliant and that momentarily silence one's adversary and leave the listener dazed.
Source: Antonio Gramsci, "Oratory, Conversation, Culture." *Selections from the Cultural Writings*. Ed. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. Trans. William Boelhower. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985. 380-81.

I. A. Richards (1936)
Rhetoric, I shall urge, should be a study of misunderstanding and its remedies. We struggle all our days with misunderstandings, and no apology is required for any study which can prevent or remove them. Of course, inevitably *at present*, we have no measure with which to calculate the extent and degree of our hourly losses in communication. One of the aims of these lectures will be to speculate about some of the measures we should require in attempting such estimates. "How much and in how many ways may good communication differ from bad?" That is too big and too complex a question to be answered as it stands, but we can at least try to work towards answering some parts of it; and these explanations would be the revived subject of Rhetoric.
Source: I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Oxford UP, 1936. 3.

I. A. Richards (1936)
In my introductory lecture I urged that there is room for a persistent, systematic, detailed inquiry into how words work that will take the place of the discredited subject which goes by the name of Rhetoric. I went on to argue that this inquiry must be philosophic, or—if you hesitate with that word, I do myself—that it must take charge of the criticism of its own assumptions and not accept them, more than it can help, ready-made from other studies. How words mean, is not a question to which we can safely accept an answer either as an inheritance from common sense, that curious growth, or as something vouched for by another science, by psychology, say—since other sciences use words themselves and not least delusively when they address themselves to these questions. The result is that a revived Rhetoric, or study of verbal understanding and misunderstanding, must itself undertake its own inquiry into the modes of meaning—not only, as with the old Rhetoric, on a macroscopic scale, discussing the effects of different disposals of large parts of a discourse—but also on a microscopic scale by using theorems about the structure of the fundamental conjectural units of meaning and the conditions through which they, and their interconnections, arise.
Source: I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Oxford UP, 1936. 23-24.

Sister Miriam Joseph (1937)
[Rhetoric is] the art of communicating thought from one mind to another, the adaptation of language to circumstance.
Source: Sister Miriam Joseph, *The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric*. Ed Marguerite McGlinn. Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2002. 3.

Sister Miriam Joseph (1937)
Rhetoric is the master art of the trivium, for it presupposes and makes use of grammar and logic; it is the art of communicating through symbols ideas about reality.
Source: Sister Miriam Joseph, *The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric*. Ed Marguerite McGlinn. Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2002. 9.

Sister Miriam Joseph (1937)
Because rhetoric aims for effectiveness rather than correctness, it deals not only with the paragraph and the whole composition but also with the word and the sentence, for it prescribes that diction be clear and appropriate and that sentences be varied in structure and rhythm. It recognizes various levels of discourse, such as the literary (maiden or damsel, steed), the common (girl, horse), the illiterate (gal, hoss), the slang (skirt, plug), the technical (*homo sapiens*, *equus caballus*), each with its appropriate use. The adaptation of language to circumstance, which is a function of rhetoric, requires the choice of a certain style and diction in speaking to adults, of a different style in presenting scientific ideas to the general public, and of another in presenting them to a group of scientists. Since rhetoric is the master art of the trivium, it may even enjoin the use of bad grammar or bad logic, as in the portrayal of an illiterate or stupid character in a story.
Source: Sister Miriam Joseph, *The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric*. Ed Marguerite McGlinn. Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2002. 9-10.

I. A. Richards (1938)
Rhetoric I take to be 'the art by which discourse is adapted to its end.' This makes it very inclusive. What should be among its topics may be seen from the contents of George Campbell's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1823), a book which deserves more attention than it is likely ever to again receive.
Source: I. A. Richards, *Interpretation in Teaching*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. 12.

I. A. Richards (1938)
The general task of Rhetoric is to give, not by dogmatic formula but by *exercise in comparisons*, an insight into the different modes of speech and their exchanges and disguises.
Source: I. A. Richards, *Interpretation in Teaching*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. 14.

Walter J. Ong (1942)
Within this division of works of art in terms of final causality the division between works or rhetoric and works of poetic falls. For, if we take rhetoric to signify what Aristotle took it to signify—"the ability to find the available means of persuasion with reference to any subject whatsoever"—works of rhetoric must be ordered to the production of action in another individual and to action in the sense of something other than contemplation. Works of rhetoric have their finality, then, only in terms of that action to which they are ultimately directed. There is another art, which we call poetic, which produces works ordered to contemplation and to no other direct end, that is, works of beauty. Such works are produced simply to be enjoyed by the one contemplating them.
Source: Walter J. Ong, "The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic." *The Modern Schoolman* 19 (1942): 24.

Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren (1949)
Argument is the kind of discourse used to make the audience (reader or listener) think or act as

the arguer desires. It is sometimes said that the purpose of argument is not double, as just stated, but single—in other words, that its purpose is to lead the audience to act. In the final analysis there is justification for this view, for a way of thinking means by implication a way of acting, and acting is the fulfillment of a way of thinking.
Source: Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, *Modern Rhetoric*. New York: Harcourt, 1949. 141.

P. Albert Duhamel (1949)
Rhetoric is better thought of as an idea, the concept of effective expression, than as a set or collection of principles with an abiding purpose. The content and purpose of rhetoric books differ from author to author, and the assumption that techniques and devices in any books are commensurable is unfounded. Terms and purposes are meaningful only within the context of the author's system taken as a whole. All rhetoricians have had one object: the teaching of effective expression. That object can be considered as the "least common denominator" of mental notes which undergo accretion and modification in accordance with an author's conception of what constitutes eloquence. The idea or concept of effective expression is not simple but complex, for it contains more than one element and is invested with several relations. In its simplest form the idea may be said to be undetermined. It is determined by influences external to itself, its relations, which constitute the more basic elements of the rhetorician's philosophy.
Source: P. Albert Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10 (1949): 344-45.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
The *Rhetoric* deals with the possibilities of classification in its *partisan* aspects; it considers the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 22.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
The *Rhetoric* must lead us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the Wars of Nerves, the War. It too has its peaceful moments: at times its endless competition can add up to the **transcending itself.** In ways of its own, it can move from the factional to the universal. But its ideal culminations are more often beset by strife as the condition of their organized expression, or material embodiment. Their very universality becomes transformed into a partisan weapon. For one need not scrutinize the concept of "identification" very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division. Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 23.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
The most characteristic concern of rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men's beliefs for political ends.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 41.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
[T]he basic function of rhetoric [is] the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 41.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
For rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born

anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols. Though rhetorical considerations may carry us far afield, leading us to violate the principle of autonomy separating the various disciplines, there is an intrinsically rhetorical motive, situated in the persuasive use of language.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 43-44.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
We have considered two main aspects of rhetoric: its use of *identification* and its nature as *addressed*. Since identification implies division, we found rhetoric involving us in matters of socialization and faction. Here was a wavering line between peace and conflict, since identification is got by property, which is ambivalently a motive of both morality and strife. And inasmuch as the ultimate of conflict is war or murder, we considered how such imagery can figure as a terminology of reidentification ("transformation" or "rebirth"). For in considering the wavering line between identification and division, we shall always be coming upon manifestations of the logomachy, avowed as in invective, unavowed as in stylistic subterfuges for presenting real divisions in terms that deny division.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 45.

Kenneth Burke (1950)
Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is "meaning," there is "persuasion." Food, eaten and digested, is not rhetorical. But in the *meaning* of food there is much rhetoric, the meaning being persuasive enough for the idea of food to be used, like the ideas of religion, as a rhetorical device for statesmen.
Source: Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 172-73.

André Breton (1953)
At the present stage of poetic research, the purely formal distinction once established between metaphor and comparison should not receive much emphasis. The fact remains that they both serve as interchangeable vehicles of analogical thinking. Metaphor does have the ability to dazzle the mind, but comparison (think of Lautréamont's series of "as beautiful as") has the considerable advantage of *deferring*. Naturally, compared to these two, the other "figures" that rhetoric persists in enumerating are totally devoid of interest. The trigger of analogy is what fascinates us: nothing else will give us access to the motor of the world.
Source: André Breton, "Ascendant Sign." *Free Rein*. Trans. Michel Parmentier and Jacqueline d'Amboise. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1995. 106.

Donald C. Bryant (1953)
In summary, rhetoric is the rationale of informative and suasory discourse, it operates chiefly in the areas of the contingent, its aim is the attainment of maximum probability as a basis for public decision, it is the organizing and animating principle of all subject-matters which have a relevant bearing on that decision.
Source: Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 39 (1953): 408.

Donald C. Bryant (1953)
Speaking generally, we may say that the rhetorical function is the *function of adjusting ideas to people and of people to ideas*. This process may be thought of as a continuum from the complete modification or accommodation of ideas to audiences (as is sometimes said, "telling people only what they want to hear") at the one extreme, to complete regeneration at the other (such perfect illumination that the "facts speak for themselves"). This continuum may, therefore, be said to have complete flattery (to use Plato's unflattering epithet) at one end and the Kingdom of Heaven at the other! Good rhetoric usually functions somewhere well in from the extremes.
Source: Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 39 (1953): 413.

Jacques Lacan (1953)
The important part [of psychoanalysis] begins with the translation of the text, the important part which Freud tells us is given in the elaboration of the dream—that is to say, in its rhetoric. Ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repetition, apposition—these are the syntactical displacements; metaphor, catachresis, autonomasis, allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche—these are the semantic condensations in which Freud teaches us to read the intentions—ostentatious or demonstrative, dissimulating or persuasive, retaliatory or seductive—out of which the subject modulates his oneiric discourse.
Source: Jacques Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis." *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977. 58.

Allen Tate (1953)
By rhetoric I mean the study and the use of the figurative language of experience as the discipline by means of which men govern their relations with one another in the light of truth.
Source: Allen Tate, *The Forlorn Demon: Didactic and Critical Essays*. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. 100.

Richard Weaver (1953)
Thus when we finally divest rhetoric of all the notions of artifice which have grown up around it, we are left with something very much like Spinoza's "intellectual love of God." This is its essence and the *fons et origo* of its power. It is "intellectual" because, as we have previously seen, there is no honest rhetoric without a preceding dialectic. The kind of rhetoric which is justly condemned is utterance in support of a position before that position has been adjudicated with reference to the whole universe of discourse—and of which the world always produced more than enough. It is "love" because it is something in addition to bare theoretical truth. That element in addition is a desire to bring truth into a kind of existence, or to give it an actuality to which theory is indifferent. Now what is to be said about out last expression, "of God." Echoes of theological warfare will cause many to desire a substitute for this, and we should not object. As long as we have in ultimate place the highest good man can intuit, the relationship is made perfect. We shall be content with "intellectual love of the Good." It is still the intellectual love of the good which causes the noble love to desire not to devour his beloved but to shape him according to the gods as far as mortal power allows. So rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up towards the ideal, which only the intellectual can apprehend and only the soul have affection for. This is the justified affection of which no one can be ashamed, and he who feels no influence of it is truly outside the communion of minds. Rhetoric appears, finally, as a means by which the impulse of the soul to be ever moving is redeemed.
Source: Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. 25.

Richard Weaver (1953)
[Rhetoric is] something which creates an informed appetition for the good.
Source: Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. 115.

Everett Lee Hunt (1955)
Rhetoric is the study of men persuading men to make free choices. It may well be regarded as the oldest and most central of humane studies. Man's first great free choice was to sin by eating the apple. The first persuader was the devil, and there are many who feel that there always has been and always will be something devilish about persuasion.
Source: Everett Lee Hunt, "Rhetoric as a Humane Study." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 41 (1955): 114.

Maurice Natanson (1955)
Going from the narrower meaning down to the broadest meaning, we have the following aspects of rhetoric: rhetorical intention in speech or writing, the technique of persuasion, the general

rationale of persuasion, and finally the philosophy of rhetoric. Rhetoric in the narrower aspect involves rhetorical intention in the sense that a speaker or writer may devote his effort to persuade for some cause or object. Since much of what is commonly called "bad" rhetoric frequently is found in such efforts, the field of rhetoric understood as the technique of persuasion is systematically studied and taught. Here the teacher of rhetoric investigates the devices and modes of argument, the outline for which is to be found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or other classical rhetorics. Reflection of a critical order on the significance and nature of the technique of persuasion brings us to rhetoric understood as the general rationale of persuasion. This is what might be termed the "theory" of rhetoric in so far as the central principles of rhetoric are examined and ordered. The emphasis is on the general principles of rhetoric as rhetoric is intimately related to functional, pragmatically directed contexts. Finally, we come to the critique of the rationale of rhetoric which inquires into the underlying assumptions, the philosophical grounds of all the elements of rhetoric. It is here that a philosophy of rhetoric finds its placement. If rhetoric is bound to and founded on dialectic, and dialectic on philosophy, then the limits of rhetoric find their expression in the matrix of philosophical inquiry.
Source: Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 41 (1955): 139.

Roland Barthes (1957)
One must understand here by *rhetoric* a set of fixed, regulated, insistent figures, according to which the varied forms of the mythical signifier arrange themselves. These figures are transparent inasmuch as they do not affect the plasticity of the signifier; but they are already sufficiently conceptualized to adapt to an historical representation of the world (just as classical rhetoric can account for a representation of the Aristotelian type). It is through their rhetoric that bourgeois myths outline the general prospect of this *pseudo-physis* which defines the dream of the contemporary bourgeois world.
Source: Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*. 1957. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York: Noonday, 1972. 150.

Northrup Frye (1957)
Rhetoric has from the beginning meant two things: ornamental speech and persuasive speech. These two things seem psychologically opposed to each other, as the desire to ornament is essentially disinterested, and the desire to persuade essentially the reverse. In fact ornamental rhetoric is inseparable from literature itself, or what we have called the hypothetical verbal structure which exists for its own sake. Persuasive rhetoric is applied literature, or the use of literary art to reinforce the power of argument. Ornamental rhetoric acts on its hearers statically, leading them to admire its own beauty or wit; persuasive rhetoric tries to lead them kinetically toward a course of action. One articulates emotion; the other manipulates it.
Source: Northrup Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957. 245.

Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958)
[T]he theory of argumentation cannot be developed if every proof is conceived of as a reduction to the self-evident. Indeed, the object of the theory of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us *to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent*. What is characteristic of the adherence of minds is its variable intensity: nothing constrains us to limit our study to a particular degree of adherence characterized by self-evidence, and nothing permits us to consider *a priori* the degrees of adherence to a thesis as proportional to its probability and to identity self-evidence with truth.
Source: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1969. 4.

Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958)
[Rhetoric is] the art of persuading and of convincing, the technique of deliberation and of discussion.

Source: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1969. 5.

Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958)
[Rhetoric is] action on minds by means of discourse.
Source: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1969. 9.

Stephen Edelston Toulmin (1958)
The claim implicit in an assertion is like a claim to a right or to a title. As with a claim to a right, though it may in the event he conceded without argument, its merits depend on the merits of the argument which could be produced in its support. Whatever the nature of the particular assertion may be—whether it is a meteorologist predicting rain for tomorrow, an injured workman alleging negligence on the part of his employer, a historian defending the character of the Emperor Tiberius, a doctor diagnosing measles, a business—man questioning the honesty of a client, or an art critic commending the paintings of Piero della Francesca—in each case we can challenge the assertion, and demand to have our attention drawn to the grounds (backing, data, facts, evidence, considerations, features) on which the merits of the assertion are to depend. We can, that is, demand an argument; and a claim need be conceded only if the argument which can be produced in its support proves to be up to standard.
Source: Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1958. 12.

Harry L. Weinberg (1958)
But we can discern levels of rhetoric just as we did the levels of science. On the first, we have the audience to be persuaded. At the next level, we have the various rhetorical rules for persuading it, rules of invention, arrangement, delivery, logic, etc. At the third level are the rules for using these rules. What are they? I believe that they should be:

1. Never lie.
2. Always strive to communicate reliable knowledge.
3. Since we are dealing with people, and not objects or animals, never induce non-survival behavior in the audience or oneself.

It seems to me that if we do not include this level in our definition of rhetoric and choose to operate only on the second, we then remain rhetorical technicians and tinkerers—sophists, hucksters, propagandists and deserve the contempt and suspicion many scientists and others have for rhetoric, equating it with deception.
Source: Harry L. Weinberg, "A Redefinition of Rhetoric." *Today's Speech* 6.4 (1958): 9.

Harry L. Weinberg (1958)
Going further, I see the new rhetoric more as fire prevention than fire fighting and should like to define it as, "The Art of *Ethical* Persuasion." Rhetoric would consist of two factors, an invariant and a variable just as science-in-general does. Our formula would read R=kx, where k is the set of rules for using the lower order rules and techniques, x, which vary from speech to speech according to the purpose of the speaker and the occasion. Reflecting this, *every* speech would consist of two parts, k and x. The latter would be the arguments for the particular case and the facts and evidence selected to sustain them together with techniques of delivery, etc. The k would be the constant aim of inducing better, less destructive use of the defense mechanism and other motivating energies in our listeners and ourselves. The techniques for doing this are yet to be worked out and will constitute, I believe, the first really new advance in rhetorical theory and practice in 2000 years.
Source: Harry L. Weinberg, "A Redefinition of Rhetoric." *Today's Speech* 6.4 (1958): 10.

Daniel Fogarty (1959)
The term "rhetoric," as it is used in this study, stands for the art of prose expression, written or oral. In classical times rhetoric was understood to mean the persuasion of many by one speaker. Later it came to include written persuasion and even exposition. In our own times it signifies persuasion in many forms, in language, in visual symbols, and in symbols of status. Most important of all, perhaps, it has come to mean the ways of arriving at mutual understanding among people working toward patterns of cooperative action.
Source: Daniel Fogarty, *Roots for a New Rhetoric*. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959. 4.

Daniel Fogarty (1959)
Were we to make up a synthetic definition for teaching rhetoric [...] it would be something like this: the science of recognizing the range of meanings and of the functions of words, and the art of using and interpreting them in accordance with this recognition.
Source: Daniel Fogarty, *Roots for a New Rhetoric*. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959. 130.

Wayne C. Booth (1961)
In treating technique as rhetoric, I may seem to have reduced the free and inexplicable processes of the creative imagination to the crafty calculations of commercial entertainers. The whole question of the difference between artists who consciously calculate and artists who simply express themselves with no thought of affecting a reader is an important one, but it must be kept separate from the question of whether an author's work, regardless of its source, communicates itself. The success of an author's rhetoric does not depend on whether he thought about his readers as he wrote; if "mere calculation" cannot insure success, it is equally true that even the most unconscious and Dionysian of writers succeeds only if he makes us join in the dance. By the very nature of my task I cannot do justice to those sources of artistic success which could never be calculatedly tapped, but one can accept this limitation without denying the importance of the incalculable or confining the study to works whose authors thought consciously of their readers.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983. xiv.

Walter Fisher (1961)
In trying to synthesize and, perhaps, to simplify, the discussion of rhetoric from a pedagogical perspective, we would suggest this summation. (1) Rhetoric refers to the making of speeches and the writing of themes, essays, and other literary forms and includes the principles which guide the production of these speeches and written forms. (2) Rhetoric refers to the various forms of speaking and writing. (3) Rhetoric is concerned with the criticism and study of these forms of discourse. (4) Rhetoric also refers to the analysis of theories and histories of rhetoric, the generalizations and speculations about how discourse does or does not, should or should not work. And finally, (5) rhetoric refers to the examination of the true nature of speech practices and literary forms of discourse, the philosophic study of language meanings.
Source: Walter Fisher, "Rhetoric: A Pedagogic Definition." *Western Speech* 25 (1961): 170.

Emmanuel Levinas (1961)
Rhetoric, absent from no discourse, and which philosophical discourse seeks to overcome, resists discourse (or leads to it: pedagogy, demagogy, psychagogy). It approaches the other not to face him, but obliquely—not, to be sure, as a thing, since rhetoric remains conversation, and across all its artifices goes unto the Other, solicits his yes. But the specific nature of rhetoric (of propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.) consists in corrupting this freedom. It is for this that it is preeminently violence, that is, injustice—not violence exercised on an inertia (which would not be a violence), but on a freedom, which, precisely as freedom, should be incorruptible. To freedom it manages to apply a category; it seems to judge of it as of a nature; it asks the question, contradictory in its terms, "what is the nature of this freedom?"

Source: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969. 70.

Wayne C. Booth (1963)
The common ingredient that I find in all of the writing I admire (excluding for now novels, plays, and poems) is something that I shall reluctantly call the rhetorical stance, a stance which depends on discovering and maintaining in any writing situation a proper balance among the three elements that are at work in any communicative effort: the available arguments about the subject itself, the interests and peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied character, of the speaker. I should like to suggest that it is that it is this balance, this rhetorical stance, difficult as it is to describe, that is our main goal as teachers of rhetoric.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, "The Rhetorical Stance." *College Composition and Communication* 14 (1963): 141.

Northrup Frye (1963)
Our present subject is rhetoric, or the social aspect of the use of language, and rhetoric from the beginning has been divided into three levels, high, middle and low. These levels were originally suggested by the three classes of society, and are illustrated both in speech and in literature.
Source: Northrup Frye, *The Well-Tempered Critic*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1963. 39-40.

Marie Hochmuth Nichols (1963)
I take rhetoric to mean the theory and the practice of the verbal mode of presenting judgment and choice, knowledge and feeling. As persuasion, it works in the area of the contingent, where alternatives are possible. In poetic, it is the art of imaginative appeal; in scientific discourse, it the means of so presenting the truth as to fix it clearly in the mind of the listener or reader.
Source: Marie Hochmuth Nichols, *Rhetoric and Criticism*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1963. 7.

Karl R. Wallace (1963)
A good reason is a statement offered in support of an ought proposition or of a value-judgment. Good reasons are a number of statements, consistent with each other, in support of an ought proposition or of a value-judgment.
Source: Karl R. Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 49 (1963): 247.

Karl R. Wallace (1963)
In a word, the concept of good reasons embraces both the substance and the processes of practical reason. One could do worse than characterize rhetoric as the art of finding and effectively presenting good reasons.
Source: Karl R. Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 49 (1963): 248.

Richard Weaver (1963)
Rhetoric seen in the whole conspectus of its function is an art of emphasis embodying an order of desire. Rhetoric is advisory; it has the office of advising men with reference to an independent order of goods and with reference to their particular situation as it relates to these. The honest rhetorician therefore has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of his auditors. Toward both of these he has a responsibility.
Source: Richard Weaver, "Language is Sermonic." *Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship*. Ed. Roger E. Nebergall. Norman: U of Oklahoma Department of Speech, 1963. 54.

Richard Weaver (1963)
Rhetoric must be viewed formally as operating at that point where literature and politics meet, or where literary values and political urgencies can be brought together. The rhetorician makes use of the moving power of literary presentation to induce in his hearers an attitude or decision which is political in the very broadest sense. Perhaps this explains why the successful user of

rhetoric is sometimes in bad grace with both camps. For the literary people he is too "practical"; and for the more practical political people he is too "flowery." But there is nothing illegitimate about what he undertakes to do, any more than it would be illegitimate to make use of the timeless principles of aesthetics in the constructing of a public building.
Source: Richard Weaver, "Language is Sermonic." *Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship*. Ed. Roger E. Nebergall. Norman: U of Oklahoma Department of Speech, 1963. 63.

Richard Ohmann (1964)
Great though the difference is between rhetoric as mysterious power and rhetoric as calculated procedure, these two conceptions share one feature which, for my present purposes, is the most important one: both take rhetoric to be concerned, fundamentally, with *persuasion*. The practical rhetorician—the orator—seeks to impel his audience from apathy to action or from old opinion to new, by appealing to will, emotion, and reason. The theoretical rhetorician—the rhetor—sets down methods of persuasion. And the novice—the student—learns the tricks, almost as he would learn a new language, proceeding from theory through imitation to practice.
Source: Richard Ohmann, "In Lieu of a New Rhetoric." *College English* 26 (1964): 17.

Roland Barthes (1964-1965)
The rhetoric under discussion here is that metalanguage (whose language-object was "discourse") prevalent in the West from the fifth century BC to the nineteenth century AD. We shall not deal with more remote efforts (India, Islam), and with regard to the West itself, we shall limit ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France. This metalanguage (discourse on discourse) has involved several practices, simultaneously or successively present, according to periods, within "Rhetoric":

1. A *technique*, i.e., an "art," in the classical sense of the word; the art of persuasion, a body of rules and recipes whose implementation makes it possible to convince the hearer of the discourse (and later the reader of the work), even if what he is to be convinced of is "false."
2. A *teaching*: the art of rhetoric, initially transmitted by personal means (a rhetor and his disciples, his clients), was soon introduced into institutions of learning; in schools, it formed the essential matter of what would today be called higher education; it was transformed into material for examination (exercises, lessons, tests).
3. A *science*, or in any case a proto-science, i.e. a. a field of autonomous observation delimiting certain homogeneous phenomena, to wit the "effects" of language; b. a classification of these phenomena (whose best-known trace is the list of rhetorical "figures"; c. an "operation" in Hjelmslevian sense, i.e. a meta-language, a body of rhetorical treatises whose substance—or signified—is a language-object (argumentative language and "figured" language).
4. An *ethic*: as a system of "rules," rhetoric is imbued with the ambiguity of that word: it is at once a manual of recipes, inspired by a practical goal, and a Code, a body of ethical prescriptions whose role is to supervise (i.e. to permit and to limit) the "deviations" of emotive language.
5. A *social practice*: Rhetoric is that privileged technique (since one must pay in order to acquire it) which permits the ruling classes gain *ownership of speech*. Language being a power, selective rules of access to this power have been decreed, constituting it as a pseudo-science, closed to "those who do not know how to speak" and requiring an expensive initiation: born 2500 years ago in legal cases concerning property, rhetoric was exhausted and died in the "rhetoric" class, the initiatory ratification of bourgeois culture.
6. A *ludic practice*: since all these practices constituted a formidable ("repressive," we now say) institutional system, it was only natural that a mockery of rhetoric should develop, a "black" rhetoric (suspicions, contempt, ironies): games, parodies, erotic or obscene allusions, classroom jokes, a whole schoolboy practice (which still remains to be explored, moreover, and to be constituted as a cultural code).

Source: Roland Barthes, "The Old Rhetoric: An *aide-mémoire*." *The Semiotic Challenge*. Trans. Richard Howard. Berkeley: U of California P, 1994. 12-14.

A. Craig Beard (1965)
Rhetoric is oral and written communication, especially the instrumental type as against literary expression. In popular meaning, "public speaking," "rhetoric," and "communication" are often used interchangeably.

The original and historical interpretation and application of the term "rhetoric" give it breadth and authenticity for continued use in these latter decades of the twentieth century.
Source: A. Craig Beard, *Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry*. New York: Ronald, 1965. 5.

Edwin Black (1965)
Essays in rhetorical criticism focus on persuasive speakers or discourses, and the weight of the rhetorical tradition too falls in that direction. Consequently, we are obliged to conclude that the subject matter of rhetorical criticism is persuasive discourse.
Source: Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 14.

Edwin Black (1965)
Of course, it is important to be clear about how rhetorical discourse is to be persuasive. Persuasive in this sense refers to intent, not necessarily to accomplishment. Rhetorical discourses are those discourses, spoken or written, which aim to influence men. Whether a given discourse actually exerts an influence has no bearing on whether it is rhetorical.
Source: Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 15.

Robert M. Gorrell (1965)
Rhetoric is very like an umbrella. Under its expansive shade, more or less comfortably, cluster a variety of subjects—semantics, logic, usage, style. Rhetoric is very like an arch. It spans widely, bridging psychology, linguistics, sociology, philosophy. Rhetoric is very like a dynamo. It is the machinery for generating the ideas and language of communication. Rhetoric is sometimes very like a whale, with its mouth open, sweeping the ocean. Rhetoric is also very like a jelly fish.
Source: Robert M. Gorrell, "Very Like a Whale: A Report on Rhetoric." *College Composition and Communication* 16 (1965): 138.

Robert T. Oliver (1965)
The meaning ascribed to *rhetoric* has not always been uniform. Generally in these essays it means a mode of thinking that considers an object in terms of a purpose concerning it which is to be accomplished in the form of a specific reaction from one or more auditors. The purpose might be to persuade or to inform or even to entertain. An individual is thinking rhetorically when he considers race relations, for example, in terms of the facts that will serve his purpose in effecting agreement or understanding or enjoyment by selected auditors. The rhetorical procedure is to determine what the speaker wishes to accomplish in influencing the behavior of particular listeners concerning a specific subject.
Source: Robert T. Oliver, "Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation: Congenial or Conjunctive?" *Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation*. Ed. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1965. ix.

Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (1965)
Rhetoric is the most liberal of the arts, and it deserves out primary, earnest attention. Along with language itself and logic, it provides the key to everything else that we learn. Rhetoric may justly be described as "the science of recognizing the range of the meanings and of the functions of words, and the art of using and interpreting them in accordance with their recognition."
Source: Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga, "Introduction." *The Province of Rhetoric*. Ed. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga. New York: Ronald, 1965. iii.

Richard Weaver (1965)

Rhetoric is the means we have of making convictions compelling to others by showing them in contexts of reality and of human values.
Source: Richard Weaver, "Reflections of Modernity." *Life Without Prejudice and Other Essays*. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. 116.

Richard Weaver (1965)
Rhetorical language is by nature sermonic; that means it is the speech by which we preach sermons to ourselves and to others on all sorts of subjects in our private and public capacities. It therefore supplies the bond of community, for community rests upon informed sentiment.
Source: Richard Weaver, "Reflections of Modernity." *Life Without Prejudice and Other Essays*. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. 118.

Richard Weaver (1965)
[Rhetoric is] persuasive speech in the service of truth.
Source: Richard Weaver, "Reflections of Modernity." *Life Without Prejudice and Other Essays*. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. 118.

Roland Barthes (1966)
There exists a diegetic form common to different arts, a form we are beginning to analyze today according to new methods inspired by Propp. However, confronting the element of fabulation it shares with other creations, literature possesses one element which defines it specifically: its language; this specific element the Russian formalist school has already sought to isolate and to treat under the name of *Literaturnost*, "literariness"; Jakobson calls it *poetics*; poetics is the analysis which permits answering this question: What is it that makes a verbal message a work of art? It is this specific element which, for my part, I shall call *rhetoric*, so as to avoid any restriction of poetics to poetry and in order to mark our concern with a general level of language common to all genres, prose and verse alike.
Source: Roland Barthes, "Rhetorical Analysis." *The Rustle of Language*. Trans. Richard Howard. Berkeley: U of California P, 1986. 83.

Kenneth Burke (1966)
Man is
the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal
inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)
separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making
goaded by the spirit oh hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)
and rotten with perfection.
Source: Kenneth Burke, "Definition of Man." *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method.* Berkeley: U of California P, 1966. 16.

James J. Murphy (1966)
The four faces of rhetoric actually seem to be these:

I. **Rhetoric as a Subject with a History** For example, the rhetoric of Cicero or Quintilian; a typical modem study is *Rhetoric at Rome*, or *Rhetoric in Shakespeare's Time*.
II. **Rhetoric as Theory without Relation to Time** For example, abstract statement without immediate application; a current instance is "A Generative Rhetoric of the Paragraph."
III. **Rhetoric as a Set of Formulated Precepts** That is, pieces of advice of the type "An Introduction should be prepared last." The typical freshman "Rhetoric" text is a prime example.
IV. **Rhetoric as Recognizable Structure in Literary Works** Two major types appear:
    A. Recognizable Structures derived from historical study; typical examples are

studies of Shakespeare's use of tropes and figures, or Pope's use of Roman patterns of arrangement in his *Essay on Man*.

B. Recognizable Structures derived from analysis of literary works; a recent example is *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, or almost any piece of Burkean criticism.

What is common to all four of these is a respect for *order*—either order in the mind of the author, or an order in the mind and heart of a reader exposed to a piece of discourse. That is, anyone who uses the term "rhetoric" at all seems to have made a kind of commitment to a principle of orderliness. Ultimately this is a Western concept—there does not seem to be an Asiatic rhetoric, for instance—which is based on the fundamental principle that discourse can be planned in advance. (It is thus opposed to the so-called "doctrine of inspiration" as found anciently in Plato's *Ion* and later in some aspects of the Romantic movement. (A direct corollary of this principle is the belief that such planning can be detected after the fact and its efficiency evaluated; in other words, that "criticism" is possible. A final corollary worked out in Western culture is the pedagogical principle that criticism can identify the "good" elements of literary works for the purpose of showing other writers how to write; this leads to formulation of new precepts or bits of advice for future discourse.

Source: James J. Murphy, "Four Faces of Rhetoric: A Progress Report." *College Composition and Communication* 17 (1966): 57.

M. L. Steinman (1966)

Rhetoric, then, is effective choice among synonymous expressions; but, as the word "effective" suggests, it is concerned, not with utterances only, the mere forms, but with some of their relations to other things. These other things are among the six variables that every act of speech or writing has: the speaker or writer, his utterance, his context (occasion or medium), his audience (listener or reader), his purpose (the effect he intends his utterance to have upon his audience), and the effect of his utterance upon his audience; and rhetoric is best characterized by reference to these variables.

Source: M. L. Steinman, "Rhetorical Research." *College English* 27 (1966): 280.

Robert L. Scott (1967)

Man must consider truth not as something fixed and final but as something to be created moment by moment in the circumstances in which he finds himself and with which he must cope. Man may plot his course by fixed stars; he only proceeds, more or less effectively, on his course. Furthermore, man has learned that his stars are fixed only in a relative sense.

In human affairs, then, rhetoric, perceived in the frame herein discussed, is a way of knowing; it is epistemic. The uncertainty of this way may seem too threatening to many. But the other way of looking at the world offers no legitimate role to rhetoric; if one would accept that way, then one may be called upon to act consistently with it.

Source: Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic." *Central States Speech Journal* 18 (1967): 17.

Lloyd Bitzer (1968)

In order to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-to-situation, we should acknowledge a viewpoint that is commonplace but fundamental: a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive.

Source: Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1.1 (1968): 3-4.

Lloyd Bitzer (1968)

Hence, to say that rhetoric is situational means: (1) rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to a situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence in response to a question, or a solution in response to a problem; (2) a speech is given rhetorical significance by the situation, just as a unit of discourse is given significance as answer or as solution by the question or problem; (3) a rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a necessary condition of an answer; (4) many questions are unanswered and many problems remain unsolved; similarly, many rhetorical situations mature and decay without giving birth to rhetorical utterance; (5) a situation is rhetorical insofar as it needs and invites discourse capable of participating with a situation and thereby altering its reality; (6) discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions (or seeks to function) as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it. (7) Finally, the situation controls the rhetorical response in the same sense that the question controls the answer and the problem controls the solution. Not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity—and, I should add, of rhetorical criticism.
Source: Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1.1 (1968): 5-6.

Douglas Ehninger (1968)
A rhetoric I define as an organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about practical discourse in any of its forms or modes. By practical discourse I mean discourse, written or oral, that seeks to inform, evaluate, or persuade, and therefore is to be distinguished from discourse that seeks to please, elevate, or depict.
Source: Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1.1 (1968): 131.

Douglas Ehninger (1968)
The continuing dialogue on the question, What is rhetoric? except as an academic exercise, is largely profitless. If there is no one generic rhetoric which, like a Platonic idea, is lurking in the shadows awaiting him [sic] who shall have the acuteness to discern it, the search for a defining quality can only end in error or frustration.
Source: Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1.1 (1968): 140.

W. Ross Winterowd (1968)
As groundwork for the pages that are to ensue in this book about rhetoric, it might be well to outline the main concerns of rhetoricians. This outline will be brief, for it is the purpose of the volume to fill in the details—in all their breadth and complexity—of the field of rhetoric.

Aristotle defines rhetoric as the art or faculty of discovering the best possible means of persuasion in regard to any subject whatever. He goes on to point out that this is the property of no other discipline, each of which is concerned with its own particular province, as medicine with healing, geometry with the properties of solids, and so forth. But rhetoric impinges on all areas of human concern, for human beings do and most talk about everything within their ken. Aristotle's definition is so basic that it deserves commitment to memory and some discussion here.

Aristotle was thinking of rhetoric primarily as a tool in argumentation, particularly the kind of deliberation or dispute that arose in courts of law or chambers of government. In a sense, his treatise, The "Art" of Rhetoric, was basically a handbook for lawyers, diplomats, and politicians, outlining the best methods whereby they might carry their points. But *The "Art" of Rhetoric* is not strictly or even primarily a handbook outlining techniques; if it were, it would have fallen into obscurity. Rather, it is a theoretical treatment of the ways in which man can most effectively persuade. Aristotle argues that ideally logic ought to carry points, but men being what the are, other means must supplement bare dialectic. For human beings act not only on the basis of reason, but also in passion. In effect, Aristotle is saying that rhetoric must gain emotional assent as well as logical assent. Therefore, we can say that Aristotle's definition of rhetoric extends to the ways in which we use discourse to ingratiate ourselves, to arouse sympathy, to evoke

indignation, and so forth. And, in fact, we can extend the basic definition of rhetoric posited by Aristotle to include the elicitation of the sympathetic agreement of the reader or auditor, in precisely the way that a lyric poem arouses sympathetic agreement.

What we are here saying—and it is an important point—is that Aristotle's definition serves as a valid and useful basis on which to construct the theory and practice of rhetoric.
Source: W. Ross Winterowd, *Rhetoric: A Synthesis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968. 14-15.

John H. Mackin (1969)
We may say that rhetoric is an art of speaking or writing to help solve a problem that some group faces. The concept of "groups" and "problem solving" are modern. The idea of "art" is an ancient one. This definition, then, tries to combine old and new ideas. Where "art" stands in the definition, we may put the classical art of rhetoric. Where "problem" and "group" stand, we may place any of our own immediate circumstances.
Source: John H. Mackin, *Classical Rhetoric for Modern Discourse: An Art for Invention, Arrangement, and Style for Readers, Speakers, and Writers*. New York: Free, 1969. 7.

Gerard Genette (1970)
[A]t the beginning of the twentieth century, "metaphor" was one of the rare terms to survive the great shipwreck of rhetoric, and this miraculous survival is obviously neither fortuitous nor insignificant.
Source: Gerard Genette, "Rhetoric Restrained." *Figures of Literary Discourse*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. 114.

Gerard Genette (1970)
The age-old tendency of rhetoric to reduction seems, then, to have culminated in an absolute valorization of metaphor, bound up with the idea of the essential metaphoricity of poetic language—and of language in general.
Source: Gerard Genette, "Rhetoric Restrained." *Figures of Literary Discourse*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. 118.

Gerard Genette (1970)
What is true [...] is that a metaphorics, a tropology, a theory of figures, does not relieve us of general rhetoric, still less of that "new rhetoric" (as it might be called), which we need (among other things) if we are to "act on the engine of the world," and which would be a semiotics of discourses. Of all discourses.
Source: Gerard Genette, "Rhetoric Restrained." *Figures of Literary Discourse*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. 121.

Group μ (University of Liège, Center for Poetic Studies: Jacques Dubois, Francis Édeline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Philippe Minguet, Francis Pire, and Hadelin Trinon) (1970)
Today rhetoric appears not only as a science of the future but also as a timely science within the scope of structuralism, new criticism, and semiology. Roland Barthes in 1964 noted incidentally that "rhetoric must be rethought in structural terms," and he added that "it is the object of a study already underway."
Source: Group Mu, *A General Rhetoric*. Trans. Paul B. Burrell and Edgar M. Slotkin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981. 1.

Group μ (University of Liège, Center for Poetic Studies: Jacques Dubois, Francis Édeline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Philippe Minguet, Francis Pire, and Hadelin Trinon) (1970)
In light of what we have raised above, to wit, that the theory of figures was far from exhausting the rhetoric of the ancients—and this justifies Perelman's use of the expression "new rhetoric" to

designate a theory of argumentation—rhetoric is the knowledge of the techniques of language characteristic of literature.
Source: Group Mu, *A General Rhetoric*. Trans. Paul B. Burrell and Edgar M. Slotkin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981. 19.

James Richard McNally (1970)
[I]f it can be determined that the "sense" of a piece of discourse resides chiefly in factual reportage and inference, we may call the discourse "semantically oriented"; if in elaborating the implications of a set of formal or aesthetic "premises," it is syntactically oriented; and if its meaningfulness consists chiefly in the address to interpreters' responses, it is "pragmatically oriented discourse." According to this view, a scholarly history of Sumer, to the extent that it is truly history, would be presumed to be semantically oriented discourse (though of course it may present interesting syntactic and pragmatic considerations); an equation in calculus or a James Bond novel would be syntactically oriented; and an editorial, political speech, or advertisement would exhibit pragmatic concentration.

Given the Morrisian typology and the concept of "semiotic concentration," we may define "rhetoric" generally as "(1) *sign-behavior exhibiting a pragmatic concentration of meaning or* (2) *the study of such behavior*."

Such a definition, despite its simplicity, seems to avoid the definitional problems presented earlier. It avoids the identification of rhetoric with either its practice (one of Gorgias' problems in calling rhetoric the *producer* of belief) or with its study (Aristotle's problem in making rhetoric a study of the *sources* or *means* of persuasion). It likewise avoids the global inclusiveness of Quintilian's and Campbell's views—rhetoric as humanly salutary or as adaptative. Instead, it appears to meet, even in its rather bald first statement, the criteria of a definition provided earlier. It is the definition of a word, yet it specifies the aspects of human behavior which that word preferably designates. The scope of its *definiens* permits adequate reportage or traditional usages, even those considered less desirable. Finally, the undefined words by means of which the definition conveys a more precise sense to "rhetoric"—"sign behavior," "study," and "pragmatic concentration"—confer a taxonomic power to the definition which previous definitions have lacked.
Source: James Richard McNally, "Toward a Definition of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 3 (1970): 77-78.

Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Beard, and Waldo W. Braden (1970)
[Rhetoric is] an instrument by which a speaker can, through the apt use of certain "lines of argument," make an adjustment to a situation composed of himself, his audience, his subject, and the occasion.
Source: Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Beard, and Waldo W. Braden, *Speech Criticism*. 2nd ed. New York: Ronald, 1970. 18.

Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike (1970)
Rhetoric, we argued, is concerned primarily with a creative process that includes all the individual choices a writer makes from his earliest tentative explorations of a problem in what has been called the "prewriting" stage of the writing process, through choices in arrangement and strategy for a particular audience, to the final editing of the final draft.
Source: Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*. New York: Harcourt, 1970. xii.

Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike (1970)
Perhaps the most succinct summary of our concept of rhetoric is the one St. Augustine made of his own rhetoric over 100 years ago: "There are two things necessary…way of discovering those things which are to be understood, and a way of teaching what we have learned." Despite significant differences between our concept of rhetoric and Augustine's, we share his views that the *process of discovering knowledge* must be yoked with the process of communicating it and

that, of the two, the first demands greater attention. And we believe, as he did, that *psychological change* in the audience, rather than elegant prose, is the immediate and proper goal of the writer. Above all, we share his belief that training in rhetoric should provide the writer with a means of both improving the quality of his intellectual life and entering the struggle for a more civilized community.
Source: Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*. New York: Harcourt, 1970. xiv.

Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike (1970)
The present state of rhetoric might be characterized as a need in search of a discipline. Perhaps never before in our history has there been such a need for effective communication, but the old formulation of rhetoric seem inadequate to the times. The outlines of a modern discipline appear to be emerging, however. This book can be taken as one effort to redefine the nature of the discipline. The features of the book are, in part, the result of our concern with the social changes we have been discussing. We have sought to develop a rhetoric that implies that we are all citizens of an extraordinarily diverse and disturbed world, that the "truths" we live by are tentative and subject to change, that we must be discoverers of new truths as well as preservers and transmitters of the old, and that enlightened cooperation is the preeminent ethical goal of communication.
Source: Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*. New York: Harcourt, 1970. 8-9.

Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike (1970)
As a process, rhetoric clearly begins with a person's impulse to communicate, to share some experience with others—although this is a somewhat arbitrary starting point since he often has explored his experiences and formulated ordering principles before he feels a desire to communicate. At some stage in the process he must identify his audience and decide what strategy he can use to present his ideas. If he chooses to write rather than speak, he must at some stage begin to write and rewrite what he wants to say. However, the process is not strictly linear, with clearly defined stages; they often overlap—the writing stage, for example, frequently serves as an opportunity to explore and clarify the experience in his own mind. But in spite of this blurring and merging of stages, the writer does at various times shift his attention from his experience and his own resources to his audience and to the written work itself; these shifts of attention and activity constitute the rhetorical process for the writer.
Source: Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*. New York: Harcourt, 1970. 9.

Hans Blumenberg (1971)
As far as rhetoric is concerned, the traditional basic conceptions of it can likewise be reduced to one pair of alternatives: Rhetoric has to do either with the consequences of possessing the truth or with the difficulties that result from the impossibility of obtaining truth.
Source: Hans Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of Rhetoric." *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* Ed. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: MIT, 1987. 429-30.

Wayne C. Booth (1971)
It occurs to me, as a naïve visitor, that there may be some use in a rapid survey of what other practices and theories would be included, in our time, if we took seriously a pragmatic definition as broad and loose as that: rhetoric will for now be *all* the arts of changing men's minds.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, "The Scope of Rhetoric Today." *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project*. Ed. Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 95.

John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs (1971)

Most traditional definitions of rhetoric explain the term as encompassing a theory or a rationale about verbal phenomena linked to persuasion. The definition used in this text is in the spirit of the traditional ones but extends their scope. For the purposes of this book, rhetoric is defined as **the rationale of instrumental symbolic behavior**.
Source: John Waite Bowers, Donovan J. Ochs, and Richard J. Jensen. *The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control*. 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1993. 1.

Peter Dixon (1971)
To speak in public presupposes an audience which is spoken to, an audience which the speaker wishes to influence, to persuade, perhaps to exhort and instruct. And public speech is necessarily different from private chat. The *rhetor* will use more artistic, more artificial and formal kinds of language than he would in everyday conversation. At the very least he will be more orderly than usual, choosing his words with greater precision; otherwise he may find himself not communicating to an audience but addressing the empty air. If, then, out of these implications we construct a working definition of *rhetor*—'a man skilled in speaking who addresses a public audience in order to make an impact upon it'—we may begin to see how the diverse uses of the word *rhetoric* in modern criticism can be traced back through various historical diversions and intersections to the several components of this basic definition.
Source: Peter Dixon, *Rhetoric*. London: Methuen, 1971. 1-2.

Richard McKeon (1971)
Rhetoric is an instrument of continuity and of change, of tradition and of revolution. The history of rhetoric is the history of a continuing art undergoing revolutionary changes. It has played an important part at some points in the formation of culture in the West, notably during the Roman Republic and the Renaissance. In both periods it was enlarged in its operation, using an extended form of the rhetorical device of "amplification," to become a productive or poetic art, an art of making in all phases of human activity. It was systematized in its organization, using a comprehensive form of the rhetorical device of "schematization," to become an architectonic art, an art of structuring all principles and products of knowing, doing, and making. If rhetoric is to be used to contribute to the formation of culture of the modern world, it should function productively in the resolution of new problems and architectonically in the formation of new inclusive communities. Rhetoric can be used to produce a new rhetoric constructed as a productive art and schematized as an architectonic art. At a second stage the new rhetoric can be used to reorganize the subject-matter and arts of education and life. What rhetoric should be and to what conditions it is adapted are not separate theoretical questions but the single practical question of producing schemata to guide the uses of the productive arts in transforming circumstances.
Source: Richard McKeon, "The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age." *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project*. Ed. Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 45.

Robert T. Oliver (1971)
A widely accepted encapsulated definition of rhetoric is "the function of adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas." It should be added: and also of adjusting people to people. The function of rhetoric is not, like dialectic, to examine a given subject in order accurately to depict its nature. Nor is rhetoric, like logic, designed to discover and demonstrate inevitable conclusions about a subject. The province of rhetoric, as Aristotle pointed out, is the realm of probabilities. We do not argue about that which is certain or ascertainable; we try to persuade concerning propositions which alternative acceptable conclusions.
Source: Robert T. Oliver, *Communication and Culture in India and China*. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1971. 6.

Robert T. Oliver (1971)
It follows that eloquence, the fruit of rhetoric, whether it be suasive or informative, is devoted to

influencing the behavior of men concerning the matters of choice by which they are confronted. Rhetoric is the consideration of means by which eloquence is or may be rendered effective in influencing the reactions of listeners (or of readers). Whatever might be adduced to influence the unfettered actions of men is the proper inquiry of the rhetorician.
Source: Robert T. Oliver, *Communication and Culture in India and China*. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1971. 6-7.

Karl R. Wallace (1971)
Rhetoric is, I think, primarily an art of discourse. It is an art because its principles and teachings are directed to two general ends or functions: the making or producing of utterances and the understanding and appraising them. Rhetoric is, moreover, something more than a methodological art. Its principles reflect men's behavior in their conversing, discussing, and speech-making, when they are in practical settings rather than in specialized or professional ones. The principles and rules of its art refer to, and have relevance for, the subject matter or "content" of everyday discourse. They cover situations where men are acting as social creatures in their families, neighborhoods, communities, and political associations and are not speaking as experts to experts. This concern gives rhetoric its distinctive character among schools and college subjects. Rhetoric is also a formal art. It deals with the patterns and structures of ideas men use in their reporting, explaining, arguing, judging, praising, and blaming. Rhetoric, then, appears whenever an individual must communicate, or chooses to communicate, by word, speech, and gesture in his customary dealings with others. The decision of a person to speak and the decision of an "audience" to participate imply that the parties involved believe they are capable of understanding the message and can profit from their engagement.

Yet to think of rhetoric as the art of practical discourse is not to exclude its interest in science, particularly the scientific endeavor that yields the kind of knowledge and information an art finds relevant to its ends and wishes to bring into its corpus by adoption and assimilation. Some of the basic processes in speech and language communication today are investigated empirically under controlled conditions of observation and experiment, as for example, factors that influence speech intelligibility and verbal methods of influencing attitude and belief. The rhetorician must be aware of the linguist's scientific study of language structures, but he will be especially alert to implications for his own examination of rhetorical styles and delivery. The rhetorician must be concerned with the psychologist's study of human nature and personality, but in ways that may illuminate and lead to the study of men as communicators. Because the interests of rhetoric and communication overlap, some rhetoricians and some students of communication in practical situations often associate closely. Some rhetoricians focus their research on a particular aspect of the communication process, and some communication specialists in college and industrial settings teach courses in speechmaking, discussion and conference leadership. Every rhetorician is directly concerned with what goes on when men adjust to one another through their communications; he is concerned too with how communications work and how they can be made to work better.
Source: Karl R. Wallace, "The Fundamentals of Rhetoric." *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project*. Ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 3-4.

Sol Chaneles and Jerome Snyder (1972)
At the very least, rhetoric is all the reasons for using words: it is the bag of crafty tricks for common word-mongers; it is the sublime esthetic for the consummate orator; it is the repertoire of homilies for pietists and the source of the sage commonplaces of elder statesmen. Words are acts of aggrandizement—rhetoric their tactical plan—to bring out into strong relief some aspect of truth which would not be clear otherwise. Whatsoever is certain needs no persuasion, it is closed to rhetoric.
Source: Sol Chaneles and Jerome Snyder, *"That Pestilent Cosmetic, Rhetoric."* New York: Grossman, 1972. 6.

Douglas Ehninger (1972)

[Rhetoric is] the rationale of symbolic inducement: as that discipline which studies all of the ways in which men may influence each other's thinking and behavior through the strategic use of symbols.
Source: Douglas Ehninger, *Contemporary Rhetoric: A Reader's Coursebook*. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1972. 3.

Donald C. Bryant (1973)
I would now define rhetoric as *the rationale of the informative and suasory in discourse*. That wording implies two distinguishable but closely entangled dimensions of discourse as rhetorical, and it implies others which are not. Perhaps it dodges or circumvents the problems of genre, but I think rather that it recognizes pure genres as fictions and implies that most artifacts of discourse exhibit various dimensions, the informative-suasory of which comprise the province of rhetoric.
Source: Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Scope *Rediviva*." *Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1973. 14.

Michel Foucault (1973)
[The problem is that of introducing] rhetoric, the orator, the struggle of discourse within the field of analysis; not to do, as linguists do, a systematic analysis of rhetorical procedures, but to study discourse, even the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedures, as ways of conquering, of producing events, of producing decisions, of producing battles, of producing victories. In order to "rhetoricize" philosophy.
Source: Quoted in Arnold I. Davidson, "Structures and Strategies of Discourse: Remarks toward a History of Foucault's Philosophy of Language." *Foucault and His Interlocutors*. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997. 5.

Robert L. Scott (1973)
The problem of defining "rhetoric" seems irresistible to rhetoricians. For many years I thought that that undertaking was my principle concern, that somehow I would achieve nirvana, if in twenty-five words or fewer, I could complete the sentence, "Rhetoric is…."
Source: Robert L. Scott, "On *Not* Defining Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6 (1973): 81.

Robert L. Scott (1973)
I shall argue the plausibility of these propositions:

1. That people generally have a sense of rhetoric. This sense or feeling, which precedes any definition of rhetoric, is immediately rooted in experience.

2. That the way in which and the degree to which one senses rhetoric is dependent on one's set toward reality. Some personal sets toward reality tend to close off the sense of rhetoric. An intersubjective stance tends to open one to a sense of rhetoric. The intersubjectivist experiences his environment as rhetorical.

3. That although particular definitions of rhetoric may be useful in particular circumstances, these definitions should set one toward knowing the reality of rhetoric on three levels: the strategic, the substantial, and the dynamic. This set of labels, like any other, is arbitrary and, if the terms are sensible, they are simultaneous aspects of reality.

Source: Robert L. Scott, "On *Not* Defining Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6 (1973): 82.

Wayne C. Booth (1974)
If philosophy is defined as inquiry into certain truth, then what I pursue here is not philosophy but rhetoric: the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse. But the differences are not sharply definable, and I of course think of inquiry as in a larger sense philosophical. To talk to improving beliefs implies that we are seeking truth, since some beliefs are "truer" than others. Besides, many philosophers from Cicero to the present have defined what they do precisely as I would define rhetoric.

Source: Wayne C. Booth, *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. xiii.

Wayne C. Booth (1974)
[Rhetoric is] the art of probing what men believe they ought to believe, rather than proving what is true according to abstract methods. It is thus always dirtying its hands in mere opinion, offering its services to both sides of a controversy, and producing results that are at best rather messy. And rhetoric is always tainted, in the view of purer disciplines, by concern for audiences.

This might not be too bad if rhetoric worried only about "what all men believe," but more often than not it alters its conclusions, as it manipulates its devices, to suit local opinions of special audiences: rhetoric not only uses different arguments when addressing different audiences, but it will prove conflicting conclusions, since it is finally and utterly bound to whatever convictions are shared by a given rhetorical community.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. xiii.

Wayne C. Booth (1974)
"Good rhetoric" [...] often means merely whatever is successful in the sense of winning assent regardless of whether the assent is justified. At best, in popular usage, *good rhetoric* will mean rhetoric that is effective, in the sense of doing all that is possible to produce persuasion regardless of whether the audience is pig-headed or not. But I shall be pursuing here the art of discovering good reasons, finding what really warrants assent because any reasonable person ought to be persuaded by what has been said. This latter meaning has disappeared from most discussions of communication in our time, and it is the one I deal with most extensively. *Bad rhetoric* throughout the lectures will not be primarily what is technically clumsy—though that is one kind of badness—but the rhetoric which lacks genuine power to move reasonable auditors, if any should happen along.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. xiv-xv.

Wayne C. Booth (1974)
Rhetoric has almost always had a bad press, and it more often than not still carries a sense of trickery or bombastic disguise for a weak case: making the worse appear the better cause. But I am groping toward something far more important, though obviously far too grandiose to be achieved in four lectures: a view of rhetoric as the whole art of discovering and sharing warrantable assertion.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974. 11.

Frank D'Angelo (1975)
From the time of Aristotle, rhetoric has generally been considered an art. Aristotle himself defined rhetoric as the art of discovering the available means of persuasion in any given case. And since the time of Aristotle, rhetoric has been variously defined as the art of speaking or writing effectively, the art of verbal communication, and the art of effective expression. But what if rhetoric were a science as well as an art? Such a view of rhetoric would change its character from the intuitive (conceived in this sense as the exercising of skills that cannot be learned by study alone), the practical, and the prescriptive to the systematic, the theoretical, and the descriptive. Such a view is certainly implicit in the recent work of those scholars who have attempted to derive principles of rhetoric from the study of style and structure in writing.
Source: Frank D'Angelo, *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1975. 1-2.

Frank D'Angelo (1975)
Perhaps an even more useful distinction than that between rhetoric as an art and as a science would be that between rhetoric and composition. Rhetoric, in this view, is a science which attempts to discover general principles of oral or written discourse. It subjects its findings and conclusions to close examination and verification. A rhetorician, therefore, is one who attempts

to discover these rhetorical principles. Composition is essentially the art of applying these principles in writing, and the teacher of composition is one who tries to impart some of these principles to his students as well as to give the students a way of arriving at their own ideas about writing.
Source: Frank D'Angelo, *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1975. 3.

Robert L. Scott (1975)
As a backdrop of definition for this enterprise, take this statement: rhetoric is communication characterized by a high degree of intentionality and a high degree of structure, including distinctness of communicative roles; it eventuates in discourse in the public realm of experience rather than private.
Source: Robert L. Scott, "A Synoptic View of Systems of Western Rhetoric." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 61 (1975): 440.

Umberto Eco (1976)
Rhetoric: the revival in studies of rhetoric is currently converging on the study of mass communication (and therefore of communication with the intention of persuasion). A rereading of traditional studies in the light of semiotics produces a great many suggestions. From Aristotle to Quintilian, through the medieval and Renaissance theoreticians up to Perelman, rhetoric appears as a second chapter in the general study of semiotics (following linguistics) elaborated centuries ago, and now providing tools for a discipline which encompasses it. Therefore a bibliography of the semiotic aspects of rhetoric seems identical with a bibliography of rhetoric.
Source: Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1976. 13-14.

Ernesto Grassi (1976)
If the image, the metaphor, belongs to rhetorical speech (and for this reason it has a pathetic character), we also are obliged to recognize that every original, former, "archaic" speech (archaic in the sense of dominant, *arche*, *archomai*; *archontes* or the dominants) cannot have a rational but only a rhetorical character. Thus the term "rhetoric" assumes a fundamentally new significance; "rhetoric" is not, nor can it be the art, the technique of an exterior persuasion; it is rather the speech which is the basis of the rational thought.
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Rhetoric and Philosophy." Trans. Azizeh Azodi. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 9 (1976): 202.

Ernesto Grassi (1976)
What I have attempted here is to demonstrate that the problem of rhetoric in every sense cannot be separated from a discussion of its relation to philosophy. One problem, however, seems yet unsolved, namely, that an essential moment of rhetorical speech is metaphor. Can we claim that the original, archaic assertions on which rational proofs depend have a metaphorical character? Can we maintain the thesis that the *archai* have any connection with images as the subject of a "transferred" meaning? Surprisingly enough, perhaps, we can speak about first principles only through metaphors; we speak of them as "premises" {*premittere*}, as "grounds," as "foundations," as "axioms" {*axioo* or estimate}. Even logical language must resort to metaphors, involving a transposition from the empirical realm of senses, in which "seeing" and the "pictorial" move to the foreground: to "clarify," to "gain insight," to "found," to "conclude," to "deduce." We also must not forget that the term "metaphor" is itself a metaphor; it is derived from the verb *metapherein* "to transfer," which originally described a concrete activity (Herodotus 1.64.2).
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Rhetoric and Philosophy." Trans. Azizeh Azodi. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 9 (1976): 214-15.

Richard A. Lanham (1976)
What kind of man would *homo rhetoricus* be? What would the "rhetorical ideal of life" be like? Our composite picture suggests, at a first reflection, that rhetorical man must have felt an

overpowering self-consciousness about language. So far have we moved in the opposite direction that the point bears emphasis. For rhetorical man, what we think of as a natural verbal spontaneity was never allowed to develop. Language, spoken or written, was naturally premeditated. Attention would fall, first and last if not always, on the verbal surface, on words not ideas.
Source: Richard Lanham, *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1976. 3.

Richard A. Lanham (1976)
Rhetorical man is an actor; his reality public, dramatic. His sense of identity, his self, depends on the reassurance of daily histrionic reenactment. He is thus centered in time and concrete local event. The lowest common denominator of his life is a social situation. And his motivations must be characteristically ludic, agonistic. He thinks first of winning, of mastering the rules the current game enforces. He assumes a natural agility in changing orientations. He hits the street already street-wise. From birth, almost, he has dwelt not in a single value-structure but in several. He is thus committed to no single construction of the world; much rather, to prevailing in the game at hand. He makes an unlikely zealot. Not is conceptual creativity, invention of a fresh paradigm, demanded of him. He accepts the present paradigm and explores its resources. Rhetorical man is trained not to discover reality but to manipulate it. Reality is what is accepted as reality, what is useful. So Protagoras's wonderful answer when asked if the gods exist: "I do not know whether they exist or not. It is a difficult question and life is too short." Nothing is aught till it is valued. Rhetorical man does not ask, "What is real?" He asks, "What is accepted as reality here and now?"

Nor is he a Puritan, especially about language. He cannot be surprised ceaselessly *pushing through* language to a preexistent, divinely certified reality beyond. No such reality exists for him. He can play freely with language. For him it owes no transcendental loyalties. Rhetorical man will always be an unregenerate punster. He will be not so much dazzled by the delights of language, poisoned by roses, as a sophisticated connoisseur of them. Such a connoisseurship would form a predictable analogue to the emphasis on scoring.

The rhetorical view of life, then, begins with the centrality of language. It conceives reality as fundamentally dramatic, man as fundamentally a role player. It synthesizes an essentially bifurcated, self-serving theory of motive. We play for advantage, but we play for pleasure, too. Such a scheme is galvanized by the Gorgian prime mover, ηδονη, pleasure. Purposeful striving is invigorated by frequent dips back into the pleasurable resources of pure play. Rhetoric is always ritualizing, stylizing purpose in order to enjoy it more. The rhetorical view thus stands fundamentally opposed to the West's bad conscience about language, revels in what Roland Barthes (in "Science vs. Literature") has called "the Eros of Language." *Homo rhetoricus* cannot, to sum up, be *serious*. He is not pledged to a single set of values and the cosmic orchestration they adumbrate. He is not, like the serious man, alienated from his own language. And if he relinquishes the luxury of a central self, a soul, he gains the tolerance, and usually the sense of humor, that comes from knowing he—and others—not only may *think* differently, but may *be* differently. He pays the price for this, of course—religious sublimity, and its reassuring, if breathtaking, unities.
Source: Richard Lanham, *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1976. 4-5.

Richard A. Lanham (1976)
The rhetorical view of life threatens the serious view at every point. Thus rhetoric's most perceptive serious students damn it utterly, find it in principle unredeemable. To find it a mixed blessing, like Aristotle and unlike Plato, is, at least at first, to underestimate its power, direction, and inner coherence. But would it not make far more sense to recognize the rhetorical ideal as a world view, a way of life as well as a view of life, a coherent counterstatement to "serious"

reality? The recurring attempts to make rhetorical training respectable in serious terms all go astray. The contribution rhetorical reality makes to Western reality as a whole is greatest when it is most uncompromisingly itself, insists most strenuously on its own coordinates.

The Western self has from the beginning been composed of a shifting and perpetually uneasy combination of *homo rhetoricus* and *homo seriosus*, of a social self and a central self. It is their business to contend for supremacy. To *settle* the struggle would be to end the Greek experiment in a complex self. Those who seek for sensible compromise, like Aristotle, though they contribute more to a living balance, throw less light on the theoretical antithesis than those, like Plato, who wish the Western self to become entirely serious. The rhetorical half of the pairing has been described by Platonic philosophers, or by rhetoricians who did not—and most did not—see clearly the implications of their own proceedings. They could not see their own authentic contribution to the larger task at hand, constructing the complex, unstable, painful Western self. We find here the explanation for rhetorical training's paradoxical durability. To leave it out cuts man in half.

Thus, though the media stayed in serious hands, rhetorical training thrived long as their immediate needs it satisfied. It had, by that time, come to satisfy needs yet more fundamental and long-lasting. It provided a brilliant education in politics and the social surface. From the Sophists onward, it addressed itself to speaking and acting in the city's business (τα τηζ πολεωζ και λεγειν και πραττειν). It provided a training in the mechanisms of identity, offered a selection of roles the adolescent could try out. It offered a training in tolerance, if by that we mean getting inside another's skull and looking out. It offered the friendliest of advices on how to tap into any and all sources of pleasure. It habituated its students to a world of contingent purpose, of perpetual cognitive dissonance, plural orchestration. It specialized less in knowledge than in the way knowledge is held, which is how Whitehead defines wisdom.

Perhaps the serious premises have thrived because they flatter us. The rhetorical view does not. The rhetorical view of life is satirical, radically reductive of human motive and human striving. Rhetoric's real crime, one is often led to suspect, is its candid acknowledgement of the rhetorical aspects of "serious" life. The concept of a central self, true or not, flatters man immensely. It gives him an identity outside time and change that he sees nowhere else in the sublunary universe. So, too, the theory of knowledge upon which seriousness rests Here there is little to choose between a positivist reality and a Platonic, between realism and idealism. As Eric Havelock points out, "For Plato, reality is rational, scientific, and logical, or it is nothing." How reassuring to arrive at essence, Eleatic Being. How flattering that we, at whatever brave cost to ourselves, penetrate to the way things are, look, at the end of our quest, upon the true face of beauty "itself, of and in itself, always one being" (*Symposium* 211B). How humiliating to be all this time only looking in a mirror.

At the heart of rhetorical reality lies pleasure. We personify for pleasure, we act for pleasure. And we clothe this pleasure with high-minded protestations, again for pleasure, as well as for advantage. The rhetorical view makes us all incorrigible sentimentalists. Again, how humiliating. We would prefer to dwell on our tragic fate, painful but heroic. To set ourselves off against the whole universe makes us, in a manner of speaking, as big as it is. *Homo rhetoricus* is flung into a meaningless universe too, of course. But unlike his serious—or existential—*doppelgänger*, he doesn't repine, bathe in self-pity because his world possesses no center. He can resist such centermentalism because he knows that his own capacity to make up comforting illusions is as infinite as the universe he is flung into. Naked into the world he may come, but not without resource.

Source: Richard Lanham, *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1976. 6-8. CHECK.

Robert L. Scott (1976)

[R]hetoric may be the art of persuasion, that is, it may be seen from one angle as a practical capacity to find means to ends on specific occasions; but rhetoric must also be seen more

broadly as a human potentiality to understand the human condition.
Source: Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later." *Central States Speech Journal* 27 (1976): 266.

Chaïm Perelman (1977)
The theory of argumentation, conceived as a new rhetoric or dialectic, covers the whole range of discourse that aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the subject matter.
Source: Chaïm Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*. Trans. William Kluback. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1982. 5.

Chaïm Perelman (1977)
Philosophical, like juridical, argumentation constitutes the application to particular fields of a general theory of argumentation which we understand as a new rhetoric. In identifying this rhetoric with the general theory of persuasive discourse, which seeks to gain both the intellectual and the emotional adherence of any sort of audience, we affirm that every discourse which does not claim an impersonal validity belongs to rhetoric. As soon as a communication tries to influence one or more persons, to orient their thinking, to excite or calm their emotions, to guide their actions, it belongs to the realm of rhetoric. Dialectic, the technique of controversy, is included as one part of this larger realm.

Thus rhetoric covers the vast field of nonformalized thought: we can thus speak of "the realm of rhetoric." It is in this spirit that Professor Jens of the University of Tubingen described rhetoric as "the once and future queen of the human sciences" [*alte und neue Königin der Wissenschaften*].
Source: Chaïm Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*. Trans. William Kluback. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1982. 161-62.

Tzvetan Todorov (1977)
The object of rhetoric is eloquence, defined as effective speech that makes it possible to act on others. Rhetoric grasps language not as form—it is not concerned with utterances as such—but as action; the linguistic form becomes an ingredient of a global act of communication (of which persuasion is the most characteristic type). Rhetoric deals with the functions of speech, not its structure. Its one constant is the objective it seeks to achieve: to persuade (or, in the terminology of a later age, to instruct, to move, and to please). Linguistic means are taken into account to the extent that they may be used to reach this objective.

Rhetoric studies the means that allow a chosen end to be achieved. It is not surprising to discover that the metaphors used in rhetoric to designate rhetoric itself are always based on this relation of means to end. Rhetoric is sometimes compared to medical technique, sometimes to military strategy.
Source: Tzvetan Todorov, *Theories of the Symbol*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982. 61.

Tzvetan Todorov (1977)
It is clear that the spirit of rhetoric is pragmatic, and by that very token immoral: whatever the circumstances or the cause defended, one must be able to achieve one's end. The assorted declarations of principle clustered at the entrance or the exit of the rhetorical edifice hardly prevent the eloquent orator from using his art for purposes whose justice is apparent only to himself. Rhetoric does not valorize one type of speech over others; any means are good provided that the objective is attained. Any speech may be efficacious; it must simply be used toward an appropriate end.
Source: Tzvetan Todorov, *Theories of the Symbol*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982. 61-62.

Jonathan Culler (1978)
Rhetoric is the art of using language effectively, yet it is also that which any speech or composition must avoid if it is to be truly effective. Such paradoxes may, of course, be treated

simply as curious historical shifts. Thus, one might claim that rhetoric was at one time the art of inventing appropriate formulations and organizing them so as to produce the desired effect of the whole: at another time rhetoric as an inventory of devices or conventional figures which threaten to entrap and limit a writer unless he go beyond them or give them new life by a creative or innovative use. It is far from clear, however, that we have here two separate historical realities, and if we wish to account for the possibility of rhetoric taking either of these forms at a given moment in history, we would be well advised to keep the two sides of the paradox together, as components of a paradoxical definition.
Source: Jonathan Culler, "On Trope and Persuasion." *New Literary History* 9 (1978): 607-08.

Ernesto Grassi (1978)
The poet as orator calls the human world into being and realizes it for the sake of the word, through the word as rhetorical. But the objection remains that the world that comes into being through the poet cannot be the object of science because it is based on metaphors. Scientific thought precludes accepting such a presupposition, since it represents something that is "merely human." Metaphors represent a merely picturesque beginning for thought in unfounded and unfoundable guideposts within a darkness that is impenetrable for men. This objection leads to the rejection of the humanist tradition as "empty." Does it not offer us a "subjective" world if it is based upon principles [*archai*] that cannot be proved rationally? Metaphors reduce themselves to a mysterious "game" that scientific thought never can grasp.
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophizing?: The Humanist Tradition." Trans. John Michael Krois. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (1978): 75.

Ernesto Grassi (1978)
The metaphor, and hence the language which it draws upon, has an "archaic" character, "possesses principles," and is what we call "rhetorical." But this certainly is no longer understood as a mere technique for the "superficial" use of persuasion. Rather, on the basis of its archaic character, it is what outlines the basis or framework of rational argument; it comes "before" and provides that which deduction can never discover.
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophizing?: The Humanist Tradition." Trans. John Michael Krois. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (1978): 91.

Stanley Meltzoff (1978)
Rhetoric is the study of languages and sign systems in use, but neither languages or sign systems are needed to communicate rhetorically. If we know a language or a code, we read a text linguistically and decode a message semiotically. Dictionaries or code books provide semantic reference for the words or signs which make up a communication, but we get the meaning of the whole by rhetorical understanding.
Source: Stanley Meltzoff, "Rhetoric, Semiotics, and Linguistics Look at the *Strolling Actresses* of Hogarth." *New Literary History* 9 (1978): 561.

Paul De Man (1979)
[Rhetoric is] the study of tropes and of figures, [...] not in the derived sense of comment or of eloquence or persuasion.
Source: Paul De Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. 6.

Paul De Man (1979)
[Rhetoric is] precisely the gap that becomes apparent in the pedagogical and philosophical history of the term. Considered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when considered as a system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance. Rhetoric is a text in that it allows for two incompatible, mutually self-destructive points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or understanding. The aporia between performative and

constative language is merely a version of the aporia between trope and persuasion that both generates and paralyzes rhetoric and thus gives it the appearance of a history.
Source: Paul De Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. 131.

Michael Hyde and Craig Smith (1979)
The primordial function of rhetoric is to "make-known" meaning both *to oneself and to others*. *Meaning is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making known that meaning*.
Source: Michael Hyde and Craig Smith, "Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65 (1979): 348.

Donald P. Cushman and Phillip K. Tompkins (1980)
Rhetoric will be viewed as a form of communication which permits the realization of an agent's dispositions toward intentionality, rationality, creativity, and self-realization. We shall argue that the manifestations of these dispositions are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for normatively defining a given instance of communication as rhetoric.
Source: Donald P. Cushman and Phillip K. Tompkins, "A Theory of Rhetoric for Contemporary Society." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980): 52.

Ernesto Grassi (1902-1991), "Historical and Theoretical Premises of the Humanistic Conception of Rhetoric" (1980)
So according to this humanist tradition, we are obliged to recognize that every original, former, "archaic" speech (archaic in the sense of dominant, *arche*, *archomai*, *archontes* or the dominants) cannot have a rational but only a rhetorical character. Thus the term "rhetoric" assumes a fundamentally new significance; "rhetoric" is not, nor can it be, the art or the technique of an exterior persuasion; it is rather the speech which is the basis of the rational thought.
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Historical and Theoretical Premises of the Humanistic Conception of Rhetoric." *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition*. Trans. John Michael Krois and Azizeh Azodi. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1980. 65.

Ernesto Grassi (1980)
Rhetorical speech on the other hand is a "dialogue," that is, that which breaks out with vehemence in the urgency of particular human situation and "here" and "now" begins to form a specifically human order in the confrontation with other human beings. And because the material belonging to language consists in the interpretation of the meaning of sensory appearances—for the main thing is to order and form these—it is laden with figurative expressions, color, sounds, smells, tangibles. It proves in the highest degree to be "metaphoric" speech, laden with symbols in accordance with a formulation of Baudelaire's. "Nature is a temple in which living pillars sometimes let forth confused words; man passes therein through a wood of symbols. They give him familiar views like wide echoes, that are prolonged in the distance in a deep and dark unity like the night and the brightness, mix and respond to the smells, colors, and sounds."
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Language as the Presupposition of Religion." *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition*. Trans. John Michael Krois and Azizeh Azodi. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1980. 113-14.

Paolo Valesio (1980)
[R]hetoric speaks about the ways in which human discourse works and has worked, and it speaks about these things as one of the fundamental branches of the human sciences, in terms relevant to all our contemporary concerns. What I have just said essentially answers the question that naturally occurs at this point—the one about the ontological basis of rhetorics: if rhetorics is a theory, what is it a theory of? I have already noted that rhetorics is a theory of

rhetoric; I specify now that rhetoric is the functional organization of discourse, within its social and cultural context, in all its aspects, exception made for its realization as a strictly formal metalanguage—in formal logic, mathematics, and in the sciences whose metalanguages share the same features. In other words: rhetoric is all of language, in its realization as discourse. For to exclude strictly formalized metalanguages from the domain of rhetoric (and even this tentatively—until one investigates the possible rhetorical elements in those metalanguages) is to discard something that is not, properly speaking, language; the catholicity of rhetoric, that ranges over the whole of linguistic structure, is thus confirmed rather than weakened.
Source: Paolo Valesio, *Novantiqua: Rhetorics as Contemporary Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1980. 7.

Jonathan Culler (1981)
Rhetoric, once rumored to have died in the nineteenth century, is once again a flourishing discipline, or at least a very active field; and much of this activity is focused on *metaphor*.
Source: Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981. 188.

Terry Eagleton (1981)
A political literary criticism is not the invention of Marxists. On the contrary, it is one of the oldest, most venerable forms of literary criticism we know. The most widespread early criticism on historical record was not, in our sense, 'aesthetic': it was a mode of what we would now call 'discourse theory,' devoted to analysing the material effects of particular uses of language in particular social conjunctures. It was a highly elaborate theory of specific signifying practices—above all, of the discursive practices of the juridical, political, and religious apparatuses of the state. Its intention, quite consciously, was systematically to theorize the articulations of discourse and power, and to do so in the name of political practice: to enrich the political effectivity of signification.

The name of this form of criticism was rhetoric. From its earliest formulations by Corax of Syracuse in fifth-century Greece, rhetoric came in Roman schools to be practically equivalent to higher education as such. It constituted the paramount study in such schools down to the fourth century, providing a whole course in the humanities, incorporating the art of speaking and writing well in any discourse whatsoever. Throughout late antiquity and the middle ages, 'criticism' was, in effect, rhetoric; and in its later history rhetoric remained a textual training of the ruling class in the techniques of political hegemony. Textual analysis was seen as preparatory to textual composition: the point of studying literary felicities and stylistic devices was to train oneself to use them effectively in one's own ideological practice. The textbooks of rhetoric were the densely codified manuals of such politico-discursive education; they were handbooks of ruling-class power. Born in antiquity as a supremely pragmatic discourse—how to litigate, prosecute, politically persuade—rhetoric emerged as a discourse theory utterly inseparable from the social relations of exploitation. Cleric and litigant, politician and prosecutor, military leader and popular tribune would naturally have recourse to the prescriptions of rhetorical theory; for how absurd to imagine that the business of politically effective discourse could be left to the vagaries of individual inspiration. Specialists in the theory of signifying practices—rhetoricians—would thus be at hand, to offer systematic instruction in such matters. Their rhetorical meditations—born often enough, as with Cicero, out of their own political practice—would then be encoded by the pedagogical apparatuses of later ruling classes, for their own political purposes. Textual 'beauties' were not first of all to be aesthetically savoured; they were ideological weapons whose practical deployment was to be learnt. The term 'rhetoric' today means both the theory of effective discourse and the practice of it.
Source: Terry Eagleton, "A Short History of Rhetoric." *Walter Benjamin, or, Toward a Revolutionary Criticism*. London: Verso, 1981. 101-02.

H. P. Rickman (1981)
So, to define the subject of rhetoric as persuasive communication is useful, and conforms with

traditional usage, but the concept becomes even more useful if we get rid of two implications of the traditional definition; namely, that persuasion is a distinctive use of language that can be contrasted with information or technical instruction, and that it must be confined to such areas as law and politics and, we must add today, advertising.
Source: H. P. Rickman, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 14 (1981): 101.

H. P. Rickman (1981)
We can sway him by arousing his emotions, giving him factual information, demonstrating how something works, or presenting him with arguments. So, it seems more helpful to consider how *any* of these forms of approach can be persuasive rather than singling out one of them—say, emotional arousal—as the sole or main field of persuasion. We can then redefine rhetoric as the study of effective communication.
Source: H. P. Rickman, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 14 (1981): 101.

Michael Calvin McGee (1982)
I will hazard one of those infamous italicized sentences which begin "rhetoric is…" and then call specific attention to the issues I want to raise in with the chosen wording. *Rhetoric is a natural social phenomenon in the context of which symbolic claims are made on the behavior and/or belief of one or more persons, allegedly in the interest of such individuals, and with the strong presumption that such claims will cause meaningful change.*
Source: Michael Calvin McGee, "A Materialist's Conception of Rhetoric." *Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in Honor of Douglas Ehninger*. Ed. Ray E. McKerrow. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1982. 38.

Robert Pattison (1982)
Speech is not one of the technologies of language; it is the fact about the world from which all technologies of language flow. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is a technology—the earliest technology of language. Except for illiterates like the Wild Boy, everyone has access to the world of language embodied in speech, but not everyone can use language to equal effect. Rhetoric, the art of using language to effect—the art of persuasion, as Aristotle has it—is a skill developed by men to exploit the natural resource of speech. The power of speech is like the ability to move one's limbs. Both are complex physical acts that depend upon training within the human community, but both are available to all men in the normal course of development. Rhetoric, though, is like etiquette, a learned social refinement of biological reality. The rhetorician aspires to reach and alter our consciousness. His is therefore a literate endeavor. He uses language in a studied way for result, thereby forming the raw matter of language by the technology of rhetoric. To be able to alter human affairs merely by opening one's mouth and making sounds that profess to deal in ideas is a powerful talent.
Source: Robert Pattison, *On Literacy: The Politics of the Word from Homer to the Age of Rock*. New York: Oxford, 1982. 30.

Renato Barilli (1983)
From a linguistic analysis of the term "rhetoric" we can isolate some features or at least pinpoint issues that rhetoric raised and is still raising in its long existence of over two millennia. A lexical marker, the root *rhe*, can be identified, as well as some morphological markers contained in the group "toric." The Greek root *rhe* means "to say," to use discourse, *logos*. To this must immediately be added an intensive connotation, a connotation of fullness; rhetoric is a comprehensive, total way of using discourse. This means that the physical aspects of speech are not sacrificed to the intellectual dimension. The physical aspects include the sounds of a linguistic message, together with the modes of delivery, pronunciation, facial expressions, and gestures. Obviously, all of these aspects intervene only in an oral situation, when rhetorical communication takes place in the presence and mutual involvement of a speaker and an audience, so that the latter can judge, appreciate, and enjoy the physicality of speech.
Source: Renato Barilli, *Rhetoric*. Trans. Giuliana Menozzi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989. vii.

Renato Barilli (1983)
Rhetoric reveals a vocation for fullness and totality also with regard to meaning. Etymologically, rhetoric means "the art of discourse." It claims to produce discourses on a wide range of matters, in essence, on all the areas that concern ordinary human beings and that no one can ever renounce, for example, state or government activity, the administration of justice, and the setting of ethical values to be followed in private and public life, thus also laying the foundation for standards of judgment: praising or stigmatizing others on the grounds of their behavior.
Source: Renato Barilli, *Rhetoric*. Trans. Giuliana Menozzi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989. viii.

Terry Eagleton (1996)
Rhetoric, which was the received form of critical analysis all the way from ancient society to the eighteenth century, examined the way discourses are constructed in order to achieve certain effects. It was not worried about whether its objects of inquiry were speaking or writing, poetry or philosophy, fiction or historiography: its horizon was nothing less than the field of discursive practices in society as a whole, and its particular interest lay in grasping such practices as forms of power and performance. This is not to say that it ignored the truth-value of the discourses in question, since this could often be crucially relevant to the kinds of effect they produced in their readers and listeners. Rhetoric in its major phase was neither a language, nor a "formalism," preoccupied simply with analyzing linguistic devices. It looked at such devices in terms of concrete performance—they were means of pleading, persuading, inciting and so on—and at people's responses to discourse in terms of linguistic structures and the material situations in which they functioned. It saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, to be aesthetically contemplated or endlessly deconstructed, but as forms of *activity* inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers, orators and audiences, and as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they were embedded.
Source: Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996. 179.

John Poulakos (1983)
Rhetoric is the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is possible.
Source: John Poulakos, "Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (1983): 36.

James A. Berlin (1984)
A rhetoric is a social invention. It arises out of a time and place, a peculiar social context, establishing for a period the conditions that make a peculiar kind of communication possible, and then it is altered or replaced by another scheme. A rhetoric is the codification of the unspeakable, as well as the speakable. No rhetoric—not Plato's or Aristotle's or Quintilian's or Perelman's—is permanent, is embraced by all people, or even by some one person or group, at all times. A rhetoric changes in the same way that a poetic changes, responding to the same social conditions. The study of rhetoric is made difficult, as well as enticing, by this inevitability. In any social context, furthermore, there are usually a number of rhetorics competing for allegiance. A glance at any of the standard rhetorical histories—Kennedy's, McKeon's, Howell's, Corbett's—reveals this plurality of systems, each one claiming to be the one, true, and permanent.
Source: James A. Berlin, *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 1.

James A. Berlin (1984)
Rhetoric has traditionally been seen as based on four elements interacting with each other; reality, writer or speaker, audience, and language. Rhetorical schemes differ from each other, I am convinced, not in emphasizing one of these elements over another. Rhetorical schemes differ

in the way each element is defined, as well as in the conception of the relation of the elements to each other. Every rhetoric, as a result, has at its base a conception of reality, of human nature, and of language. In other terms, it is grounded in a noetic field: a closed system defining what can, and cannot, be known; the nature of the knower; the nature of the relationship between the knower, the known, and the audience; and the nature of language. Rhetoric is thus ultimately implicated in all a society attempts. It is at the center of a culture's activities.
Source: James A. Berlin, *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 1-2.

Andrea A. Lunsford and Lisa S. Ede (1984)
Table 1. Major Distinctions Typically Drawn between Classical and Modern Rhetoric

Classical Rhetoric
1. Man is a rational animal living in a society marked by social cohesion and agreed-upon values.
2. Emphasis is on logical (or rational) proofs.
3. Rhetor-audience relationship is antagonistic, characterized by manipulative one-way communication.
4. Goal is *persuasion*.

Modern Rhetoric
1. Man is a symbol-using animal living in a fragmented society.
2. Emphasis is on emotional (or psychological) proofs.
3. Rhetor-audience relationship is cooperative, characterized by emphatic, two-way communication.
4. Goal is *communication*.

Source: Andrea A. Lunsford and Lisa S. Ede, "On Distinctions between Classical and Modern Rhetoric." *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*. Ed. Robert J. Connors, Andrea A. Lunsford, and Lisa S. Ede. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 40.

James Boyd White (1984)
[Rhetoric is] the study of the ways in which character and community—and motive, value, reason, social structure, everything, in short, that makes a culture—are defined and made real in performances in language. Whenever you speak, you define a character for yourself and for at least one other—your audience—and make a community at least between the two of you; and you do this in a language that is of necessity provided to you by others and modified in your use of it. [...] As the object of art is beauty and of philosophy truth, the object of rhetoric is justice: the constitution of a social world.
Source: John Boyd White, *When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1984. xi.

Jim W. Corder (1985)
Rhetoric is love, and it must speak a commodious language, creating a world full of space and time that will hold our diversities. Most failures of communication result from some willful or inadvertent but unloving violation of the space and time we and others live in, and most of our speaking is tribal talk. But there is more to us than that. We can learn to speak a commodious language, and we can learn to hear a commodious language.
Source: Jim W. Corder, "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love." *Rhetoric Review* 4 (1985): 31-32.

Richard A. Cherwitz and James A. Hikins (1986)
The preceding pages provide a cursory inspection of the history of definitions of rhetoric. This I not to be confused with a history of rhetorical theory—a topic beyond the scope of this book.

Each epoch's definitions of rhetoric have attempted to correct deficiencies assumed to exist in prior treatments. There have been progressive refinements and increased philosophical sophistication. Yet, even the best of the major definitions so far proposed fail to identify the fundamental constituents that set rhetoric apart from other products of human activity. Each definition suffers from one or more of the following problems:

1. Failure to accommodate collective activities of practitioner, critics, and theorist;
2. Failure to recognize that rhetorical discourse may occur in either written or oral mediums;
3. Isolation of symptoms, processes, motives, and ends of rhetoric to the neglect of necessary and sufficient features;
4. Failure to recognize inventional as well as managerial aspects of the concept;
5. Failure to recognize the diverse areas of human thought and inquiry where rhetoric can inform discussion and deliberation;
6. Presupposing that ethical malpractice occurs in all rhetorical acts;
7. Exhibiting overriding concern with showing rhetoric's relationship to other arts and sciences or definition by exclusion rather than inclusion; and/or
8. Failure to recognize that principles of rhetoric transcend the modes of rhetoric employed in given cases.

Source: Richard A. Cherwitz and James A. Hikins, *Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology*. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1986. 60-61.

Richard A. Cherwitz and James A. Hikins (1986)

Our definition is advanced as an extension of previous thinking. We begin with the assumption that persuasion is a vital feature of discourse that can reasonably be called rhetoric. This claim is justified in part by the general historic agreement that persuasion is the ultimate aim of rhetorical discourse and in part by the general, modern agreement that language is itself fundamentally "sermonic." Our definition is sympathetic to and consistent with most major treatments of the term, but our aim is to frame a definition that is responsive to the eight problems previously listed. The most basic of these problems is failure to expose the necessary and sufficient constituents of rhetorical acts. Its solution is essential if a definition of rhetoric is to have philosophical viability and relative accuracy.

The contemporary theorists who have come closest to detailing the rhetorical attributes of discourse focused their definitions on such processes and intentions as suasion and inducement. On that kind of analysis, what makes a given specimen of discourse rhetorical is its potential to evoke persuasion or, more broadly expressed, symbolic inducement. These features of rhetoric, however, are only symptomatic and not indicative of what rhetoric *is*. To uncover the basis for such symptoms or more accurately to specify the discursive components responsible for potentially persuasive dimensions of rhetoric, we offer the following definition: *Rhetoric is the art of describing reality through language*.

Under this definition, the study of rhetoric becomes an effort to understand how humans, in various capacities and in a variety of situations, describe reality through language. To act rhetorically is to use language in asserting or seeming to assert claims about reality. At the heart of this definition is the assumption that what renders discourse potentially persuasive is that a rhetor (e.g. a speaker or writer) implicitly or explicitly sets forth claims that either differ from or cohere with views of reality held by audiences (e.g. a specific scholarly community, a reader of fiction, or an assembly of persons attending a political rally).

Source: Richard A. Cherwitz and James A. Hikins, *Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology*. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1986. 62.

Walter H. Beale (1987)

Purpose, Subject or Field, Author-Audience Relation, Conditions for Success, Occasion and Context, and Language and Strategy are interpenetrating features of any discourse performance.

Out of their consideration emerge composite definitions of rhetoric and the other three aims of discourse. As a distillation and general summary of these features we may identify five basic principles and norms of rhetorical activity.

The first is the principle of *identification* (Burke's term), and it derives from considerations of purpose. Rhetoric is an art of identification not merely in its strategies, most of which involve techniques of association and dissociation (Perelman 415-49), but in its aims as well. Whether directly argumentative and persuasive or not, its ultimate function lies in the creation and fostering of consensus in communities.

The second principle is the principle of *contingency*, and it derives from considerations of subject. Rhetoric deals in a world of probabilities and uncertainties. The solutions it creates and the agreements and identifications that it fosters are temporary and fragile; if they survive over long periods of time, they do so largely through the continuing reinforcements of rhetorical activity.

The third principle is the principle of *exigence* (Bitzer's term), and it derives from considerations of occasion and context. Rhetoric usually arises out of and is already related to the immediate and long-range problems of communities.

The fourth principle is the principle of *accommodation*, and it derives from considerations of the final three areas of definition: author-audience relation, success conditions, and language and strategy. Donald C. Bryant has stated it eloquently: The rhetorical function is "*the function of adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas*" (413).

The fifth principle is the principle of *openness and centrality*, and it derives from a consideration of all six areas of definition. In each of these areas the other aims of discourse involve, in varying degrees, specializations and conventionalizations of discourse; the movement of rhetoric, by contrast, is in every case toward the common interests, the common capabilities, and the common norms and values of communities. It is fitting that the central strategies of rhetoric are known as "loci communes," commonplaces. In Zeno's metaphor, the method of rhetoric is the "open hand," as opposed to the "closed fist" of scientific demonstration. Rhetoric is involved in the most "open" range of subject matters, strategies, and contexts of all the aims of discourse; and surely one of its most prominent characteristics is the readiness with which it develops lines of continuum with the other aims. Since the other aims involve specializations of interest, method, and context, they invariably slide toward rhetoric as they become enmeshed (as they invariably do) in matters of contingency and value. Human beings are intrinsically creatures of will and choice, and this inescapable fact acts as a kind of centripetal force in discourse, as in all human activity.

Source: Walter H. Beale, *A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987. 104-05.

James A. Berlin (1987)

[T]he term *rhetoric* refers to a diverse discipline that historically has included a variety of incompatible systems. While one particular rhetorical theory may predominate at any historical moment, none remains dominant over time. Each major system is destined to be replaced eventually. Thus, we ought not to talk about *rhetoric* but, as Paolo Valesio has recently suggested, of *rhetorics*, seeing the field as providing a variety equal to that of poetic. This diachronic diversity in rhetoric is matched by a synchronic one. At any historical moment, it is common to discover a number of different rhetorics, each competing for attention and claiming to be the one, true system. The difference in these rhetorics is not—as I have shown in *Writing instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges*—a matter of the superficial emphasis of one or another feature of the rhetorical act. The difference has to do with epistemology—with assumptions about the very nature of the known, the knower, and the discourse community involved in considering the known.

Source: James A. Berlin, *Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900-1985*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987. 3.

Ernesto Grassi (1902-1991), "Why Rhetoric is Philosophy" (1987)
It is therefore rhetorical language which expresses the meaning of beings, language marked by the "passion" of having to correspond to objectivity. The task of rhetoric is therefore no longer one of "persuasion," intended to convince us of an ahistorical truth, but to disclose the reality signified in terms of constantly new "situations," and in this way to reveal the "succession" of the different worlds as they follow one another through the various "matches," the historical eras.
Source: Ernesto Grassi, "Why Rhetoric is Philosophy" Trans. Kiaran O'Malley *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987): 75.

John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (1987)
Scholarship uses argument, and argument uses rhetoric. The "rhetoric" is not mere ornament or manipulation or trickery. It is rhetoric in the ancient sense of persuasive discourse. In matters from mathematical proof to literary criticism, scholars write rhetorically.
Source: John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey, "Rhetoric of Inquiry." *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs*. Ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1987. 3.

Charles Bazerman (1988)
By rhetoric I mean most broadly the study of how people use language and other symbols to realize human goals and carry out human activities. Rhetoric is ultimately a practical study offering people great control over their symbolic activity. Rhetoric has at times been associated with limited techniques appropriate to specific tasks of political and forensic persuasion within European legal institutions. Consequently, people concerned with other tasks have considered rhetoric to offer inappropriate analyses and techniques. These people have then tended to believe mistakenly that their rejection of political and forensic rhetoric has removed their own activity from the larger realm of situated, purposeful, strategic symbolic activity. I make no such narrowing and use rhetoric (for want of a more comprehensive term) to refer to the study of all areas of symbolic activity.
Source: Charles Bazerman, *Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1988. 6.

Stanley B. Cunningham (1988)
Cherwitz and Hikins have already indicted other definitions with the failure to include necessary (and sufficient) conditions. Yet by excluding explicit reference to potential persuasion in their own definition they appear to have committed the very mistake for which they criticize others. This crucial flaw also has serious ramifications. Since Cherwitz and Hikins set out to elaborate upon the symbiotic relationship between language-mediated communication and all human knowledge, a faulty definition of rhetoric does much to weaken the theoretical superstructure which rests upon it. It is possible, however, to salvage this definition. It could be rewritten to read, say, that "rhetoric is the art of uttering language-mediated, potentially persuasive descriptions of reality."
Source: Stanley B. Cunningham, "Rhetor Redux: A Rejoinder to the Cherwitz/Hikins Definition of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 21 (1988): 292.

David Bordwell (1989)
Rhetoric, classically conceived, is concerned only with persuasion, not truth. More modern adherents argue (rhetorically) that in our age we cannot so easily consign the establishment of truth to the exact sciences, and that the process of arriving at consensual agreement is at least a worthwhile, and possibly the only, path to such truth as is allotted to humankind. Since my own view lies closer to the first conception, I shall treat critical rhetoric as an instrument for rendering the conclusions of critical reasoning attractive to the interpreter's audience. This is not to say that rhetorical conditions and conventions do not also inform the very process of critical reasoning, such as when the interpreter keeps an eye peeled for what can be profitably written up. But such cases are covered by what I have taken to be the prior demands of novelty

and plausibility. Rhetoric, for my purposes here, is primarily the domain of language, the structure and style of critical discourse.
Source: David Bordwell, *Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989. 34-35.

Stanley Fish (1989)
I have lingered so long over this passage because we can extrapolate from it almost all of the binary oppositions in relation to which rhetoric has received its (largely negative) definition: inner/outer, deep/surface, essential/peripheral, unmediated/mediated, clear/colored, necessary/contingent, straightforward/angled, abiding/fleeting, reason/ passion, things/words, realities/illusions, fact/opinion, neutral/partisan. Underlying this list, which is by no means exhaustive, are three basic oppositions: first, between a truth that exists independently of all perspectives and points of view and the many truths that emerge and seem perspicuous when a particular perspective or point of view has been established and is in force; second, an opposition between true knowledge, which is knowledge as it exists apart from any and all systems of belief, and the knowledge, which because it flows from some or other system of belief, is incomplete and partial (in the sense of biased); and third, an opposition between a self or consciousness that is turned outward in an effort to apprehend and attach itself to truth and true knowledge and a self or consciousness that is turned inward in the direction of its own prejudices, which, far from being transcended, continue to inform its every word and action. Each of these oppositions is attached in turn to an opposition between two kinds of language: on the one hand, language that faithfully reflects or reports on matters of fact uncolored by any personal or partisan agenda or desire; and on the other hand, language that is infected by partisan agendas and desires, and therefore colors and distorts the facts which it purports to reflect. It is use of the second kind of language that makes one a rhetorician, while adherence to the first kind makes one a seeker after truth and an objective observer of the ways things are.
Source: Stanley Fish, "Rhetoric." *Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies*. Durham: Duke UP, 1989. 474.

Steven Mailloux (1989)
[Rhetoric is] the political effectivity of trope and argument in culture. Such a working definition includes the two traditional meanings of rhetoric—figurative language and persuasive action—and permits me to emphasize either or both senses, differently in different discourses at different historical moments, in order to specify more exactly how texts affect their audiences in terms of particular power relations.
Source: Steven Mailloux, *Rhetorical Power*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989. xii.

Walter Nash (1989)
[Rhetoric is] an ordinary human competence, which, through its ability to move and amuse, develops the wit of persuasion. I call it 'ordinary' because that celebrated hero of academic myth, 'the person on the Clapham Omnibus', makes regular use of it and encounters it every day: in the Press and other news media, in humour, in argument, in popular entertainments, in literary art. It is an ordinary thing with some extraordinary manifestations, some graceful, others less so. There are occasions on which I, like any other critic of language and literature, would question the propriety and indeed the decency of rhetoric. There are, on the other hand, many instances in which I find it appropriate, fair (in two senses) and often highly entertaining; and I do not envy anyone who has never been prompted, by the skill of rhetoric, to applaud a point well made, to feel just a little gooseflesh, to rejoice in beauty, to laugh at the absurd.
Source: Walter Nash, *Rhetoric: The Wit of Persuasion*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. ix.

Walter Nash (1989)
I have designs on you, as the tattooist said to his girl friend, thus propounding the scope of

rhetoric so adroitly as to make further definition almost unnecessary. For it is indeed the point of rhetoric to have designs on an audience, or a victim; and the purpose of these designs is not wholly to persuade, as may be commonly supposed, but rather to involve the recipient in a conspiracy from which there is no easy withdrawal. In rhetoric there is always an element of complicity; it can be magniloquent, or charming, or forceful, or devious, but whatever it seeks assiduously to involve an accomplice in its designs.
Source: Walter Nash, *Rhetoric: The Wit of Persuasion*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 1.

Oxford English Dictionary (1989)
1. a. The art of using language so as to persuade or influence others; the body of rules to be observed by a speaker or writer in order that he may express himself with eloquence. **b.** *fig*. or with personification. **c.** A treatise on, or 'body' of, rhetoric. **d.** The top class or the second class (from the top) in certain English Roman Catholic schools and colleges. **e.** Literary prose composition, esp. as a school exercise. **2. a.** Elegance or eloquence of language; eloquent speech or writing. *Obs*. **b.** Speech or writing expressed in terms calculated to persuade; hence (often in depreciatory sense), language characterized by artificial or ostentatious expression. **c.** *pl*. Elegant expressions; rhetorical flourishes. Also, rhetorical terms. **d.** in ironical or jocular use. **e.** *transf*. and *fig*., said esp. *(a)* of the expressive action of the body in speaking; *(b)* of the persuasiveness of looks or acts; *(c)* of artistic style or technique. **3.** Skill in or faculty of using eloquent and persuasive language. *Obs*. **4.** *attrib*. and *Comb*.
Source: "Rhetoric." *Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. Vol. 13. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 857.

John Bender and David E. Wellbery (1990)
Rhetoric today is neither a unified doctrine nor a coherent set of discursive practices. Rather, it is a transdisciplinary field of practice and intellectual concern, a field that draws on conceptual resources of a radically heterogeneous nature and does not assume the stable shape of a system or method of education. The rhetoric that, with the ruin of the Enlightenment-Romantic culture, now increasingly asserts itself, shares with its classical predecessor little more than a name.

Our historical thesis leads us to this conclusion. Modernism is an age not of rhetoric, but of rhetoricality, the age, that is, of a generalized rhetoric that penetrates to the deepest levels of human experience. The classical rhetorical tradition rarefied speech and fixed it within a gridwork of limitations: it was a rule-governed domain whose procedures themselves were delimited by the institutions that organized interaction and domination in traditional European society. Rhetoricality, by contrast, is bound to no specific set of institutions. It manifests the groundless, infinitely ramifying character of discourse in the modern world. For this reason, it allows for no explanatory metadiscourse that is not already itself rhetorical. Rhetoric is no longer the title of a doctrine and a practice, not a form of cultural memory; it becomes something like the condition of our existence.
Source: John Bender and David E. Wellbery, "Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric." *The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice*. Ed. John Bender and David E. Wellbery. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. 25.

Jacques Derrida (1990)
Rhetoric doesn't consist only in the technique of tropes, for instance. First, rhetoric is not confined to what is traditionally called figures and tropes. Secondly, rhetoric, as such, depends on conditions that are not rhetorical. In rhetoric and speaking, the same sentence may have enormous effects or have no effects at all, depending on conditions that are not verbal or rhetorical. I think a self-conscious, trained teacher of rhetoric should teach precisely what are called "pragmatics"; that is, the effects of rhetoric don't depend only on the way you utter words, the way you use tropes, the way you compose. They depend on certain situations: political situations, economical situations—the libidinal situation, also.
Source: Jacques Derrida, "On Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation." *JAC* 10 (1990): 15-16.

Winfried Nöth (1990)
Rhetoric, the ancient art of persuasion, and stylistics, its younger descendant, are programmatically included in the semiotic field by those who consider semiotics to be the discipline which studies the "life of signs within society" (cf. Saussure), those who define it as a "translinguistic" science of the text (cf. Barthes), and those who follow Morris's project of a semiotics that transcends syntactics and semantics with pragmatics.
Source: Winfried Nöth, "Rhetoric and Stylistics." *Handbook of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990. 338.

John T. Gage (1991)
[Rhetoric is] a term used to circumscribe a complex discipline with a long history, encompassing the study of oratory, persuasion, poetry, grammar, philology, logic, invention, style, oral performance, writing, teaching, and discourse in general.
Source: John T. Gage, "On 'Rhetoric' and 'Composition'." *An Introduction to Composition Studies*. Ed. Erika Lindemann and Gary Tate. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. 18.

Patricia Bizzell (1992)
Rhetoric is the study of the personal, social, and historical elements in human discourse—how to recognize them, interpret them, and act on them, in terms both of situational context and of verbal style. This is the kind of study one has to perform in order to effect persuasion, the traditional end of rhetoric.
Source: Patricia Bizzell, *Academic Discourse and Critical Consciousness*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UP, 1992. 218.

George A. Kennedy (1992)
Rhetoric in the most general sense may perhaps be identified with the energy inherent in communication: the emotional energy that impels the speaker to speak, the physical energy expended in the utterance, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy experienced by the recipient in decoding the message. In theory, one might even seek to identify some quantitative unit of rhetorical energy—call it the "rheme"—analogous to an erg or a volt, by which rhetorical energy could be measured.
Source: George A. Kennedy, "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25 (1992): 2.

Andrea A. Lunsford (1992)
Given the shifting boundaries of such change and the tension implicit in competing definitions and roles, rhetorical scholarship concerns itself with the nature of and relation among the elements in any given language act—speaker (sender, encoder, agent, writer), listener (receiver, audience, decoder, reader), text (message, sign), and context (scene, site, situation)—as well as with the ethical, emotional, rational, and situational appeals that interanimate language or discourse events. In terms of language, rhetoricians may be said to study who is doing what to or with whom in what place(s) for what reason(s) and toward what end(s).
Source: Andrea A. Lunsford, "Rhetoric and Composition." *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*. 2nd ed. Ed. Joseph Gibaldi. New York: MLA, 1992. 78-79.

Thomas B. Farrell (1993)
Formally speaking, rhetoric is the collaborative art of addressing and guiding decision and judgment—usually public judgment about matters that cannot be decided by force or expertise.
Source: Thomas B. Farrell, *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993. 1.

Jo Liska (1993)
Rhetoric is defined here as the MANIPULATION of signs in the service of social influence.
Source: Jo Liska, "The Role of Rhetoric in Semiocenesis: A Response to Professor Kennedy." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26 (1993): 34.

Jo Liska (1993)
Rhetoric emerges and, I believe, emerged with semblamatic signs. I am arguing that rhetoric is used to influence others, and the basic function of rhetoric, as defined here, is social influence; that is, using signs to modify the behavior, attitudes, and beliefs of others.
Source: Jo Liska, "The Role of Rhetoric in Semiocenesis: A Response to Professor Kennedy." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26 (1993): 35.

Richard H. Roberts and James M. M. Good (1993)
We thus begin with a number of assumptions: that rhetoric is, in terms of a minimal but classic definition, the art or science of persuasion; that it initially received its categories and distinctions from the Sophists, Aristotle, Cicero, Isocrates and Quintilian, developments which were later taken up and applied in the Renaissance; and that these categories and distinctions have now re-emerged in what Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca have designated as the 'New Rhetoric'.
Source: Richard H. Roberts and James M. M. Good, "Introduction: Persuasive Discourse in and between Disciplines in the Human Sciences." *The Recovery of Rhetoric: Persuasive Discourse and Disciplinarity in the Human Sciences*. Ed. Richard H. Roberts and James M. M. Good. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1993. 2.

Victor Villanueva, Jr. (1993)
Rhetoric is the conscious use of language: "observing in any given case the available means of persuasion," to quote Aristotle (I.ii). As the conscious use of language, rhetoric would include everything that is conveyed through language: philosophy, history, anthropology, psychology, sociology, literature, politics—"the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols," according to modem rhetorician Kenneth Burke (46). The definition says something about an essentially human characteristic: our predilection to use symbols. Language is our primary symbol system. The ability to learn language is biologically transmitted. Burke's definition points to language as ontological, part of our being. And his definition suggests that it is epistemological, part of our thinking, an idea others say more about (see Leff).

So to study rhetoric becomes a way of studying humans. Rhetoric becomes for me the complete study of language, the study of the ways in which peoples have accomplished all that has been accomplished beyond the instinctual. There were the ancient greats saying that there was political import to the use of language. There were the modern greats saying that how one comes to know is at least mediated by language, maybe even constituted in language. There were the pragmatic applications. There was the possibility that in teaching writing and in teaching rhetoric as conscious considerations of language use I could help others like myself: players with language, victims of the language of failure.
Source: Victor Villanueva, Jr, "*Inglés* in the Colleges." *Bootstraps: From an American Academic of Color*. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 1993. 77.

James Arnt Aune (1994)
I would argue that rhetoric is itself the art of synthesizing contradictory social reality.
Source: James Arnt Aune, *Rhetoric and Marxism*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994.

Barry Brummett (1994)
In this book, we will work from a different, expanded understanding of what rhetoric means: *the ways in which signs influence people*. (The term *signs* refers to the countless meaningful items, images, and so on that surround us.)
Source: Barry Brummett, *Rhetoric in Popular Culture*. New York: St. Martin's, 1994. 6.

C. J. Classen (1994)
I would therefore, in this following others, define rhetoric as 1) the use of speech, governed by the intention of the speaker to communicate something with the purpose of achieving a

particular result, and 2) the theory which forms the basis for such a usage, i.e., all reflected and deliberate usage of language and possibly—this one might discuss—other means of communication, whether with the intention to inform or express a feeling, to elicit an emotion or to change a particular point of view.
Source: C. J. Classen, "The Role of Rhetoric Today." *Renaissances of Rhetoric*. Ed. S. Ijsseling and G. Vervaecke. Leuven: Leuven UP, 1994. 28.

C. J. Classen (1994)
It is unfortunate that rhetoric is mostly connected with or regarded as the art of speaking or the art of speaking persuasively; it is also and should also be taught as the art of thinking clearly, the art of speaking responsibly, the art of listening and judging critically.
Source: C. J. Classen, "The Role of Rhetoric Today." *Renaissances of Rhetoric*. Ed. S. Ijsseling and G. Vervaecke. Leuven: Leuven UP, 1994. 38.

William A. Covino (1994)
[Rhetoric is] the invocation of invisible powers within a sympathetic universe of widely shared signifiers; that is, magic.
Source: William A. Covino, *Magic, Rhetoric, and Literacy: An Eccentric History of the Composing Imagination*. Albany: State U of New York P, 1994. 19.

Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown (1994)
Although it is still being used by many to indicate bombast and empty gesture, *rhetoric* is being revived as an all-encompassing term, one that concerns inquiry and the making of knowledge, and the communication of that inquiry.
Source: Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown, eds. *Professing the New Rhetorics: A Sourcebook*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994. ix.

John Hartley (1994)
If rhetoric didn't already exist it would no doubt have to be invented.
Source: John Hartley, "Rhetoric." *Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies*. 2nd ed. Ed. Tim O'Sullivan, et al. New York: Routledge, 1994. 266.

Donald N. McCloskey (1994)
Rhetoric is merely speech with designs on the reader.
Source: Donald McCloskey, *Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. xiv.

Michel Meyer (1994)
Argument, or rhetoric, far from being a weak form of thought or inference, a handicapped child of reason, turns out to be an intrinsic feature of language. It is equal in dignity to the scientific form of answerhood, from which the problematic aspects of thought, though eliminated as much as possible, are nonetheless dealt with.
Source: Michel Meyer, *Rhetoric, Language,* and *Reason*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. 2.

William A. Covino and David A. Jolliffe (1995)
Rhetoric is a primarily verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic art that is both philosophical and practical and gives rise to potentially active texts.
Source: William A. Covino and David A. Jolliffe, "What is Rhetoric?" *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries*. Ed. William A. Covino and David A. Jolliffe. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995. 5.

Erika Lindemann (1995)
Given the multiplicity of meanings rhetoric has accumulated, it may be foolish to attempt a working definition here. Yet the term identifies a discipline fundamental to this book, as its title makes clear. To insure that we are attaching roughly similar connotations to the word, let me spell out five assumptions governing my use of the term:

1. Rhetoric is both a field of humane study and a pragmatic art that is, we can read about it as well as practice it.
2. The practice of rhetoric is a culturally determined, dynamic process. Rhetoric enables writers and speakers to design messages for particular audiences and purposes, but because people in various cultures and historical periods have assumed different definitions of what makes communication effective, rhetorical principles change. Although Aristotle's description of the art is still relevant, we must not assume that rhetorical principles articulated in the past *necessarily* determine or reflect contemporary practices.
3. When we practice rhetoric, we use language, either spoken or written, to "induce cooperation" in an audience.
4. The purpose of rhetoric, inducing cooperation, involves more than mere persuasion, narrowly defined. Discourse that affects an audience, that informs, moves, delights, and teaches, has a rhetorical aim. Not all verbal or written communication aims to create an effect in an audience; the brief exchanges between people engaged in informal conversation usually do not have a rhetorical purpose. But when we use language in more formal ways, with the intention of changing attitudes or behaviors, of explaining a subject matter, of expressing the self, or of calling attention to a text that can be appreciated for its artistic merits, our purpose is rhetorical.
5. Rhetoric implies choices, for both the speaker or writer and the audience. When we practice rhetoric we make decisions about our subject, audience, point of view, purpose, and message. We select our best evidence, the best order in which to present our ideas, and the best resources of language to express them. Our choices aim to create an effect in our audience. However, the notion of choice carries with it an important ethical responsibility. Our strategies must be reasonable and honest. Furthermore, the audience must have a choice in responding to the message, must be able to adopt, modify, or reject it. A burglar who holds a gun to my head and calmly expresses an intention to rob me may induce my cooperation, but not by means of rhetoric. Similarly, a formal argument that urges human beings not to age is not rhetorical. Many modern rhetoricians agree that rhetoric is inoperative when the audience lacks the power to respond freely to the message.

Source: Erika Lindemann, *A Rhetoric for Writing Teachers*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. 40-41.

Jacqueline Jones Royster (1995)

For African American women, rhetorical expertise can be significantly defined by their abilities to use language imaginatively, creatively, and effectively in their efforts to assume a subject position. An enabling strategy with these rhetors has been to place themselves in a position, not always to act on their own, but more often than not to influence the power, authority, and actions of others. For them, rhetorical prowess has been intertwined historically with the artful ways in which they have participated as agents of change in community life.

Source: Jacqueline Jones Royster, "To Call a Thing By Its True Name: The Rhetoric of Ida B. Wells." *Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition*. Ed. Andrea A. Lunsford. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1995. 176.

Stephen L. Johnson (1996)

Although these definitions of rhetoric differ in minor ways, the fundamental concept remains constant: rhetoric is a practical art concerned with the study of the influential use of communication. A problem arises, however, when one tries to classify contemporary rhetorics according to this definition. What most modern scholars offer is a view of rhetoric that is representative of the new direction taken by language studies, a view of rhetoric as responsible for the creation of knowledge.

Source: Stephen L. Johnson, "On *New* Systems of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29 (1996): 75.

Stephen L. Johnson (1996)
The new rhetorical study is characterized by the view that rhetoric (or language) is at the very base of human knowledge. In this view, rhetoric is not merely useful for the management of society, but rather necessary for the creation of the society itself.
Source: Stephen L. Johnson, "On *New* Systems of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29 (1996): 78.

Stephen L. Johnson (1996)
Given the emphasis placed on rhetoric's role in the creation of knowledge, the contemporary system of rhetoric that has developed since approximately 1965 may be characterized as "epistemological" rather than "sociological" or "psychological." These rhetorics focus on the power of language to create knowledge in society; a strong opinion is held by rhetorical scholars within this system that knowledge does not preexist our discovering it; rather, only through language is knowledge created.
Source: Stephen L. Johnson, "On *New* Systems of Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29 (1996): 79.

Gerry Spence (1995)
While birds can fly, only humans can argue. Argument is the affirmation of our being. It is the principal instrument of human intercourse. Without argument the species would perish. As a subtle suggestion, it is the means by which we aid another. As a warning, it steers us from danger. As exposition, it teaches. As an expression of creativity, it is the gift of ourselves. As a protest, it struggles for justice. As a reasoned dialogue, it resolves disputes. As an assertion of self, it engenders respect. As an entreaty of love, it expresses our devotion. As a plea, it generates mercy. As a charismatic oration, it moves multitudes and changes history. We must argue—to help, to warn, to lead, to love, to create, to learn, to enjoy justice—to be.
Source: Gerry Spence, *How to Argue and Win Every Time: At Home, At Work, In Court, Everywhere, Every Day*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995. 5.

Sonja K. Foss (1996)
Many of the common uses of the word, *rhetoric*, have negative connotations. *Rhetoric* is commonly used to mean empty, bombastic language that has no substance. Political candidates and governmental officials often call for "action, not rhetoric," from their opponents or the leaders of other nations. In other instances, *rhetoric* is used to mean flowery, ornamental speech that contains an abundance of metaphors and other figures of speech. These conceptions are not how rhetoric will be viewed in this book.

Here, *rhetoric* means the action humans perform when they use symbols for the purpose of communicating with one another. This definition suggests that four dimensions are of particular importance in conceptualizing rhetoric: 1) rhetoric is an *action*; 2) rhetoric is a *symbolic* action; 3) rhetoric is a *human* action; and 4) rhetoric functions to *enable us to communicate* with one another.
Source: Sonja K. Foss, *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*. 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1996. 4.

David S. Kaufer and Brian S. Butler (1996)
Let us define rhetoric as the control of events for an audience. To be more specific, let's say that rhetoric is the strategic organization and communication of a speaker's version of events within a situation in order to affect the here and now of audience decision making.
Source: David S. Kaufer and Brian S. Butler, *Rhetoric and the Arts of Design*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996. 12.

Thomas O. Sloane (1997)
Contrarianism is of the essence in rhetoric, and was of the essence in careers of traditional rhetoricians such as Erasmus and Thomas Wilson. Understanding that contrarianism should help us understand what it means to think like a rhetorician.

Source: Thomas O. Sloane, *On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric*. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1997. 3.

J. Michael Sproule (1997)
The word, *rhetoric*, meaning to influence people through speech, originated from the public speaking found in the marketplace (agora) of democratic Athens and in the Senate of republican Rome. However, the practice of rhetoric in some form is almost universally to be found among the world's cultures.
Source: J. Michael Sproule, *The Heritage of Rhetorical Theory*. Boston: McGraw Hill, 1997. 5.

Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard R. Glejzer (1998)
Rhetoric could be described roughly as the use of language to produce material effects in particular social conjunctures—a description that can be found in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, as well as in Aristotle's treatises on rhetoric and ethics—and that has changed little in rhetoric's various incarnations since around 300 BCE (including its denigration at the hands of the early church fathers and Peter Ramus, its reincarnation and resurrection as belles lettres, and its full-fledged renaissance as rhetoric and composition studies in the latter half of the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries). What is important to note in this understanding of rhetoric is that it takes as axiomatic language's capability to exert power in observable (and reproducible) ways, that as a form of praxis it can produce real social change, and that rhetorical analysis can yield information about language's power and its relation to the material world from which, in part, it derives that power. A rhetorically situated methodology, then, would not only seem capable of understanding the negotiations of normal and abnormal discourse and their effect of subjects' "worlds" as well as those subjects themselves, but also—because of antifoundationalism's assumptions about the constitutive power of discourse on all forms of production, discursive and nondiscursive—seem capable of theorizing the relations between cultural forms and the polises that create them, and between these polises and the material and discursive constraints.
Source: Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard R. Glejzer, "Introduction." *Rhetoric in an Antifoundational World: Language, Culture, and Pedagogy*. Ed. Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard R. Glejzer. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998. 3-4.

David Fleming (1998)
[Rhetoric is] the *study of speaking and writing well*, a historically prominent and remarkably consistent program of instruction involving both theory and practice and aimed at the moral and intellectual development of the student.
Source: David Fleming, "Rhetoric as a Course of Study." *College English* 61 (1998): 172.

George A. Kennedy (1998)
Rhetoric is not, I think, just a convenient concept existing only in the mind of speakers, audiences, writers, critics, and teachers. It has an essence or reality that has not been appreciated. I shall argue [. . .] that rhetoric, in essence, is a form of mental and emotional energy. This is most clearly seen when an individual, animal, or human is faced with some serious threat or opportunity that may be affected by utterance. An emotional reaction takes place in the mind. The emotion may be fear, anger, lust, hunger, pity, curiosity, love—any of the basic emotions, and thus of rhetoric, is the instinct for self-preservation, which in turn derives from nature's impulse to preserve the genetic line.
Source: George A. Kennedy, *Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction*. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. 3-4.

Steven Mailloux (1998)
I define [rhetoric] initially as the study of textual effects, of their production and reception. Thus, under such a definition, reader-response criticism can be seen as a contemporary rhetorical perspective on literature as it examines textual effects during reading; while its close

neighbor, reception study, is another rhetorical approach focusing on the historical effects of texts for specific reading communities. In doing reception histories, I develop a notion of "cultural rhetoric" as the political effectivity of trope and argument in culture and investigate the relation of cultural rhetoric study to critical theory and other intellectual practices.
Source: Steven Mailloux, *Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998. xii.

Deirdre N. McCloskey (1998)
The paying of attention to one's audience is called "rhetoric," a word that I later exercise hard. You use rhetoric, of course, to warn of a fire in a theater or to arouse the xenophobia of the electorate. This sort of yelling is the newspaper meaning of the word, like the president's "heated rhetoric" in a press conference, or the "mere rhetoric" to which our enemies stoop. Since the Greek flame was lit, though, the word has also been used in a broader and more amiable sense, to mean the study of all the ways of accomplishing things with language: inciting a mob to lynch the accused, but also persuading readers that a novel's characters breathe, or bringing scientists to accept the better argument and reject the worse. The newspaper definition is Little Rhetoric. I am talking about Big Rhetoric.
Source: Deirdre N. McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics*. 2nd ed. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1998. xix-xx.

Deirdre N. McCloskey (1998)
Rhetoric could of course be given another name—"wordcraft," perhaps, or "the study of argument." The book that in 1987 began the "rhetoric of inquiry" was subtitled "Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs." Yet it revived the old "R" word in the main title, *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences*. Why? The word "rhetoric" after all is used by newspapers as a synonym for the many words in English that sneer at speech: ornament, frill, hot air, advertising, slickness, deception, fraud. Thus the *Des Moines Register* headline: "Senate Campaign Mired in Rhetoric."

But the newspapers vulgarized, too, the word "pragmatism" shortly after its birth, by understanding it as unprincipled horse-trading. They defined "anarchism" as bomb-throwing nihilism. They defined "sentiment" as cheap emotionalism, "morality" as prudery, and "family values" as social reaction. They defined "science" as something no scientist practices. Not all usage should be decided by the newspapers, or else their views will be all we have. We need a scholarly word for wordcraft. The ancient and honored one will do.
Source: Deirdre N. McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics*. 2nd ed. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1998. 5.

John S. Nelson (1998)
Rhetoric of inquiry explores how scholars persuade. Thus it develops the traditions of the social sciences and humanities to improve current practices of learning. In particular, it appreciates how the learning involves argument, and the argument invokes rhetoric. The rhetoric is neither frill nor fraud, for the most part; rather it is rhetoric in the honorable, sophisticated sense of persuasive dialogue. Hence rhetoric of inquiry is especially eager to learn how we can and should communicate across our old divides of class, discipline, culture, party, and program.
Source: John S. Nelson, *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1998.xii.

John S. Nelson (1998)
Rhetoric is arguably the oldest of Western disciplines. Though it began as the study and practice of public persuasion, rhetoric turned gradually with the invention of phonic writing into the appreciation and improvement of argument especially, and communication more generally, in domains beyond the overly political. The recent turn is to explore how inquiries, scholarly and otherwise, are thoroughly rhetorical. Thus the practices of discovery, conception, invention, or testing in self-avowed sciences are persuasive through and through. Rhetoric is not limited to expression or persuasion of external audiences after the science proper has been completed. By

implication, therefore, neither the arts, the humanities, not the learned professions differ from the natural, social, or formal sciences in their rhetoricity. All these inquiries are alike in that they construct and conduct themselves rhetorically. Each offers a distinctive—yet changing—configuration of rhetorical strategies and devices in comparison with the other fields. Sometimes they share particular rhetorics, sometimes they don't, but always they proceed in rhetorical ways. Rhetoric of inquiry not only studies how but does so within each field, working to improve its conduct and knowledge. There are as many ways to do this as there are arts and artifacts of rhetoric.
Source: John S. Nelson, *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1998.xiii.

John S. Nelson (1998)
Accordingly let us begin with definitions broad and diversified. For breadth let us treat *science* as disciplined inquiry; *inquiry* as learned, knowledgeable, truth-oriented rhetoric; and *rhetoric* as stylized persuasion. For diversity, moreover, we should undertake to explore disciplines as (sub)cultures and (political) communities, truths as alignments and tropes, styles as strategies and sensibilities. These can complement—or at least supplement—the conventional Western meanings of disciplines as orders and fields, truths as discoveries and revelations, styles as (mere) ornaments and dispositions. Or, to broach yet another path, rhetoric may be a concern with what is communicated, how, by, and for whom; to what effect; under what circumstances; and with which alternatives. Hence we may well approach rhetoric of inquiry as a concern for every facet of communication in communities of learning.
Source: John S. Nelson, *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1998.xv.

M. H. Abrams (1999)
In his *Poetics* the Greek philosopher Aristotle defined poetry as a mode of imitation—a fictional representation in a verbal medium of human beings thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting—and focused his discussion on elements such as plot, character, thought, and diction within the work itself. In his *Rhetoric*, on the other hand, Aristotle defined rhetorical discourse as the art of "discovering all the available means of persuasion in any given case," and focused his discussion on the means and devices that an orator uses in order to achieve the intellectual and emotional effects on an audience that will persuade them to accede to the orator's point of view. Most of the later rhetoricians of the classical era concurred in the view that the concern of rhetoric is with the type of discourse whose chief aim is to persuade an audience to think and feel or act in a particular way. (A notable exception is the major Roman rhetorician Quintilian who, in the first century, gave rhetoric a moral basis by defining it as the art "of a good man skilled in speaking.") In a broad sense, then, rhetoric can be described as the study of language in its practical uses, focusing on the persuasive and other effects of language, and on the means by which one can achieve those effects on auditors or readers.
Source: M. H. Abrams, "Rhetoric." *A Glossary of Literary Terms*. 7th ed. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1999. 268.

Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors (1999)
Rhetoric is art or the discipline that deals with use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or motivate an audience, whether that audience is made up of one person or a group of persons. Broadly defined in that way, rhetoric would seem to comprehend every kind of verbal expression that people engage in. But rhetoricians customarily have excluded from their province such informal modes of speech as "small talk," jokes, greetings ("Good to see you"), exclamations ("What a day!"), gossip, simple explanations ("That miniature calculator operates on dry-cell batteries."), and directions ("Take a left at the next intersection, go about three blocks to the first stoplight, and then..."). Although informative, directive, or persuasive objectives can be realized in stop-and-go, give-and-take form of dialogue, rhetoric has traditionally been concerned with those instances of formal, premeditated, sustained monologue in which a person seeks to exert an effect on an audience.

Source: Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. 1.

Sharon Crowley and Deborah Hawhee (1999)
[Rhetoric is] the art that helps people compose effective discourse.
Source: Sharon Crowley and Deborah Hawhee, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*. 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999. 375.

Gerard A. Hauser (1999)
Before proceeding, I acknowledge that the term *rhetoric* may he troublesome to some readers. In many quarters it still carries the scent of manipulative discourse or flowery but empty expression. Its use here is technical. I use *rhetoric* broadly to mean *the symbolic inducement of social cooperation*. It is an inevitable consequence of language. As Kenneth Burke (1969) teaches, we cannot address others without our symbols encouraging a response. These encouragements may be as subtle as the shades of meaning suggested by intonation and of attitude conveyed by an article of clothing, or as blatant as a partisan speech by a politician seeking our vote. Although our public lives often require that we engage in intentional selection and management of language and argument influence others—a most traditional and extremely important aspect of rhetoric—we cannot avoid the inadvertent ways in which our symbolic exchanges influence and are influenced by others, by the climate for communication, by the resources of language available to us, by the situation in which we communicate and the impulse for communication it contains, and by the myriad of conditioning factors that mark our human existence.
Source: Gerard A. Hauser, *Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres*. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1999. 14.

Barry Brummett (2000)
Nearly every way of understanding *rhetoric* has centered around the idea of *influence*: the ways we use verbal and nonverbal signs to affect other people. But definitions have differed on two dimensions: *emphasis* and *weighting*. To understand what this means, let us consider just a few of the many definitions you will find stated or implied in this book.

Emphasis

For the ancient Sophists of Greece, such as Gorgias, the traveling teachers who first began talking and thinking about rhetoric, it simply meant the ability to plan and deliver effective public speaking. Plato, the philosophical adversary of the Sophists, saw rhetoric instead as flattery or pandering: saying to an audience whatever it wanted to hear so as to win its favor. For Aristotle, the first great systematizer of rhetorical theory, rhetoric meant the ability to discover the available means of persuasion in any situation. The Roman statesman Cicero thought of rhetoric as an important tool of statesmanship. One hundred years later, the Roman Quintilian used rhetoric mainly as a pedagogical device to teach young people. In the Renaissance, Peter Ramus thought of rhetoric as verbal embellishment and style. I. A. Richards, in the twentieth century, argued that rhetoric is the study of misunderstanding and its remedies. Kenneth Burke, the greatest rhetorical theorist of the twentieth century, defined rhetoric as inducing cooperation in people.

First, let's notice that each definition places a different *emphasis* on some aspect or dimension of influence. Cicero stressed influence in political struggles; Quintilian in educational contexts. Ramus emphasized the ability of rhetoric to make language beautiful; Richards stressed the importance of making language understandable. The Sophists saw rhetoric largely as public speaking, whereas Burke did not emphasize any type of communication so much as a function: specifically, that of creating cooperation. When we influence or are influenced,

sometimes the language we use will be more important. Sometimes the logical reasoning we use is primary. Sometimes the context, whether political or interpersonal or religious, is the most important dimension of influence. A definition of rhetoric will emphasize what is most important to the theorist, for reasons having to do with the culture or politics of the era.

Weighting

Second, notice that each definition places a different *weighting* on being rhetorical—a weighting that predisposes people favorably or unfavorably toward the very thing being defined: influencing others. Clearly, Ramus's definition has a somewhat unfavorable weighting; he thought that persuasive influence was mere stylistic embellishment rather than substantive argument. Aristotle's definition is more neutral; rhetoric is depicted as a "faculty" or an ability to discover the means of persuasion. Whether that is good or bad, says Aristotle, depends on the discoverer's "moral purpose," not on rhetoric itself. Burke's and Richards's definitions seem to weight rhetoric favorably: Who can object to a remedy for misunderstanding or to an activity that increases cooperation? As with the dimension of emphasis, weighting occurs because of what is important to a theorist and because of the personal, social, or philosophical goals to which that writer is committed.

When any activity or object has historically been defined in many different ways, we know that it must be something both central to human life and central to the distribution of *power*. Were power not involved in how we think about (and in what we do about) influence, nobody would fuss much over how it is defined. A *pencil* is not defined in very many ways. Why? Because little is at stake in how it is defined. But when it comes to how we influence each other rhetorically, what is emphasized and how that activity is weighted will have a lot to do with how power is managed in any society. Think, for example, of the fact that an activity like rhetoric, which is central to our everyday lives, has been defined in so many ways precisely because of these possibilities of emphasis and weighting.

Source: Barry Brummett, "Introduction." *Reading Rhetorical Theory*. Ed. Barry Brummett. Fort Worth: Harcourt, 2000. 2-3.

Ralph H. Johnson (2000)

An argument is a type of discourse or text—the distillate of the practice of argumentation—in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that support it. In addition to this illative core, an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical obligations.

Source: Ralph H. Johnson, *Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000. 168.

Laurent Pernot (2000)

First of all, what is rhetoric? We can look for an answer to this question in the treatise of Quintilian on the education of the orator, which devotes a chapter to different definitions proposed in antiquity (*Institutiones oratoria* 2.15: first century AD). The most widespread opinion defined rhetoric as "the power of persuading" (*vis persuadenedi*). Generally, this definition signified that the orator is someone whose speeches can win the assent of the listener and that rhetoric is the means of achieving this. It is the spoken word that brings about this persuasion and not, for example, mere actions of money or drugs or trustworthiness or authority. Persuasion's principal realm is public discourse, where its specific application is to political and civic issues, that is, those where the interest of the city and the citizens is at stake. Yet it can also have a place in dialogues and private conversations.

Instead of "the power" many preferred to speak of "the art" (in Greek *tekhne*, in Latin *ars*). This word's ancient meaning does not stress what moderns understand by artistic creation so much as it does the idea of a reasoned method, a system of rules meant for practical use, a

technical production, and a craft. Others used words like "the virtue," "the science," or—pejoratively—"the routine." Quintilian, for his part, winds up with a different definition: rhetoric as "the science of speaking well" (*bene dicendi scientia*). The substitution of "speaking" for "persuading" aims at enlarging the field of rhetoric by extending it to virtually all forms of discourse, whatever their aim or effect. As for the adverb "well," it has an intended ambiguity, since it can encompass at the same time grammatical correctness, aesthetic beauty, moral value, and the speech's practical effectiveness. This last definition is the most general and the most inclusive.
Source: Laurent Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity*. Trans. W. E. Higgins. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 2005. ix-x.

The Columbia Encyclopedia (2001)
[Oratory is] the art of swaying an audience by eloquent speech. In ancient Greece and Rome oratory was included under the term *rhetoric*, which meant the art of composing as well as delivering a speech.
Source: "Oratory." *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005. Columbia UP. <http://www.bartleby.com/65/or/oratory.html>.

Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (2001)
Rhetoric has a number of overlapping meanings: the practice of oratory; the study of the strategies of effective oratory; the use of language, written or spoken, to inform or persuade; the study of the persuasive effects of language; the study of the relation between language and knowledge; the classification and use of tropes and figures; and, of course, the use of empty promises and half-truths as a form of propaganda. Nor does this list exhaust the definitions that might be given. Rhetoric is a complex discipline with a long history: It is less helpful to try to define it once and for all than to look at the many definitions it has accumulated over the years and to attempt to understand how each arose and how each still inhabits and shapes the field.
Source: Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, "General Introduction." *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present*. 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001. 1.

James Jasinski (2001)
Before proceeding into an examination of the terminology, or the lexicon, of contemporary rhetorical studies, it is appropriate to reflect on the definitional ambiguities of the term rhetoric itself. Rhetoric has, and seemingly always has had, multiple meanings. Variations on the meaning of rhetoric often reflect different attitudes toward language and linguistic representation and, even more particularly, the use of language for persuasive purposes. One common sense of the term, constituting a tradition of thought stretching from the Greek philosopher Plato to our contemporary world, links rhetoric with artifice, the artificial, mere appearances, or the simply decorative. For Plato, rhetoric was a pseudo-art and, like poetry, an ignoble public practice. Numerous contemporary expressions such as the phrase "mere rhetoric" and the customary opposition of someone's "rhetoric" to his or her actions or deeds continue the Platonic denigration of rhetoric. The Platonic tradition's negative or pejorative sense of rhetoric is intertwined with a marked ambivalence toward language. Ambivalence toward language—the feeling that it is both beneficial and dangerous, a tool for building human community and a device for tearing it apart, a medium for representing knowledge (or, in more common parlance, "stating the facts") and a vehicle for distorting or deceiving—was a key element in the thought of most of the major early modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant (Bender and Wellbery, 1990). The concept of rhetoric, or what it might possibly mean, is entangled in this persistent ambivalence toward language.

Whereas Plato, and the many thinkers who followed in his path, was inclined toward a negative view of language, a considerable number of other thinkers over the years have leaned in the opposite direction. A more positive understanding of rhetoric emerged within the writings of

those individuals who stressed the beneficial capacity of language, speech, and discourse. Isocrates, one of the early Greek thinkers in the sophistic tradition, believed that language, and especially persuasive oratory or rhetoric, was a force for civilization and human advancement. In a famous speech titled "Antidosis," Isocrates maintained,

> The art of discourse…is the source of most of our blessings…. Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man [sic] which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.

Isocrates' celebration of language and rhetoric developed into a tradition of thought that extended from Aristotle and the Greek Sophists, through Cicero and Quintilian, into the humanist movement of the European Renaissance (Seigel, 1968), and continues today in the works of numerous theorists and critics whose ideas are discussed more fully throughout the remainder of this book.

Although sketching the antagonistic traditions of thought about language and rhetoric helps to reconstruct the intellectual context in which rhetorical thinking has occurred, it does not provide an adequate understanding of the substance of rhetorical thinking. For more than two millennia, philosophers, teachers, scholars, and citizen advocates have discussed the concept of rhetoric and formulated definitions of it. Looking back on this multivoiced tradition of thought, Ehninger (1968) wrote,

> The continuing dialogue on the question, What is rhetoric? except as an academic exercise, is largely profitless. If there is no one generic rhetoric which, like a Platonic idea, is lurking in the shadows awaiting him [sic] who shall have the acuteness to discern it, the search for a defining quality can only end in error or frustration. (p. 140)

Ehninger's observation guides the discussion that follows. The aim is not to uncover an absolute or final definition of rhetoric. Rather, the discussion tries to outline some of the key issues involved in the activity of trying to define rhetoric. Reflection on these issues should provide readers with an introduction to the conversation that is contemporary rhetorical studies.
Source: James Jasinski, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001. xiii-xiv.

Gerard A. Hauser (2002)
Rhetoric, as an area of study, is concerned with how humans use symbols, especially language, to reach agreement that permits coordinated effort of some sort. In its most basic form, rhetorical communication occurs whenever one person engages another in an exchange of symbols to accomplish some goal. It is not communication for communication's sake; rhetorical communication, at least implicitly and often explicitly, attempts to coordinate social action. For this reason, rhetorical communication always contains a pragmatic intent. Its goal is to influence human choices on specific matters that require attention, often immediately. Such communication is designated to achieve desired consequences in the relative short run. Finally, rhetoric is most intensely concerned with managing verbal symbols, whether spoken or written.
Source: Gerard A. Hauser, *Introduction to Rhetorical Theory*. 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 2002. 2-3.

Gerard A. Hauser (2002)
Rhetoric, then, *is concerned with the use of symbols to induce social action*.
Source: Gerard A. Hauser, *Introduction to Rhetorical Theory*. 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 2002. 3.

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Susan Schultz Huxman (2003)
[R]hetoric is the study of what is persuasive. The issues with which it is concerned are social truths, addressed to others, justified by reasons that reflect cultural values. Rhetoric is a humanistic study that examines all the symbolic means by which influence occurs.

The defining characteristics of rhetoric are represented by seven words beginning with the letter *p*. First and foremost, rhetoric is *public*, that is, it is addressed to others. It is public because it deals with issues and problems that one person, by herself, cannot answer of solve; the issues are communal; the solutions require cooperative effort. As a result, rhetoric is *propositional*; it is developed through complete thoughts. That's the case because one person's ideas must be made intelligible and salient for others whose cooperation is needed; that's also the case because much rhetoric is argumentative, making claims and offering reasons in their support. In that sense, rhetoric is not random thoughts but some kind of coherent, structured statement about an issue or concern. As you will immediately recognize, rhetoric is *purposive*, aimed at achieving a particular goal, such as selling a product or obtaining some kind of support or action. Even the most apparently expressive discourse can have some kind of instrumental or purposive goal; for example, cheering for a team expresses the feelings of fans, but it raises the morale of players and may improve their performance, helping them to win. That's closely related to rhetoric's emphasis on *problem-solving*. Most rhetorical discourse arises in situations in which we as audience and rhetors experience a felt need: a desire for closure (farewell address), a desire to mark beginnings and initiate a process (inaugural address), a desire to acknowledge death and to memorialize (eulogy). In some cases, of course, the problem is more concrete: How can a fair and accurate resolution be reached about the 2000 presidential election? What are the possible options? Which alternative would be most satisfactory to those involved?

Closely related to rhetoric's purposive, problem-solving qualities is an emphasis on the *pragmatic*. The Greek word *praxis* or action is the root for practical, meaning that it can be put into effect or enacted. Pragmatic is a synonym of practical, but it also stresses facts and actual occurrences but with an emphasis on practical outcomes. In this sense, rhetoric is material; it produces actions that affect us materially; it is active, not just contemplative.

And, in what may seem to be a contradiction, rhetoric is *poetic*; that is, rhetoric frequently displays ritualistic, aesthetic, dramatic, and emotive qualities. The rhetoric of the mass, of communion, and of other religious rituals reinforces belief; what is pleasing and appealing to our senses, such as metaphor and vivid description, invites our participation and assent. What is dramatic narrative captures our attention and involves us with characters, dialogue, and conflict and excites us emotionally so that we care about what happens and identify with the people we encounter. Those rhetorical works we call eloquent are good examples of these qualities, illustrated here and in subsequent chapters by speeches by Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., and by essays that involve us in the lives of people whose stories teach us lessons.

Finally, because it is all of these—public, propositional, purposive, problem-solving, pragmatic, and poetic—it is powerful, with the potential to prompt our participation, invite identification, alter our perceptions, and persuade us. Accordingly, it has the potential to help or harm us, elevate or debase ideas, and make or break careers.

Source: Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Susan Schultz Huxman, *The Rhetorical Act: Thinking, Speaking, and Writing Critically*. 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. 5-6.

Robert Levine (2003)

I use the term *persuasion* in its broadest sense in this book. By it, I refer to the psychological dynamics that cause people to be changed in ways they wouldn't have if left alone. The term serves as an umbrella that encompasses a number of related concepts in psychology: basic processes such as influence, control, attitude change, and compliance; and more ominous-sounding extremes like mind control and brainwashing.

Source: Robert Levine, *The Power of Persuasion: How We're Bought and Sold*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003. 4.

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2003)

1. the art of speaking or writing effectively: as a. the study of principles and rules of composition formulated by critics of ancient times, b. the study of writing or speaking as a means of

communication or persuasion; 2. a. skill in the effective use of speech, b. a type or mode of language or speech; *also*: insincere or grandiloquent language; 3. verbal communication: DISCOURSE.
Source: "Rhetoric." *Merriam-Webster's Online*. 2005. Merriam-Webster. <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va= rhetoric&x=0&y=0>.

Wayne C. Booth (2004)
Since rhetorical terms are so ambiguous, it will be useful to rely throughout on the following summary of the distinctions I've suggested:

Rhetoric: The whole range of arts not only of persuasion but also of producing or reducing misunderstanding.
Listening-rhetoric (LR): The whole range of communicative arts for reducing misunderstanding by paying full attention to opposing views.
Rhetrickery: The whole range of shoddy, dishonest communicative arts producing misunderstanding—along with the other harmful results. The arts of making the worse seem the better cause.
Rhetorology: The deepest form of LR: the systematic probing for "common ground."
Rhetor: The communicator, the persuader or understander.
Rhetorician: The student of such communication.
Rhetorologist: The rhetorician who practices rhetorology, pursuing common ground on the assumption—often disappointed—that disputants can be led into mutual understanding.
Source: Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Rhetoric: The Quest for Effective Communication*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. 10-11.

Adrian Del Caro (2004)
The complexity of Nietzschean rhetoric demands first a basic working definition of rhetoric. In the etymological sense of Greek *rhetorike*, the art of oratory, and extrapolated to include the art of communicating effectively through writing, Nietzsche's rhetoric is a highly stylized, deeply self-aware manner of expression designed to convey meaning and to appeal. In the more limited sense of my essay, Nietzschean rhetoric is furthermore a discourse whose communicative and appealing aspects are aimed at the earth for the purpose of grounding human beings.
Source: Adrian Del Caro, "Nietzsche's Rhetoric on the Grounds of Philology and Hermeneutics." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 37 (2004): 101.

***Encyclopedia Britannica Online* (2005)**
[Rhetoric is] the principles of training communicators—those seeking to persuade or inform; in the 20th century, it has undergone a shift of emphasis from the speaker or writer to the auditor or reader.
Source: "Rhetoric." *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*. 2005. Encyclopedia Britannica. 1 July 2005 <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9109484>.

Harry G. Frankfurt (2005)
Consider a Fourth of July orator, who goes on bombastically about "our great and blessed country, whose Founding Fathers under divine guidance created a new beginning for mankind." This is surely humbug. As [Max] Black's [*The Prevalence of Humbug*] suggests, the orator is not lying. He would be lying only if it were his intention to bring about in his audience beliefs that he himself regards as false, concerning such matters as whether our country is great, whether it is blessed, whether the Founders had divine guidance, and whether what they did was in fact to create a new beginning for mankind. But the orator does not really care what his audience thinks about the Founding Fathers, or about the role of the deity in our country's history, or the like. At least, it is not an interest in what anyone thinks about these matters that motivates his speech.

It is clear that what makes [the] Fourth of July oration humbug is not fundamentally that the speaker regards his statements as false. Rather, just as Black's account suggests, the orator intends these statements to convey a certain impression of himself. He is not trying to deceive anyone concerning American history. What he cares about is what people think of *him*. He wants them to think of him as a patriot, as someone who has deep thoughts and feelings about the origins and the mission of our country, who is sensitive to the greatness of our history, whose pride in that history is combined with humility before God, and so on.
Source: Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. 16-18.

Harry G. Frankfurt (2005)
The realms of advertising and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related realm of politics, are replete with instances of bullshit so unmitigated that they can serve among the most indisputable and classic paradigms of the concept. And in these realms there are exquisitely sophisticated craftsmen who—with the help of advanced and demanding techniques of market research, of public opinion polling, of psychological testing, and so forth—dedicate themselves tirelessly to getting every word and image they produce exactly right.
Source: Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. 22-23.

Thomas Habinek (2005)
Oratory is formal public speechmaking. It is the characteristic political act of ancient city-states and of later political entities that draw their inspiration from them. Rhetoric is the study of available means of persuasion. It came into being as a distinct intellectual and social enterprise because of the prevalence of oratory in classical antiquity. Rhetoric analyzed successful instances of oratorical persuasion and derived from them principles that could be applied to new situations.
Source: Thomas Habinek, *Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. vi.

John D. Ramage (2006)
What we won't be doing in this introductory chapter is telling you flat out what rhetoric is in fifty words or less—other than to say it always has to do with the production/interpretation of symbolic acts and usually has to do with persuasion.
Source: John D. Ramage, *Rhetoric: A User's Guide*. New York: Pearson, 2006. 1.

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